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This dissertation investigates why in the early 1950s the Chinese Communist 
Party launched the agricultural cooperative movement, a movement that in many 
crucial ways resembled earlier collectivization in the Soviet Union. Past research has 
treated China’s cooperative movement as a campaign imposed from above by Mao 
Zedong. By refocusing scholarly attention from the center to the localities, this 
dissertation discovers that in its early stage this movement had a measure of strong 
social support from below. Not denying Mao’s dominant role, this dissertation 
examines the roles of others who were not at the top of the party’s hierarchy. It shows 
how certain cadres at the provincial and prefectural levels first provided Mao Zedong 
with inspiration, evidence, and even theories, and finally succeeded in convincing him 
to endorse their plans. Refuting the conventional wisdom that takes this movement as 
a pre-determined one, this dissertation contends that it was the outcome of a complex 
combination of ideology, circumstances, domestic politics, and personal ambitions.  
In addition to highlighting institutional uncertainty and fluidity, this dissertation 
also studies the complex interplay between the state’s central planning and peasants as 
agents. Peasants were not simply the receptacle of policies formulated at the highest 
levels of power: they were always seeking to adapt to local conditions the directives 
that higher authorities sent down. By studying the cooperative movement at a key 
experimental site - - Changzhi prefecture in Shanxi province from 1950 to 1953, this 
dissertation explores the process of mass mobilization in the province and villages.  
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Introduction 
In late 1953 the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter as the CCP or as the party) 
launched a nation-wide cooperative movement (building agricultural producers’ 
cooperatives), a movement that in many crucial respects resembled collectivization in 
the Soviet Union.1 The cooperativization movement reached its “high tide” in 1
was completed in 1956, and ultimately led to the utopian commune movemen
The initial cooperativization movement began the process of putting an end to the
customary private peasant economy that had lasted in China for thousands of years by
promoting cooperative (semi-socialist) and then fully collective (socialist) ways of life 
for peasants. By the late 1950s the drive had ended with the most severe famine in 
human history. Surprisingly, however, the earliest origins of this calamity are poorly 
understood. 
955-56, 
t of 1958. 
 
 
                                                       
Research on China’s cooperativization movement, in English, has mostly focused 
on its high tide of autumn 1955-spring 1956. In 1966, a ten-year retrospective on 
China’s collectivization, commissioned by Roderick MacFarquhar，Kenneth Walker 
conducted a ten-year retrospective.2 In the following decade, Thomas Bernstein 
published several important articles comparing the features of China’s 
cooperativization and Soviet collectivization, with much attention given to the high 
tide.3 His overall evaluation of China’s cooperativization might have been overly 
 
1 Gao Huamin, Nongye hezuoua yundong shimo (The history of the agricultural collectivization 
movement) (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 1999) 
2 Kenneth R. Walker, “Collectivization in retrospect: the ‘socialist high tide’ of autumn 1955-spring 
1956,” The China Quarterly, no 26 (1966): 1-43. 
3 Thomas Bernstein, “Keeping the revolution going: problems of village leadership after land reform,” 
The China Quarterly, no 36 (1968): 1-22; “Stalinsim, famine, and Chinese peasants” Theory and 
Society no 13 (1984): 339-377; “Leadership and mass mobilization in the Soviet and Chinese 
collectivization campaigns of 1929-30 and 1955-56: a comparison,” The China Quarterly, no 31 (1969): 
1-47. 
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optimistic, judging by recently available sources, but it is remarkable how many of his 
sharp observations still stand today. In 1993, Frederick Teiwes published a 
documentary collection on the high tide.4 Most recently, in 2006, The China Q
published a special mini-section under the headline “high tide symposium” to 
reevaluate the high tide event in retrospect, with contributions by several prominent 
scholars.
uarterly 
                                                       
5 
With almost exclusive focus on the high tide, most scholars assume that 
agricultural development between 1949-55 was a positive phase, that Chinese leaders 
planned and initiated the cooperativization movement from the center to serve 
industrialization and that the cooperativization went along smoothly until the turn of 
1955-56. As Christopher Howe put it in 2006, “the judgment now is that the 
movement of co-operatives was a success, but that the accelerated shift in early 1956 
to the higher level collectives was a huge mistake.”6 With few exceptions,7 from a 
long-term development perspective which the contemporary CCP leaders headed by 
Mao Zedong seemed to be lacking, western scholars have generally regarded the 
cooperativization as China’s primitive accumulation for industrialization which was 
“created to ease implementation the nationalization of grain market [Tonggou 
tongxiao].”8  
In the study of China’s cooperativization, economists and political scientists, not 
historians, have made important contributions. Economists mostly focus on evaluating 
 
4 Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun eds., The Politics of Agricultural Cooperativization In China 
(New York: An East Gate Book, 1993) 
5 The China Quarterly, (Septmeber, 2006). 
6 Christopher Howe, “China’s high tide of socialism of 1955: strategic choices and paths not taken, 
some changing perspectives ,” The China Quarterly, (September, 2006): 756. 
7 Thomas Bernstein is one of them. Thirty years ago, he pointed out that primitive accumulation was 
not the CCP’s main aim of agricultural collectivization, he also underscored the fact that in the early 
1950s the party was losing its control over local cadres.  
8 Y. Y. Kueh, “Mao and agriculture in China’s industrialization: three antitheses in a 50-year 
perspective,” The China Quarterly, (Septmeber, 2006): 707. 
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China’s cooperativization with respect to its contributions to China’s industrialization 
and modernization; political scientists mainly try to explain the relative lack of 
resistance during China’s cooperativization campaign.9 Consequently, the beginning 
of the cooperativization movement tends to be treated as a fact that should be taken for 
granted not a historical process in a specific context. Scholars ask and answer the 
question “why did the cooperativization go wrong in 1955 and what were its 
influences?” not the question, “how did it start in 1953?” Looking back they have 
placed the cooperativization movement under China’s strategy of industrialization and 
analyzed it at a macroscopic level. In general, they have regarded the 
cooperativization as a predetermined development and adopted a top down approach 
with exclusive focus on central leaders, particularly Mao Zedong. 
 From the economic perspective, quite a few Chinese scholars hold similar views. 
Lin Yifu, a leading economist in China, explicitly regarded the cooperativization 
movement as China’s primitive accumulation for industrialization.10 Wen Tiejun 
explained the cooperativization movement as the vehicle for the nationalization of the 
grain market policy of 1953, believing that the state grain department was incapable of 
forcing peasants to sell surplus grain to the state.11 With more access to Chinese 
archives, Chinese historians have conducted major research on the course of the 
cooperativization movement. 
In Chinese-language studies, five monographs are dedicated to China’s 
agricultural cooperativization movement. With some special access to the party 
archives, Gao Huamin carefully examines this movement from the beginning to the 
                                                        
9 Thomas Bernstein; Yu Liu, “Why did it go so high? Political mobilization and agricultureal 
collectivization in China,” The China Quarterly, (Septmeber, 2006): 732-742. 
10 Lin Yifu, Cai (Rifang) and Lizhou, Zhongguo de qiji (China’s miracle) (Shanghai: Sanlian 
chubanshe, 1999). 
11 Wen Tiejun, Zhongguo nongcun jiben jingji zhidu yanjiu (Research on the basic economic principles 
in Chinese countryside) (Beijing: Zhongguo jingji chubanshe, 2000). 
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end and compares China’s agricultural cooperativization movement with Soviet 
collectivization. Acknowledging some differences in operations, he convincingly 
argues that in essence China’s agricultural cooperativization movement was 
fundamentally the same as the Soviet collectivization. Gao Huamin also tries to 
evaluate the historical role of this movement and answer the question why it went 
wrong in 1955. Constrained by the limited extent to which the party history is allowed 
to be criticized, Gao Huamin justifies the movement as whole, especially how it began. 
He does not challenge the theory of cooperativization. Mainly concerned with high 
politics, this book is rather weak in narrating what happened to peasants and how 
peasants reacted to the policy.12 Du Runsheng, a senior party official who had 
personally participated and for a while led the cooperatiziation movement, edited a 
huge volume on China’s cooperativization movement in the 20th century. This volume 
is a thorough collection of abundant documents based on its authoritative access to the 
central party archives. However, this volume is even more constrained by political 
correctness and essentially aims to defend the cooperativization movement. While it 
serves as a wonderful sourcebook, it fails to analyze the documents it has collected.13 
Xing Leqin focuses on the high politics and provides rather limited new analyses of 
the movement.14 Luo Pinghan pays more attention to the high tide and his research is 
relatively weak on how the cooperativization started.15 In 2006 Ye Yangbing p
the latest monograph on the cooperativization movement. Based on a large number of 
local archives and newly published party documents, Ye presents in detail how this 
movement fluctuated over the years and how peasants reacted to it. This book so far is 
ublished 
                                                        
12 Gao Huamin, Nongye hezuoua yundong shimo. 
13 Du Runsheng, Dangdai zhongguo de nongye hezuo zhi (Contemporary China’s agricultural 
cooperative system) (Beijing: Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe, 2002). 
14 Xing Leqin, 20 shiji 50 niandai zhongguo nongye hezuohua yundong yanjiu (Research on China’s 
Agricultural cooperativization movement in the 1950s) (Zhejiang: Zhejiang daxue chubanshe, 2003). 
15 Luo Pinghan, Nongye hezuohua yundong shi (History of agricultural cooperativization) (Fujian: 
Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2004). 
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the most comprehensive study of the topic. With so diverse archives from different 
regions across China, Ye Yangbing includes an exhaustive study on peasants’ reactions,
but does not well grasp the rhythms of the movement. Moreover, solely focusing on
the movement, Ye overlooks how this movement interacted with other major politic
issues in China. Like the above four scholars, Ye also had to justify the 
cooperativazition as a whole as correct.
 
 
al 
                                                       
16  
Compared with western scholars, Chinese historians have provided much more 
details of the operation of the movement. However, in the 1980s the party’s own 
interpretation, Resolution on Certain Questions in The History of Our Party Since The 
Founding of The People’s Republic of China (hereafter as the Resolution), concluded 
that 1949-1952 was a good time, that in 1953 the party made a wise and careful 
decision of launching the cooperativization, and that prior to 1955 peasants supported 
the movement.17 Confined by China’s domestic censorship and the conventional 
wisdom, Chinese scholars cannot cross the line set by the Resolution to critically 
analyze the beginning of the movement. They have to defend the policy as a whole 
and settle for the party’s conclusions. As a result, although Chinese scholars approach 
the subject differently than western scholars do, they have reached a similar 
conclusion as the western scholars that the cooperativization movement was a 
well-planned policy and up to 1955 it was a success. 
In summary, the beginning of China’s cooperativization movement has not been 
as carefully examined as the high tide which is believed a dramatic turning point. Past 
research has mostly treated the beginning as a well planned policy which was imposed 
from above by Mao Zedong. However, a close reading of contemporary documents 
 
16 Ye Yangbing, Zhongguo nongye hezuohua yundong yanjiu (Research on China’s agricultural 
cooperativization movement) (Beijing: Zhishi chanquan chubanshe, 2006). 
17 Central Committee of CCP, Guanyu jianguo yilai dang de ruogan lishi wenti de jueyi (Resolution 
on certain questions in the history of our party since the founding of the People’s Republic of China) 
(Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983). 
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reveals that this movement was far from a central plan. It originated in 1950 with 
regional leaders who cared little about primitive accumulation for industrialization. As 
early as 1952, many rash tendencies that were observed in the high tide already 
occurred, but have escaped scholars’ attention. By shifting our scholarly attention from 
the center to the locality, we can discover that in its early experimental stage this 
movement had a measure of strong social support from cadres of different levels and 
was far more complex than any imaginary central plan imposed by Mao. This 
dissertation examines the process of making cooperativization in the early 1950s, 
which I will argue was a complex combination of ideology, circumstances, 
contingencies, domestic politics, and personal ambitions. It also shows that from the 
very beginning this movement was not smooth. Peasants’ reactions rarely tallied with 
the CCP’s expectations; once the CCP tried to tune up, excesses occurred and peasants 
tended to resist passively. 
The key question for this dissertation is why the CCP ultimately chose Stalin’s 
model, which had taken Soviet peasants into decades of hunger and suffering. In 
addition to it, there are some “big” questions in my mind I like to explore through this 
project. This dissertation does not aim at answering those questions, rather it intends to 
raise them and hopefully to address some points. 
Soviet models 
The first question is to what degree the Soviet models had impacted China. The 
first generation of scholars in the United States depicted China as the Soviet Union’s 
puppet, an argument that has been largely disproved by archival research. Reacting 
against such cold war ideology, revisionists have emphasized the uniqueness of 
China’s history and downplayed the Soviet influence. However, many parallels 
between the Soviet Union and China should not be dismissed as coincidences. How 
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should we understand the Soviet influence on China? This dissertation will show the 
deep impact of the Soviet models as well as the subjective role of Chinese leaders in 
selecting and making use of the Soviet models. It will highlight the complexities of the 
various Soviet models and examine how foreign models of rural economic 
organization were introduced to the CCP. Contrary to conventional wisdom, my view 
is that Stalin’s collectivization model was not the one favored in China in 1949. After 
several rounds of internal struggles and interactions between the center and the 
localities, Stalin’s model did not become dominant in China until 1953 
In the 1970s, Moshe Lewin made a breakthrough in research on Soviet 
collectivization and on Bukharin who in the 1920s raised what was later called 
“market socialism” as an alternative approach to the long path of transition to 
socialism (some vaguely considered, distant millennium).18 After it, this alternative 
model has been applied by other historians to other socialist countries. Peter Nolan, for 
example, used this model to analyze post-Mao China.19 Chapter 1 discovers that in 
China Bukharin’s approach had been, indeed, valued and even implemented for a short 
period in the late 1940s and early 1950s. But it did not work out very well. This 
dissertation does not intend to explore the question of why Bukharin’s approach failed 
in China, but merely to highlight the fact that it was applied in China, and as in the 
Soviet Union, it was abandoned rather quickly and was eventually replaced by Stalin’s 
model. 
Intra-party relations 
In research on party history, scholars still dwell excessively on rigid hierarchies 
                                                        
18 Moshe Lewin, Russian Peasants and Soviet Power – A Study of Collectivization (New York. London: 
W W Norton & Company, 1975). 
19 Peter Nolan, The Political Economy of Collective Farms: Analysis of China’s post-Mao rural 
reforms (Boulder: Polity Press, 1988). 
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and strict control from above. However, at least the immediate aftermath of the 
founding of the People’s Republic (1949-1953) was a time of uncertainty and fluidity. 
The CCP leaders, in the course of adapting to their new role as rulers of the nation, 
constantly asked themselves “Why should we adopt this kind of policy and not 
another?” The long term goal was a wealthy and powerful socialist nation, but no one 
possessed definitive knowledge of the exact nature of the first step. The only 
unchallengeable authority in the party, Mao Zedong, did not articulate his vision. The 
rest of party leaders discussed, debated and clashed on various policies, and worked 
tirelessly to woo Mao. Political luminaries at all levels sought to define their new 
political positions and fought with each other to demarcate their zones of influence, 
while the Central Committee struggled to establish its authority with respect to 
national issues and to extend its control down to the local level. Hierarchies were in 
the process of being reconfigured. Under such circumstances, specific policies could 
be rather easily cobbled together by local actors far from the party center in Beijing in 
order to deal with local realities. And individuals, even those of relatively low rank, 
could on occasion make a significant impact on the region and even the nation. This 
reality is not well understood in much of the scholarly literature.  
Not denying Mao’s dominant role, this dissertation explores the roles of others 
who were not at the top of the party’s hierarchy. This dissertation will discuss a case in 
which a provincial politician not only challenged Liu Shaoqi, second only to Mao in 
the party’s chain of command, but actually succeeded in having his agenda promoted 
across the entire nation. It will take a different angle by focusing on the interplay 
between the center and local, between the state and peasants. It was only after several 
rounds of interaction between the center and the localities that Stalin’s model became 
dominant in China in 1953. All of this is closely connected to the difficulties that the 
CCP faced as it attempted to rule the countryside after 1949 and to the political strains 
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associated with the Korean War. This dissertation will analyze the interplay between 
the top leaders and local cadres. In the movement’s early stage, Mao was pushed by 
lower-level officials. He did not do the pushing. Certain provincial and prefectural 
cadres provided Mao with inspiration, evidence, and sometimes even the theories that 
caused Mao to endorse the movement. Chapter 2 explores a political situation in 
which Mao Zedong was presented with well-documented reports that convinced him 
of the effectiveness and popularity of agricultural producers’ cooperatives, reports that 
were manufactured and shaped to suggest that they were consistent with the voice and 
will of the peasants. Deeply influenced by cases at the provincial and local levels, in 
late 1951 Mao Zedong prepared to start the mutual aid and cooperation movement. 
This dissertation will probe how the truth was twisted step by step in the party reports. 
Party-peasant relations 
The Chinese revolution led by the CCP is widely considered to have been a 
peasant revolution. The dazzling victory of the CCP over the Nationalist Party in 1949 
is often regarded as evidence of how well the CCP knew Chinese peasants, how 
skilled it was in mobilizing them and of how extensively the peasants supported the 
party. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (hereafter as the CPSU), by contrast, 
is well known for its extraordinarily difficult relationship with the peasants. Yet, in the 
early 1950s knowing about the Soviet party’s weakness on peasant issues, the CCP 
eventually chose to adopt the Soviet strategy in rural China. Have scholars 
overestimated the CCP’s capacity for dealing with peasants? Have scholars 
overlooked certain characteristics of the CCP’s relationships with peasants? Bearing 
those questions in mind, chapter 1 will briefly sort out CCP-peasant relations before 
1949. 
The Party’s relationship with poor peasants is of particular interest to me. It has 
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been widely accepted, as the party has universally claimed, that the poor, especially 
poor peasants, were the most reliable ally of the party. However, such an alliance was 
often easily broken in the face of difficulties in the real world. At the outset of the 
CCP’s revolution, the party was compelled to reply on the support of the elite and 
floating population, the upper and lower strata of the rural population. Later in the war 
the CCP deliberately appointed poor peasants as the ranks and files of civil and 
military cadres.20 
Generational rather than class cleavages appear to have been the most decisive 
criterion in accounting for individual decisions to join the party or the revolution.21 
Landless laborers were neither more revolutionary nor more progressive than poor and 
middle peasants, mainly out of a concern for economic security. Likewise, poor 
peasants did not rush in greater proportion than middle peasants into wholehearted 
cooperation and activism. After 1949, peasants’ genuine response to the party’s policy 
exhibit striking continuities with their behavioral patterns of war time. For example, 
the youth tended to support the party’s radical policies while the elderly were often the 
most skeptical group.22 My findings suggest that in the early 1950s in many issues 
poor peasants were far from being a reliable ally of the party. It was not rare that 
middle peasants, occasionally rich peasants and former landlord, better complied with 
the party’s policies. For example, in organizing peasants into mutual aid teams and 
agricultural producers’ cooperatives, the party, both at the center and the local level, 
anticipated that poor peasants were the most sustained supporters. However, as the 
dissertation will show, when pursuing profits was allowed and remained possible, 
                                                        
20 Lucien Bianco, “Peasant responses to CCP Mobilization Policies, 1937 – 1945” in Tony Saich and 
Hans van de Ven eds., New Persectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution (New York: M.E.Sharpe, 
Inc, 1995), 176. 
21 Lucien Bianco, “Peasant responses to CCP Mobilization Policies, 1937 – 1945,” 181. 
22 Anita Chan, Richard Madsen and Jonathan Unger, Chen Village under Mao and Deng (Berkeley: 
University of Califoria Press, 1992) 
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middle peasants, instead of poor peasants, participated and took control of these 
organizations. Poor peasants rarely considered themselves as the ally of the party. 
When there was a sign of trouble in the mutual aid teams or cooperatives, poor 
peasants were the first ones who firmly claimed the right to withdraw. 
Field investigations in five villages of Changzhi prefecture in 1952 showed to the 
CCP that, after land reform, (former) rich peasants possessed no more land than 
average, but their unit yields were the highest in their villages. When inspecting the 
development of “exploitative” usury, the party was appalled to learn that usurers were 
not rich peasants, but middle peasants, party members, families of soldiers and 
disabled people. With their economic capability rich peasants could have been the ally 
of the party.23 However, the party was not ready to admit this fact. Instead, the party 
increasingly relied on the notion that ownership change would dramatically transform 
everything for the better. As Mao stated in 1954, “to solve the contradiction of 
agriculture’s backwardness, the first policy is to implement socialist revolution.”24  
Was the party’s incompetence in mobilizing poor peasants by moderate economic 
policies after 1949 an important factor that led it to employ more radical ones? When 
peasants maintained many of their old patterns, the role of the CCP switched from a 
challenger of the status quo to the status quo, a position a certain group of the party 
had not well accepted. For example, as Hartford convincingly shows, time after time, 
during the revolution, the party organizers found that the issue uniting a local 
community was a struggle against state authorities, likely state or quasi-state 
extraction from the countryside.25 After 1949, the party organizers themselves became 
                                                        
23 “Changzhi 15 ge cun ziben zhuyi qingxiang kaocha baogao” (Investigation on the development of 
capitalism in 15 villages of Changzhi), Shangxi Provincial Archive (hereafter as SPA). 
24 Christopher Howe, “China’s high tide of socialism of 1955: strategic choices and paths not taken, 
some changing perspectives,” 762. 
25 Kathleen Hartford, “Fits and Starts: the Communist Party in Rural Hebei, 1921-1936,” in Tony 
Saich and Hans van de Ven eds., New Persectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution, 166. 
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the state or quasi-state agents in the pursuit of extracting more resource from peasants. 
How could the party and its agents come to adopt to this new roles? Would peasants 
unite to resist the state extraction, as they did before 1949? Those were the imminent 
concerns for the policy-makers.  
Meanwhile, peasants were not simply victims of policies formulated at the 
highest levels of power. This dissertation will give voices to those in lower levels of 
society. Unlike the CCP’s ideal model of the peasantry, peasants were in fact a diverse 
social force - - people who had different ways of calculating life strategies, people 
who had various doubts about the state and its intentions. They often sought to adapt 
directives sent down from above. I offer a case study of early-stage coop formation at 
a key experimental site - - Changzhi prefecture, Shanxi province from 1950 to 1953. 
In doing so, I explore the process of mass mobilization from province to village, 
focusing on the complex interplay among the various levels of state organization.  
Taking Changzhi prefecture as an example, chapters 3-5 explore the fluctuations 
of mutual aid and cooperation movement between 1951 and 1953, with special 
attention given to the interplay among different levels of the party and the interplay 
between the party and peasants. Chapter 3 shows that when the mutual aid and 
cooperation movement was defined as an economic event and was carried out with 
little intervention from the party, peasants responded and turned the policy to their 
advantages. Moreover, chapter 4 discusses how peasants’ adaptations in turn caused 
the party to modify its plans. Chapter 4 shows when the mutual aid and cooperation 
movement was defined as a political event which aimed at constraining capitalism and 
was carried out under intense ideological pressures, how local cadres reacted and how 
peasants accommodated policies from above. Chapter 4 also exposes a variety of 
excesses that hurt peasants and severely reduced their incentives to farm the land. 
Chapter 5 shows how the center tried to remedy the situation by issuing the 
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rectification orders and how rural cadres tried to circumvent them. One point this 
chapter makes is that those rectification orders, undoubtedly made out of good 
intention, did not necessarily serve common peasants’ interests. Then in late 1953 a 
dramatic twist occurred when Mao Zedong managed to resume the mutual aid and 
cooperation movement and press it further. In the end, the party formally deployed 
China’s agricultural cooperativization campaign. 
To a certain degree, the earliest agricultural cooperatives were what the peasants 
and local officials made of them. To some extent, local cadres were able to circumvent 
the central policy. Their experimental activities, in turn, reoriented the thinking of 
higher-ranking cadres. 
Post-land reform 
Land reform had been the central policy of the CCP’s rural strategy. It had been 
indispensable for the party’s ultimate victory against the Nationalist Party. However, 
for both peasants and the CCP, land reform was not the end of the story. 
The CCP had universally announced that uneven distribution of land was the 
fundamental problem for Chinese peasants. Mao Zedong claimed that in China 
landlords and rich peasants together accounting for eight percent of the rural 
households, owning 70 to 80 percent of the land. This estimate was later made official 
by the party.26 Today, many scholars have proved Mao’s estimation of such uneven 
distribution was not the reality in most regions of China.27 Having overestimated the 
tenancy rate, the CCP held a basic assumption that landlords and rich peasants in the 
village had enough land to make all poor villagers into middle peasants if land were 
                                                        
26 Selected works of Mao Tse-tung IV, (Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1965), 164. 
27 For a research review on research of this subject, please refer to Liu Kexiang, “20 shiji 30 niandai 
tudi jieji fanpei zhuangkuang de zhengti kaocha he guji” (An overall investigation and estimation of the 
land and class distributions in the 1930s). 
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distributed to them. In this sense, the party believed, a successful land reform would 
make every peasant a middle peasant, owning sufficient means of production to 
support a household.28 However, the fundamental problem for Chinese peasants was 
not the uneven distribution, but the extremely low land-population ratio. As Tanaka 
Kyoko points out, “the simple truth was that there did not exist sufficient resources to 
create prosperous proprietor-farmers in near 100 per cent proportion to the total 
peasant population. Equal distribution was no solution.”29 In her calculation, in north 
China, if all the land owned by landlords and rich peasants were distributed, only 
about two-thirds of the total poor peasant families could become middle peasants. She 
provides us a formula that five mou per capita was agreed upon as necessary for a 
family’s self-sufficiency. 
The case study of Shanxi province that this dissertation will present is an example 
of the point. Shanxi province is located in north China. As statistics of 1888 show, 
peasant land owners (most of whom were considered middle peasants by the CCP) 
were the predominant majority of rural population. “The peasants who had no land 
were extremely rare; most farmers were small-land owners.” Among landlords, an 
average household planted 20-30 mou, and those who owned 50-100 mou were 
considered big businesses.30 Rural surveys in the 1930s suggest that owner-farmers 
who were able to live on their own land composed 57.67 percent of the total rural 
households; only 11.36 per cent of the total rural household had no land and were 
tenants.31 A survey of Taihang mountain area of 1942 suggests that in 1930s landlords 
and rich peasants owned 23 percent of arable land, while middle peasants owned 37 
per cent. After the “rent reduction and interest reduction” movement in 1941-42, 
                                                        
28 Tanaka Kyoko, “Mao and Liu in 1947 land reform: Allies or disputants?” The China Quarterly, no 
75 (1979): 590. 
29 Tanaka Kyoko, “Mao and Liu in 1947 land reform: Allies or disputants?” 
30 Shanxi tongzhi (History of Shanxi), 85. 
31 Shanxi tongzhi, 86. 
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landlords’ land proportion fell to 3.6 percent middle peasants’ land proportion rose to 
54.8 percent. Between 1946 and 1948, a radical land reform was conducted in the 
area32 in which land was nearly equally distributed among peasants. As investigations 
of Taihang mountain area show, on average, after the land reform, a middle peasant 
owned 3.5 mou land, a poor peasant owned 3.3 mou, while former landlord and rich 
peasant owned around 3 mou. According to Tanaka’s estimation, after land reform 
many peasants in Shanxi province could not make their livings merely on their land’s 
output. Income from sideline work was a significant portion needed for peasants’ 
survival. Local archives in Shanxi confirm this point. For example, a survey of 
Yaozizheng village of Changzhi prefecture of Shanxi suggests that after the land 
reform, average land per capita was 4.1 mou and average land output was 3.6 dan per 
capita, by which peasants could barely make ends meet.33  
Meanwhile, land reform anticipated a static state of equal distribution of land, 
which could not continue perpetually. After land reform, changes did arise, many of 
which were regarded as threats by the party, as chapter 2 will discuss. On the other 
hand, theoretically land reform departed from the then-popular theory advocating 
large-scale production in agriculture. Between 1945-49, the idea of industrialization of 
agriculture and building cooperatives had become the main trend in agricultural theory, 
both within and outside the party, although it was only sporadically put into practice.34 
Ironically, it was anti-CCP contemporaries who were acutely conscious of the fact that 
land reform was not the end of the party’s rural policy.35 Having not given careful 
                                                        
32 Tanaka argues that one reason for the land reform getting more and more radical between 1946-48 
was that the party overestimated land owned by landlords and rich peasants so the party kept pushing 
them when they actually did not have any extra land. Cheng Yung-fa well examines the role of war 
mobilization during this movement, as will be discussed in chapter 1. 
33 “Changzhi diweiqu jieshu tugai qingkuang” (Situations of Changzhi prefecture’s completion of land 
reform), JCA.  
34 Miao Xinyu, Jianguo qian 30 nian zhongguo nongye fazhan sixiang (China’s agricultural 
development thoughts 1919 – 1949) (unpublished dissertation, 1997, Fudan University). 
35 Dong Shijin, Lun gongchandang de tudi gaige (On the CCP’s land reform) (Hong Kong: Ziyou 
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thought to post-land reform and having made no preventive plans, the party had to 
face quite a few unpleasant facts and make quick, often not so thoughtful, decisions to 
remedy the situations. In this process, Shanxi province played important roles, partly 
because of its leaders’ political ambitions and the agenda for socialism, partly because 
of the fact that it was a region which did not fit the party’s high tenancy estimation, yet 
first completed land reform and so first faced the post-land reform rural problems. 
Sources and Methodology 
In the research for this dissertation, besides consulting readily available published 
materials such as collections of documents, memoirs, biographies and old newspapers, 
I have relied on two key sets of sources. One set is Neibu cankao (Internal reference), 
a multivolume collection of reports written by Xinhua wire-service reporters from 
1950 to the 1960s. These reporters were instructed to describe the real conditions in 
the country at the time and produced candid studies that were read only by 
high-ranking CCP leaders. The CCP leaders in Beijing relied heavily on these reports 
to find out what happened in various regions of China. For example, Mao Zedong 
frequently read them and occasionally made comments on them. Scholars agree that 
prior to 1956 the reports published in Neibu cankao generally were accurate. The 
value of these reports lies not only in their reflections of social reality but also in their 
indication of what the CCP leaders had as a basis for their understanding of China at 
the time. For these reasons, these documents are invaluable for historians. 
 The other important set of sources comes from archival materials in local 
archives of various levels, especially in Shanxi province. In local archives, materials 
are usually categorized and filed as either published or unpublished documents. The 
published documents generally were locally published, internally circulated, and made 
                                                                                                                                                                
chubanshe, 1950). 
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available only to select groups of leaders at the time. A good example is Zhonggong 
zhongyang Huabei ju zhongyao wenjian huibian (Collections of important documents 
of the North China Bureau of the CCP). Those published documents are readily 
accessible to the public now.  
The unpublished documents in archives consist of original materials, handwritten 
or typed, and were filed by topic. Some of them discuss sensitive cases involving 
deaths and personal information, and these are labeled “nei kong” (internally 
controlled) and are not accessible at all. The other non- “nei kong” archives are 
supposedly accessible to scholars, yet in reality access ultimately depends on 
archivists’ moods. 
In my research, four types of archival materials are important. One type is 
statistics and registrations; one is cables and directives exchanged among different 
levels of local government; one is bottom-up reports from “insiders” in villages, 
districts, counties, prefectures, and provinces; one is top-down investigation reports 
prepared by investigation teams, whose members often came from outside the places 
that they were investigating. As the dissertation will demonstrate, reports did not 
always reflect social realities. But in general, the lower the level at which documents 
were drafted, the more reliable they were. Of course, local cadres tended to exaggerate 
their successes and present their accomplishment in a positive light. But in the subject 
under examination, for years the North China Bureau did not passively accept these 
reports at the face value in Shanxi Province and Changzhi prefecture, and routinely 
sent work teams to conduct investigations. Occasional the Bureau’s investigators went 
to the opposite extreme by concentrating exclusively on mistakes and mismanagement. 
Nevertheless, when read in conjunction with local government’s own reports, those 
materials in local archives provide a comprehensive basis for documenting the 
interplay between state officials and peasants.   
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This dissertation is based entirely on documentary sources, it does not rely on 
oral history. Undoubtedly, interviewing peasants and contemporary officials would be 
a healthy supplement to the research, and I hope I will have the opportunity to conduct 
such interviews in the future.36 For this reason, peasants’ voices, as quoted and 
discussed in this dissertation, should be understood as coming from official documents 
where they were recorded by officials for presentation to the decision makers of the 
party. 
This dissertation heavily draws on a case study of Changzhi prefecture in Shanxi. 
As chapter 2 will discuss, certain Shanxi provincial leaders and Changzhi prefects 
played decisive roles in steering the party towards cooperativization. Changzhi 
prefecture was the pioneer of the cooperativization movement. China’s first ten 
experimental agricultural producers’ cooperatives were built in Changzhi; rules set by 
Changzhi prefects later became the standard practices across the nation; certain 
cooperatives in Changzhi were widely regarded as national models. More importantly, 
before Changzhi started the experiments, no one knew what an agricultural producers’ 
cooperative was and how to operate it. To a certain degree, the earliest agricultural 
producers’ cooperatives were what the peasants and local officials made of them. Their 
experimental activities, in turn, reoriented the thinking of higher-ranking cadres. But 
after late 1952, when the political pressure was getting more intense and regulations 
getting more fixed, the institutional fluidity of the early experimental stage faded away. 
In this sense, the case of Changzhi shows the process of how fluid policies became 
solidified. 
                                                        
36 Rural investigations by Philip Huang and Wu Yi show that peasants had very vague memories of the 
cooperativization movement. Sun Liping also confirms that, in doing oral history, “land reform is easy 
(for peasants) to talk about, cooperativization is quite difficult to talk about.”Ye Yangbing, Zhongguo 
nongye hezuohua yundong yanjiu, 23. Sun Liping, “Guocheng-shijian fenxi yu dangdai 
zhongguo-nongmin guanxi” (Analysis on process-event and contemporary China’s state-peasant 
relations), online http://www.sociology.cass.cn.  
 
 18
 19
Changzhi is an old liberated region where the party had deep roots at the village 
level. As pioneers of the mutual aid and cooperation movement, cadres of Shanxi 
province, from the provincial level to the county level of certain areas, might have 
contributed more to the movement than did most other counties and provinces in 
China. To this extent, the case of Shanxi was not typical. To supplement it, I briefly 
introduce some examples from Sichuan province, a region liberated in 1950 where the 
party’s control over villages was relative weak, to demonstrate the differences as well 
as similarities in the implementations of the policies in a newly liberated area 
compared to Shanxi. It is difficult to present a comprehensive description of the 
movement across the entire nation and this dissertation does not intend to do so. 
Instead of providing wide geographical coverage, this dissertation concentrates on 
probing deeply into all levels of the state within a limited area, and it shows how 
easily breakdowns in communications occurred at every level.         
 
Chapter 1  Choosing from Soviet models 
To begin the exploration of the decision making of China’s agricultural 
cooperativization movement between 1949-53. This chapter will introduce the settings 
in 1949, with the focus given to how Soviet ideas on the peasant economy were 
conceptualized and used in China. 
To comprehend the CCP’s peasant policy after 1949, it is essential to examine the 
nature of the CCP’s relationship with peasants before 1949, a relationship I argue 
ended up restricting the CCP’s ability to cope with peasant issues. Scholars are 
challenging conventional ideas that assume the CCP’s unconditional success among 
peasants before 1949 and that accept the CCP’s claim of always caring about peasants’ 
interests.1 Acknowledging the continuity of peasants’ behavior patterns and the CCP’s 
perceptions of peasants, this chapter first examines certain characteristics of the CCP 
which, in my view, made it fairly receptive to Stalin’s collectivization model. 
Considering Mao Zedong’s paramount role in Chinese revolution and later  his 
dominance on peasant issues, this chapter starts with a reexamination of his 
relationship with peasants. 
Mao Zedong, the CCP and the rural economy in the early years 
Mao Zedong was a man of controversy, and so was his relationship with peasants. 
                                                        
1 New research finds that the CCP-peasant wartime alliance was unequal. In addition of voluntary 
support a minority of peasants, the CCP obtained a grudging acquiescence from the majority. Benton 
argues that Chinese peasants’ capacity for endurance was striking in prewar time and during war time, 
and to a large degree it continued after 1949. CCP’s deep penetration of rural society after 1949 made it 
even harder for peasants to resist. See Gregor Benton, Mountain Fires: The Red Army’s Three-Year War 
in South China, 1934-1938 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Lucien Bianco, “Peasant 
Responses to CCP Mobilization Policies, 1937-1945” in Tony Saich and Hans van de Ven eds., New 
Perspectives on The Chinese Communist Revolution (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc,1995). 
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In terms of identity, although he frequently claimed to be of his peasant origin and 
maintained many peasant habits through his life, consistently elaborating on his deep 
affinity with peasants, Mao never identified himself as a farmer and never wanted to 
be one. In his early years, as with many other educated young people, he considered 
peasants to represent the most backward and benighted part of Chinese society.2 In 
terms of knowledge, Mao clearly regarded himself as an authority on peasant issues 
and believed he knew peasants well, probably even better than peasants knew 
themselves. However, this kind of authority should be qualified. Mao was born and 
raised in a peasant family, but he did not learn to be a farmer and never aimed to be. 
He nearly spent almost no time in acquiring farming skill. As Mao matured, he came 
to loathe the life of rural drudgery and fought for a chance to advance his education in 
a nearby city. In the writings of his early years, he concerned himself with urban 
issues.3 
After being converted to Marxism in 1921--as Mao himself claimed so--Mao 
mainly focused on organizing urban workers. As with other comrades, for years he had 
ignored the Comintern’s directions encouraging the CCP to forge a strong relationship 
with peasants. Mao had no strong faith in peasants’ potential for a revolution since he 
considered peasant revolts only capable of producing a new emperor but never a new 
system.4 Only when he retreated to Shaoshan in 1925 did Mao first note the 
revolutionary power of the peasantry. Mao started to convince himself and his 
comrades that a Chinese revolution could only succeed when “it was able to mobilize 
the huge, untapped reservoir of peasant discontent against the classes which oppressed 
them.”5 But he did not explain why and how, at this time, Chinese peasants were 
                                                        
2 Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong Zaoqi Wengao (Collections of Mao’s Writings in Early years) (Hunan: 
Hunan Renmin chubanshe, 1990). 
3 Jung Chang and Jon Hallidays, Mao: The Unknown Story (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005), 9. 
4 Philip Short, Mao: A Life (New York: Herry Holt and Company, LLC, 1999), 152.  
5 Philip Short, Mao: A Life, 155.  
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suddenly capable of creating something more than an emperor. It is important to note 
that at the same time Mao was lamenting the loss of his “glorious years” as a 
passionate student who believed he could solve all of China’s problems. He now was 
aware that he had to think and act as a pragmatic adult. Does this mean that by then, 
Mao had given up the ideal of “helping the people” and turned to the practice of 
“leading the people?” Mao did not provide us a straightforward answer. But what is 
clear is that from this point on, what concerned him most was how to find a way to 
lead the people. 
In the next two years, while residing in urban areas, Mao devoted himself to 
training peasant organizers. He began to theorize about the significance of peasants to 
the Chinese revolution by “weaving together the principle of working-class leadership 
and his conviction that the fate of the Chinese revolution ultimately depended on what 
happened in the countryside.”6 He was regarded as a specialist on peasant issues in 
both the CCP and the Nationalist Party. In January and early February 1927 Mao 
embarked on one month-long journey across five rural counties in Hunan province to 
survey peasant movements. This trip resulted with his landmark “Report on the 
Peasant Movement in Hunan.” The superficial experience in Hunan countryside would 
accompany Mao Zedong all his life and laid the groundwork for Mao’s diagnosis of 
the problems of Chinese peasants.7 To a certain degree, Mao imagined what a Chinese 
peasant should be like based on what he saw during this investigation. Here it is 
necessary to observe one of Mao’s methodologies. He always preferred to investigate 
one place in depth rather than to make superficial studies of large areas.8 From a 
specific case study he would draw lessons and find solutions, then tended to apply 
them to much broader areas, even to the whole country. This method could be 
                                                        
6 Stuart Schram, The Thought Of Mao Tse-Tung (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 41. 
7 Short, Mao: A Life, 174. 
8 Short, Mao: A Life, 304. 
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dangerous because conditions varied dramatically in different areas of China: there 
was hardly a solution that could fit all areas. 
Moreover, the lessons Mao learned in Hunan were twisted. Mao commenced this 
investigation with a specific purpose: to locate peasants in the center of the Chinese 
revolution. This purpose predisposed him to interpret the turbulence caused by the 
ongoing North Expedition War as the revolutionary nature of the peasants.9 Because 
of this purpose, the only standard in Mao’s analysis was how revolutionary a certain 
group could be and Mao concluded that the vanguard and heroes in the coming 
revolution were poor peasants who were “the most responsive to the Communist Party 
leadership.”10 To what degree Mao’s assertion reflected the reality is a subject of 
debate. Latest research finds that “Revolutionary seeds were not found in greater 
proportion among poorer than among better-off peasants.”11 
Because of Mao’s self-identity and his deep devotion to the Chinese revolution, 
Mao never saw peasants just as farmers who were of diverse personalities and entitled 
to their own lives, but as a part of the Chinese revolution. Further, the issues Mao 
focused on in any given period were quite selective in accordance with the practical 
needs of that time. Thus, in respects that Mao was less interested in, his knowledge 
was considerately limited. The peasant economy was one of them. 
With newly-obtained Marxist knowledge, Mao’s analysis of the peasant economy 
was rather simple. He only regarded planting crops as the productive labor and 
categorized  management of a farm and trading as exploitation which should be 
eliminated. Mao seemed unable or unwilling to appreciate the dynamic of rural 
                                                        
9 John Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker eds., The Cambridge History of China Cambridge vol. 13 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 301-306. 
10 Mao Zedong, “Hunan nongmin yundong kaocha baogao” (Report on an iInvestigation of the peasant 
movement in Hunan), online, retrieve from 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_2.htm 
11 Lucien Bianco, “Peasant responses to CCP Mobilization Policies, 1937 – 1945,”176.  
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prosperity. He took a hostile attitude towards debt and credit relations. In his mind, 
debts were mostly the exploitation of usury. Prior to 1948, Mao even insisted that all 
debts among peasants should be abolished.12 Partly because of Mao’s aspiration for 
the “Great Harmony” (Da Tong), partly because of the communism ideology, Mao 
held antipathy against rich people and chose to downplay their roles in the rural 
economy. Mao Zedong was not alone in applying such kind of narrow calculations. 
Many other CCP leaders held quite the similar criteria. Thus, Mao and his colleagues, 
who did not fully comprehend the dynamic of rural prosperity were easily tempted to 
pursue an easy and short way to control the rural economy. Such a position left them 
receptive to straightforward yet extremely simplified theories such as collectivization. 
Sadly, for a long time the CCP needed not to ponder on rural economy issues: its 
special method of extracting resources allowed it to overlook rural productivity in its 
peasant mobilization plan and tended to treat the rural economy as simply as possible. 
As a result, the CCP leaders did not possess adequate experience to sense the damages 
collectivization might generate. 
As it was for all of its rivals, extracting resources was indispensable for its 
survival. Unlike most of them, however, the CCP did not rely on regular extraction 
methods such as taxes. For a while, there were no such concepts as taxation in the 
CCP’s idea of a “good government.” As a CCP directive explicitly stated, “The 
financial source of Chinese Soviet is fundamentally different from landlords and 
capitalists. We place the burden upon those ‘exploiters.’ In the revolutionary era, the 
main financial source should be the confiscation of the property of exploiters and 
enemies.”13 
                                                        
12 Wen Rui, Mao Zedong shiye zhong de zhongguo nongmin wenti (The problems of Chinese peasants 
in Mao Zedong’s view) (Nanchang: Jiangxi Renmin Chubanshe, 2004), 47-51. 
13 Huang Zhenglin, Shan-Gan-Ning bianqu shehui jingji shi (1937-1945) (Social and economic history 
of the Shan-Gan-Ning base area (1937-1945)) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2006), 185. 
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At the early stage of the revolution, quite a few of measures of Soviet war 
communism were adopted. For example, collective farms were built up. In 1928, in a 
small base area in east Hunan, a semi-commune was established, “all land is to be 
collectivized, cattle, pigs, sheep, ducks, fertilizers and ploughs are all collectively 
used.”14 A farming committee was set up to arrange production and living affairs, a 
working sheet was scheduled in details for peasants from 6 am to 5 pm. Before this 
commune bred any fruit (or aftermath), the CCP was driven out of the area by the 
Nationalist Party. The practice of building communes continued in newly acquired 
base areas. By the end of 1929, the harm of this practice had been so apparent and 
disturbing, one prefecture head Wang Shoudao suggested the Central Committee of 
the CCP to abolish it. He said, “At the present stage, peasants’ preoccupation with the 
private ownership was unbreakable. Adopting the collective farming often led to 
sabotage,” “led to the production reduction and the waste of land,” and “drove middle 
peasants and small capitalist to flee.”15 In 1930, in Huang’an county, another 
collective farm was established, land and all production materials were collectivized, 
wages and rations were issued. In the end, “peasants were hurt, property were 
damaged.”16 Aware of precedent failures, in 1931, the CCP formally prohibited 
building collective farms; peasants’ private ownership of land was acknowledged, land 
reform was carried out as the main form to “liberate” peasants.17 However, the party 
made it clear that “the key purpose of land reform is not to develop agricultural 
                                                        
14 Di er’ci guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi tudi geming wenxian xuanbian (Ducument Collections on 
the land revolution during the second civil war period) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao 
chubanshe, 1987), 68-69. 
15 Cao Jiansheng, “Tudi geming chuqi de ‘nongye jitihua’ wenti zaitan” (Comments on the agricultural 
collectivization issue in the outset of land revolution period), Zhongguo nongye hezuoshi ziliao, no 1 
(1992). 
16 Wang Xinguang, “Tudi geming chu qi de ‘nongye jitihua’ qingkuang” (Situation of the agricultural 
collectivization in the outset of land revolution period), Zhongguo nongye hezuoshi ziliao, no 2 (1990). 
17 Ye Yangbing, Zhongguo nongye hezuohua yundong yanjiu, 107-108. 
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production, but to ‘get’ people.’”18 In the 1930s, upon arriving in a new area, the CCP 
initiated land reform to reallocate land of the class enemies, including landlords and 
rich peasants, among the poor, 19 confiscated class enemies’ surplus property and 
abolished old taxes.  
As for the material supply of the party and is army – the Red Army, since the late 
1920s, battle captures and confiscation from class enemies had been the main 
source.20 After April 1930, economic conditions in the base areas deteriorated. To 
meet the need, on the one hand the party instructed the Red Army to expand outwards 
to collect more money; on the other hand it issued directives to levy taxes on lan
in practice the tax burden was redirected to merchants and rich people,
d. But 
 
conomy 
                                                       
21 and only
accounted for a very minor portion of the CCP’s total revenue.22 Luckily, when base 
areas were expanding, there were always available enemies’ property to be 
confiscated. 
In 1932 the Nationalist Party intensified its attack on the CCP’s base areas, the 
party had to relieve the Red Army from the commission of “collecting money” to fully 
concentrating on the battle ground. Immediately, the CCP government encountered 
with a revenue crisis. It decided to raise land tax rate, but revenue from taxation 
remained small. So the party issued “revolutionary war bonds” and launched 
“uncovering unregistered land movement” [Chatian yundong] to squeeze landlords 
and rich peasant.23 The needs were met temporarily, but in the long term, the e
 
18 Wang Zhangling, Gongdang wenti yanjiu, Taiwan, vol. 9, no 8. 
19 The CCP’s land reform policies varied in different periods and in different regions. Very roughly 
speaking, the party confiscated the land of landlords and rich peasants, often together with grain, 
livestock, and other property, then redistributed the land among the poor. 
20 Short, Mao: A Life, 231. 
21 Zhongguo nongmin fudan shi 3 ce (the History of Chinese Peasant Burden, vol 3) (Beijing: 
Zhongguo caizheng jingrong chubanshe, 1990), 71. 
22 Zhongguo nongmin fudan shi, 72. 
23 Chen Yung-fa, “Civil War, Mao Zedong and Land Revolution – Misjudgment or Political Strategy? 
Part 1,” in Ta Lu, series 92: 9-19. 
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was devastated. Running away became peasants’ popular response. When virtually n
landlords and only a few rich peasants were left, common peasants had to undertake 
the burden of supplying the CCP. In the summer and fall 1934, the party “borrowed”
grain and collected land taxes, twice, mainly from poor peasants. CCP officials then
noticed that bandits immediately spread over the “red” areas.
o 
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24 In the same year, the 
CCP launched the Long March – a legendary escape. Chinese scholar Li Ming points 
out that the Red Army had to leave base areas not mainly because of the military 
defeat against the Nationalist Party, but because of the economic collapse within the 
areas. The CCP’s economy was in nature an expansionist economy. When the Red 
Army was unable to keep extracting resources from the outside, it started to exhaust i
own economy inside. Soon the economy crashed.25 
In 1935, Mao and his followers arrived in northwest China and established the 
Shan-Gan-Ning base area. Again, “the party depended almost completely on fines, 
confiscations and the extralegal method of ‘attacking local gentry’ for revenue and left 
the ‘emancipated peasants’ largely to themselves.”26 When local confiscation failed to 
meet the needs, the party had to extend to neighboring areas. In 1936, presumably 
because of the supply crisis, the party was considering an expedition to southern 
Shanxi. Fortunately, Xi’an accident in 1936 saved the CCP from a relocation and the 
CCP started to negotiate with the Nationalist Party to build the Second United front 
against Japan. The CCP promised to cease confiscating landlords’ property and not to 
implement land reform under the condition that the Nationalists provided the CCP a 
subsidy.27 Eventually the Nationalist Party agreed to provide the CCP a subsidy which 
 
24 Zhongguo nongmin fudan shi. 
25 Xiaojia Hou’s interview with Li Ming in Hong Kong, October 2005, and in Beijing, September 
2007. 
26 Chen Yung-fa, “The Blooming Poppy under the Red Sun: The Yan’an Way and the Opium Trade,” 
in New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution, 265. 
27 Gu Longsheng, Mao Zedong Jingji Nianpu (Economic Chronicle of Mao Zedong) (Beijing: 
Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1993), 98. 
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by no means was insignificant. As a matter of fact, in 1939, 89.66 per cent of the CCP 
government revenue was from the Nationalist Party’s subsidy.28 
Supplied by the outside funds, the CCP showed little interest in levying taxes. For 
years there was even no formal agricultural tax. The CCP requested the “Grain to Save 
the Nation” [jiuguo gongliang] from peasants. Such taxation was informal and the rate 
was not fixed. Each year the central government decided the amount and sent quotas 
down to each level. Despite of regulations, local cadres had plenty room for 
manipulation and commonly had middle peasants and rich peasants to shoulder the 
burden. Before 1939, the quotas were very light. For example, in 1937, the party asked 
for 14000 dan of grain which accounted only for 1.28 percent of peasants’ total 
output.29 Without a fair taxation system, local production did not have a direct effect 
on the CCP. The Party’s supervision on agriculture was loose. Although radical land 
reform was not carried out, “revolution by installment”30 or “silent revolution” as was 
called by Mark Selden,31 took place, middle peasants became the majority of the rural 
population. In general, common peasants’ livelihoods were improved. But there was 
no breakthrough in agricultural productivity. Quite the contrary, as Chen Yung-fa 
points out that, from 1937 to 1943 unit yield dropped each year. After years of land 
reform, the CCP had to face the fact that peasants still did not produce more grain, not 
to mention turning over more to the state. 32 
 
                                                        
28 Huang Zhenglin, Shan-Gan-Ning bianqu shehui jingji shi (1937-1945), 189. 
29 Huang Zhenglin, Shan-Gan-Ning bianqu shehui jingji shi (1937-1945), 197-199. 
30 Ttsuya Kataoka, Resistance and Revolution in China: The Communists and the Second United Front 
(Berkeley: University of California, 1974). 
31 Edward Friedman, Paul Pickowicz and Mark Selden, Chinese Village, Socialist State (New Haven & 
London: Yale University, 1991). 
32 Chen Yung-fa, “Reconsidering Yan’an, Again,” Xin Shixue (New History), Taiwan, no 3 (1997): 
146. 
 28
Yan’an: learning from the Soviet 
As the anti-Japanese war approached a stalemate in 1939, conflicts between the 
CCP and the Nationalist Party intensified. The CCP began to worry about the 
possibility of diminishing Nationalist subsidies and consider extracting more within 
the CCP’s base areas. It established a taxation system in 1940. It also increased the 
quota of “Grain to Save the Nation” to 90,000 dan in 1940 and to over 200,000 dan in 
1941. Peasants were furious. When pressed too hard, peasants put their anger into 
action. Revolts were reported. For example, in December 1939, Huan County was 
assigned a quota of 8500 dan by the Shan-Gan-Ning government. Local cadres were 
planning to collect even more. A revolt immediately occurred in January 1940. 
Peasants from 17 townships and 2,500 self-defense army soldiers joined the revolt.33 
In 1941, situations turned to worse. The Nationalist Party completely terminated 
the subsidy and further launched an economic embargo against the Shan-Gan-Ning 
base area. The Japanese army began its “three-all” offensive against the CCP. The 
CCP base areas shrank and the population dropped. The base area economy was on the 
verge of collapse. The CCP-peasants relations were under stress. A widely circulated 
story was that, in a storm, a CCP cadre was “struck” by lightening and killed. Hearing 
the news, peasants wondered why the lightning did not strike Chairman Mao.34 To the 
CCP the most urgent issue was economic development, among which agricultural 
production was of foremost importance.35 
Facing the enormous hardship, in 1941 the CCP sent an investigation group, head 
by the CCP Propaganda Minister Zhang Wentian, to Shanxi province to “explore how 
to increase agricultural production and improve peasants’ livelihood.”36 Spending 
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nearly a year in Shanxi, Zhang Wentian observed that land reform itself did not 
increase p agricultural production. He concluded that “it is wrong to rely on 
redistributing other people’s property to improve peasants’ life; it’s better to develop 
production and increase social wealth to improve people’s livelihood.” He suggested 
to encourage new capitalism.37 To bolster the economy, the CCP promised peasants 
the ownership of their property, provided economic incentives and encouraged trading.  
Mao Zedong was also thinking about the agricultural issue. But he took a different 
orientation. Although he believed small peasants were the main force to improve rural 
production, he placed more efforts on reorganizing laborers rather than offering 
economic incentives.38 
In the late 1930s, a large number of refugees and immigrants moved to the base 
areas. If managed well, they could be of great help. In 1940, Yan’an county organized 
mutual aid organizations in order to reclaim 80,000 mou wasteland. Mao was very 
impressed by the achievement. As the CCP raised its extraction quota, more peasants 
fled or simply worked less assiduously. It was important to exert certain control over 
peasants. Everyone, including the elderly, women and “lazy” ones, should be 
participating in rural production. So Mao recommended organizing mutual aid teams 
in the entire base areas. Under the party’s leadership, mutual aid organizations 
mushroomed. In many cases, explicit working regulations were drafted and peasants 
were required to work for long hours each day. Through those forms the party was 
able to “persuade” peasants to plant the kinds of crops the party was in need of. In 
addition, those organizations were coordinated with wartime service.  
Reorganizing peasants was not only an economic issue, but a political one.39 Mao 
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was eager to explore new forms of organizing peasants. Meanwhile, inspired by Soviet 
experience, Mao endowed them with greater meaningness. Years of intense study of 
Soviet work in Yan’an now came to fruition.  
As Schram notes, one of the indispensable qualifications for the leadership of a 
communist movement was a reputation as a Marxist theoretician. Claiming the 
authority of interpreting Marxist classics would bring practical power. In the Long 
March, Mao had established his reputation as a prominent military leader, but he 
remained weak in Marxist theories. So in the late 1930s, Mao devoted himself to the 
study of Marxist philosophy. It turned out that in terms of Marxist classics, Mao was 
unable to compete with his rivals, the “returned Student faction” [Liusu Pai], who 
were trained in the Soviet Union and headed by Wang Ming. Mao then came to 
disfavor Marxist classics.40  
Without the classics, what else could Mao learn? The History of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course (hereafter as Short Course) 
provided Mao with a timely theoretical instrument. Short Course was composed under 
Stalin’s direct command. Stalin himself even wrote one section. After the World War 
II, Stalin claimed sole authorship of the entire work and the Chinese communists 
believed that Stalin himself had written the book.41 By narrating and fabricating 
Bolshevik history, this book reinterpreted Marxist theory, legitimized Stalin’s 
leadership, and told a story of successfully building socialism in the Soviet Union. 
This book was published in the Soviet Union in 1938. Then Stalin imposed it on the 
communist world as the official interpretation of the Soviet party’s history.42 The CCP 
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members in Moscow translated it from Russian into Chinese. Ren Bishi, one of Mao’s 
most trusted comrades, played an important role in getting this translation published in 
Moscow and sent it back to Yan’an in the same year. The book became a 
“crash-course” to teach CCP cadres at the party schools. Li Wenhan, who had taught 
Short Course in Yan’an, recalled that in the 1930s and 1940s the CCP leaders learned 
Marxism and Leninism through the Short Course.43  
Mao Zedong himself was particularly fond of this book. In the Yan’an 
Rectification Movement of 1941-43, the book was called “the encyclopedia of 
Marxism” and was listed as the No.1 “must-read” text for high-level CCP cadres.44 It 
maintained this privilege up to 1955. As Mao stated, 
In studying Marxism-Leninism, we should use the History of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course as the principal material. 
It is the best synthesis and summing-up of the world communist movement of 
the past hundred years, a model of the integration of theory and practice, and 
so far the only comprehensive model in the whole world.45  
Mao used this book to criticize those comrades who “studied Marxism-Leninism 
not to meet the needs of revolutionary practice, but purely for the sake of study” and 
who were unable to “apply the viewpoint and method of Marx, Engels, Lenin and 
Stalin to the concrete study of China’s present conditions.”46 This book provided Mao 
with a new model of studying Marxist theory and demonstrated to him new methods 
of acquiring authority. For example, inspired by the creation of Short Course, Mao 
Zedong ordered the composition and the publication of a documentary book From the 
Sixth Congress – the CCP’s Internal Secretary Documents, which was aimed at 
reconstructing the CCP’s past so as to legitimize Mao’s leadership as well as to lay the 
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groundwork for Mao’s role as a leading theorist.47 
Short Course also served as Mao’s road map for building socialism in China. 
Benjamin Schwartz notes that Mao uncritically accepted the image of “socialism” as 
described in Short Course. Li Hua-yu goes further arguing that Mao had closely 
followed the steps outlined by Stalin in the Short Course and created a Stalinist 
economic structure after 1949.48 In the early 1940s, when Mao was concerned with 
the economic crisis in the base areas and searched for a method to effectively 
reorganize peasants, Short Course provided Mao with an ideal formula that could link 
the current mutual aid teams with a socialist future. Short Course told Mao that Lenin 
“regarded co-operative societies in general, and agricultural cooperative societies in 
particular, as a means of transition – a means within the reach and understanding of 
the peasant millions –from small, individual farming to large-scale producing 
associations, or collective farms.”49 Short Course book also demonstrated to Mao the 
effectiveness and popularity of collective farms among Soviet peasants. Deeply 
impressed by the glorious Soviet history thus depicted, in 1943, Mao Zedong came to 
portray the socialist future for Chinese peasants, 
Among the peasant masses a system of individual economy has prevailed for 
thousands of years, with each family or household forming a productive unit. 
This scattered, individual form of production is the economic foundation of 
feudal rule and keeps the peasants in perpetual poverty. The only way to 
change it is gradual collectivization, and the only way to bring about 
collectivization, according to Lenin, is through cooperatives.50  
Mao now came to see individual peasant farming as a backward phenomenon, 
regarding collective labor as progress in production and a better way of “liberating” 
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the productive forces. When Mao Zedong utilized Short Course to establish his 
authority in interpreting Marxist theory, he was at the same time inoculated with its 
concepts. From this book, Mao not only acquired an authoritative history of the Soviet 
Union but also became familiar with Marxist theories as interpreted by Stalin and the 
revolutionary language of the Bolsheviks. Evidently he absorbed the language and the 
concepts of Short Course in his own work. Here I quote one paragraph of Short 
Course from which Mao Zedong seemed to have drawn images and terms for his 
well-known declaration mentioned above, 
Scattered and disunited, each on his tiny, even dwarf individually-run farm, 
destitute of anything like serviceable implements or traction, having no way 
of breaking up large tracts of virgin soil, without prospect of any 
improvement on their farms, crushed by poverty, isolated and left to their 
own devices, now the peasants had at last found a way out, a way to a better 
life, in the amalgamation of their small farms into cooperative undertakings, 
collective farms; in tractors, which are able to break up any ‘hard ground,’ 
any virgin soil.51 
Armed with Stalinist theory and Stalinist language, Mao Zedong believed that he 
found a way to liberate Chinese peasants. He now would not only allocate poor 
peasants land, but also teach them how to produce, transform them into new laborers 
and lead them into a stage of socialism. 
It all started with mutual aid teams. Mutual aid teams were a traditional practice 
among Chinese peasants. There were many types of mutual aid teams and most were 
temporary and aimed at overcoming labor shortage and livestock shortage. The 
fundamental principle was reciprocity.52 They had nothing to do with collective 
ownership. But after Mao released his article entitled “Get Organized,” mutual aid 
teams evolved into “a renovation of the production system, a revolution of relations 
among the people.”53 Even though in 1943, mutual aid teams were built on the ground 
                                                        
51 Lian gong (bu) dangshi jianming jiaocheng, ,365-366. 
52 Chen Yung-fa, Making Revolution- the Communist Movement in Easten and Central China, 
1937-1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 215-219. 
53 Mao Zedong, “On Cooperatives,” in Jianguo Yilai Nongye Hezuohua Shiliao Huibian (Collection of 
Historical Materials on Agricultural Cooperativization History Since the Found of the People's Republic) 
 34
of private ownership, Mao portrayed them as possessing a more progressive aspect 
and a necessary means in the transition to collective farms. As he said, “At present 
they are only of a rudimentary type and must go through several stages of 
development before they can become cooperatives of the Soviet type known as 
collective farms.”54 Mao frequently used the term cooperative, partly because Lenin 
had used this term, partly because cooperative was a very popular term in China in the 
1930s and 1940s.55 It would become clearer that Mao mainly referred to mutual aid 
teams. “Getting peasants organized” meant to organize peasants into mutual aid 
teams.56 Nevertheless at this point, Mao did not know how the stages through which  
mutual aid teams should transit to collective farms. 
Another factor that drove Mao to pay a tribute to collectivization at this moment 
was Mao’s desire to improve his relationship with Stalin. In the early 1940s, the CCP’s 
relationship with the CPSU reached a low point. Nazi Germany had attacked the 
Soviet Union, coming close to defeat. Stalin, fearing an attack by Japan, asked Mao 
for help, which Mao, more than once, denied, thereby infuriating Stalin and Soviet 
comrades.57 The CCP showed little respect for Soviet delegates in Yan’an.58 
Meanwhile Mao used this chance to carry out the rectification campaign against the 
“returned student faction.” Not surprisingly, the CPSU was not pleased with this 
movement. However, after Stalingrad,1943, it became clear that the Soviet Union 
would eventually defeat Germany. In Yan’an, Mao won the battle against his rivals. It 
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was time to improve connections with the CPSU. Suddenly, Soviet delegates in Yan’an 
were treated warmly and were later invited to attend the CCP core meetings. It was 
now to Mao’s advantage to voice his admiration of Soviet achievements. 
No matter what was Mao’s main intention, Mao’s articles on mutual aid teams and 
collectivization were widely circulated among the party members. The slogan “Get 
Organized” was unquestioned. The idea that in addition to the improvement of 
agricultural technology, the organization of production was the determining factor in 
increasing productivity was disseminated. In 1943, nearly all base areas launched a 
mutual aid movement, planning to organize 50 percent of peasants. Nevertheless, “Get 
Organized” was not a great success. It’s effectiveness in improving the productivity 
was extreme limited, perhaps even, serving as a hindrance to productivity. But the 
influence should not be underestimated. 
Most rank and file members knew the term “get organized. however, they rarely 
understood its socialist feature or appreciated the supposed significance. To their 
knowledge, common peasants knew how to farm their land. Most of them treated the 
call as a political movement that had to be fulfilled, either by employing 
administrative methods or by lip service. In 1944, severe commandism and formalism 
spread in the Shan-Gan-Ning base area. Quite a few rural cadres, without consulting 
with any peasant, sometimes even without propagating the virtues of “getting 
organized,” sit in their offices to manufacture a list by copying names. As a result, a 
large number of mutual aid teams of no validity mushroomed. Take Qingyang city as 
an example. In 1944, 417 mutual aid teams were established among which 416 mutual 
aid teams were fakes. When mutual aid teams were imposed on peasants by local 
agents, cases of sabotage were reported, mutual aid teams easily fell apart.59 In 1945, 
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other base areas decided to help peasants “get organized”, similar patterns occurred. 
  During the upsurge of “getting organized,” agricultural cooperative farms 
appeared, sporadically. One well known case was “Jia Baozhi land and conveyance 
cooperative” in Baijiagou village of Shanxi province. Baijiagou village was nearly 
devastated by Japanese troop’s attack in 1943. In 1944, in the face of tremendous 
difficulties, four party members recruited four poor peasants to form a land and 
conveyance cooperative. Of the eight members, one took care of war services for all 
others, six took care of land, and Jia Baozhi himself started a trading business. The 
cooperative was extremely successful and attracted more members. Jia Baozhi was 
later rewarded the first-degree model laborer and his cooperative kept expanding, 
especially on its sideline work. A textile mill and a coal mine were added to the 
cooperative.60 Another good case was Geng Changsuo cooperative in Wugong village 
in Hebei province, as Chinese Village, Socialist State has vividly presented.61 
However, cases of success were rare. There were much more cases of failures. 
Although there is no statistic on the rate, the fact that in the 1950s when the party tried 
to demonstrate Chinese peasants’ long history of building cooperatives prior to 1949, 
it could only find to the two examples listed above speaks for itself. One famous case 
of failure was the cooperative farm in Miaozidian village of the Shan-Gan-Ning base 
area. To make better use of laborers, in March 1944, three rich peasants decided to 
form a farm of collective working. Local party cadres considered it “close to 
socialism” and promised lower taxes and less war service. So 14 households formed a 
cooperative farm. They calculated their land, cattle and laborers as shares and pooled 
them together. Ideally, they should farm land collectively and distribute income 
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according to the share. From the very beginning the cooperative farm was in a mess, 
rich members wanted to withdraw, some poor ones simply fled. Only with frequent 
urges of party cadres, the farm barely reaped the grain, in February 1945. Less than 
half of the production plan was fulfilled. The farm disassembled. Local party learned 
the lesson, “At current stage, peasants still value the private ownership of their 
products,” “cooperative farm is a form too advanced for now.”62 Quite a few similar 
cooperative farms were built in Shandong province, and then failed. One Shandong 
provincial head admitted that such kind of cooperatives “could not be accepted by 
Chinese peasants at current stage,” “In the past, peasants took care of their own land. 
Now when land is collectivized, peasants do not care about farming land as much as 
before. The larger the size of cooperative farms, the smaller proportion each peasant 
has, the less he cares about the land. Therefore, such kind of collective farming often 
leads to a drop in production.” So propagating it was a “naive idea that does not fit 
peasants’ request, and won’t work.”63 
 Mutual aid teams did not necessarily increase land yield, cooperative farms did 
not fit in peasants’ mentality. However, before the CCP leaders had time to reexamine 
comprehensively the theory of “getting organized,” the civil war between the CCP and 
the Nationalist Party burst out in 1946. In order to mobilize more peasants and to 
expropriate more resource for the war, from 1946 to 1948, radical land reform was 
carried out in north China, especially in old liberated regions.64 Enormous disruption 
of rural production resulted. Remaining mutual aid teams and cooperative farms, if 
any, fell apart. The CCP was fully aware of excesses and consequences. But for the 
                                                        
62 “1944 nian An’zhai xian miaodianzi ban hezuo nongchan de shimo” (The history of Miaodianzi in 
Anzhai county building cooperative farm in 1944), Zhongguo nongye hezuoshi ziliao, no 4 (1987). 
63 Ye Yangbing, Zhongguo nongye hezuohua yundong yanjiu, 151. 
64 Old liberated regions were regions that were occupied by the CCP during the war against Japan 
(1937-45). Nearly all of them were located in north China. Research on the radical land reform in North 
China between 1946-48 is discussed in Huang Daoxuan, “Mengyou yihuo qianzai duishou?” (Ally or 
potential rivals) online article, retrieved from http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wk_wzdetails.asp?id=6520. 
 38
wartime mobilization the CCP was willing to pay that price.65 Once again, 
productivity became negligible. 
 Starting from 1948, when the victory against the National Party approached and 
chaos in the countryside reached a breaking point, the party modified radical land 
reform policies. To encourage peasants to work harder, the party promised them the 
right of private ownership, the right of hiring laborers, of money lending and 
borrowing, and of renting land. Further, in 1948, the notion of equally redistributing 
land and property was labeled “agricultural socialism” and was openly condemned.66 
Local governments no longer propagated, in some areas even discouraged, to form 
mutual aid teams. From 1948 to 1950, the mutual aid teams were in recession. 
1949: an alternative plan 
In the late 1940s, the CCP began to prepare for ruling the country. The Soviet 
system became their instant choice. CCP leaders frequently consulted with Stalin on a 
wide range of important issues.67 As Soviet archives reveal, the CCP had planned to 
establish a socialist government. Stalin did not support it. Differing with his writing in 
the 1920s, Stalin now suggested moderate plans to Chinese comrades and preached 
gradualism. As he cabled to Mao, “for the time being no nationalization of all land and 
no abolition of private ownership of land will be affected, no confiscation of the 
property of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, from the petty up to the big 
bourgeoisie, no confiscation of the property of not only big landowners, but also of the 
middle and small ones living by hired labor.”68 The CCP seemed to have accepted his 
suggestions. In February 1949 Liu Shaoqi, secretary of the CCP Central Committee 
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and number two in China’s Communist Party’s “pecking order,” reported to Mikoyan, 
who was visiting the CCP in early 1949 as Stalin’s special agent, that “The transition 
to socialism will be lengthy in terms of time, and harsh in terms of struggle,” “we shall 
have to wait 10 to 15 years for the full offensive against capitalist elements in our 
economy.”69 In the Second Plenary Session of CCP's Seventh Central Committee, a 
meeting held in 1949, projected new China’s economic strategies of accommodating a 
mixed economy and the development of capitalism under the banner of “New 
Democracy.” Theoretically this plan was based on Lenin’s New Economic Policy 
(NEP). Liu Shaoqi was a strong supporter of it. As for rural economic policy, peasants 
were encouraged to work for themselves and to accumulate family wealth. Rich 
peasants were to be protected. Supplemented to the development of individual rural 
economy, Zhang Wentian and Liu Shaoqi proposed the Supply and Marketing 
Cooperatives (SMC) as the form to draw peasants into the state’s orbit. 
In the late 1940s, the old base areas, especially the northeast China, served as the 
trial areas for the CCP’s new policies. As Li Hua-yu rightly points out, in the early 
1950s many ideas that developed in the northeast China were adopted as the basis for 
national economic policy.70 The rural development plan was one of them. In the 
northeast region, land reform was completed in 1948, rural prosperity and stability 
became major issues. Zhang Wentian, the then-governor of Heilongjiang province, 
suggested the party’s guideline should shift from encouraging class struggle to 
encouraging rural production. He criticized the actions of advocating for rash 
collectivization or forcing peasants to join mutual aid teams. Instead, he advocated for 
SMC, a Soviet model that was not depicted in Short Course.  
In 1923, Lenin published his far-reaching article “On Cooperation” stating that “if 
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the whole of the peasantry were organized in cooperatives, we would be standing 
firmly with both feet on the soil of Socialism.”71 Lenin clearly underscored the role of 
cooperatives in building a socialist society, yet he died in 1924 without elaborating on 
it. His followers needed to figure out what kind of cooperatives should be created. In 
the late 1920s, heated debates arose between CPSU leaders Bukharin and Stalin.72 
Roughly speaking, Bukharin believed that Lenin’s cooperatives referred to Supply and 
Marketing Cooperatives by which the state could organize small producers through 
commodity circulation and indirectly control them through economic regulations. In 
his plan a private rural economy would be allowed. Stalin, on the other hand, 
interpreted Lenin’s cooperatives as referring to producers’ cooperatives in which the 
state would organize small producers in collective production and directly administer 
them. The private sectors would be eliminated. It has been generally agreed among the 
present scholars that Lenin had little to say about producers’ cooperatives in his 
article.73 But, in the late 1920s, Bukharin was politically defeated and his theories 
were erased from Soviet history. Later on, Short Course was compiled in which 
Lenin’s ideas were twisted in Stalin’s favor. Disciples of Short Course, such as Mao 
Zedong, probably believed that Lenin had originally advocated collectivization in the 
form of producers’ cooperatives and did not know about Bukharin’s interpretation. But 
some CCP comrades did know about Bukharin’s version. Zhang Wentian who studied 
in Moscow between 1925 to 1930, was one of them. Zhang Wentian was actually 
known within the party for his deep knowledge on Bukharin. In 1953, he was referred 
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to teach Li Weihan, then the head of the United Front Department, about Bukharin.74 
Li Hua-yu convincingly shows how Zhang Wentian was deeply influenced by 
Lenin’s idea of the “transition from capitalism to socialism” and his NEP policy.75 In 
addition, Zhang also incorporated Bukharin’s theory, although he did not give 
Bukharin, known then as a traitor, any credit. As Bukharin, Zhang asserted that one 
key in the transition to socialism was to organize SMC, 
At present, SMCs in the countryside are the economic headquarters that direct 
the economic activities of small producers and the central linkage between 
agricultural production and consumption. After the land reform, they were the 
most important form of organization for peasants and small handicraftsmen. 
Without cooperatives, it would be impossible to organize economically 
thousands and thousands of small agricultural producers.76  
Zhang concluded that SMC “can not only facilitate the circulation of 
commodities between cities and the countryside, but also connect the state-owned 
economy with small producers.”77 Acknowledging the future of collectivization, 
Zhang reminded his comrades that the efforts of forced collectivization had resulted in 
failure and he suggested to guarantee peasants’ right to private property.78 Zhang 
Wentian stressed, “nowadays, we should pay particular attention to consumer 
cooperatives which could connect state owned economy and private economy.”79 At 
this point, Zhang Wentian’s theory closely resembled to Bukharin’s projection of the 
function of SMC. 
Zhang Wentian was not the only one who at that time discovered the form of 
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SMC. Almost at the same time, Liu Shaoqi wrote a series of articles on SMC. He 
planned to integrate the country’s whole economy through marketing administration 
and SMC was the instrument to achieve this goal.80 Liu pointed out that Lenin and 
Stalin both had emphasized on the importance of cooperatives. He underscored that 
the alliance between cooperatives and the state owned economy would lead China 
toward socialism. He particularly valued the key role of SMC: 
Obviously, without widespread SMCs as the bridge to connect small producers 
and the state-owned economy, the country led by proletarians will not forcefully 
guide hundreds of thousands of scattered small producers; therefore, the 
construction of national economy of New Democratism will not proceed 
smoothly.81 
Liu Shaoqi proposed building SMCs as the means of assuring that hundreds of 
thousands of peasants would produce in accordance with proletarians’ demands. A 
close reading of Liu’s works on cooperatives in this period reveals that his language 
was not based on Short Course, but on Lenin’s work during the NEP. Liu Shaoqi 
considered China’s situation in 1948 similar to that of the Soviet Union in the NEP 
period. As he said, “Our policies are very similar to the conditions of the USSR before 
the capitalist uprising in 1918 and of their NEP policies, so their experience is worth 
thinking.”82 His interpretation of Lenin’s “On Cooperation” resembled Bukharin’s to
Liu Shaoqi showed little interest in forming mutual aid teams and his use of the term 
cooperatives often did not include mutual aid teams. In a politburo meeting in 
September 1948, Liu suggested organizing cooperatives across China, he only referred 
to SMC. Mao Zedong had to interrupt adding that mutual aid teams were also a form 
o. 
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of cooperatives.83 
Liu’s proposals seemed to be welcomed by the CCP leaders. Even Chairman Mao 
said “Comrade Liu Shaoqi did great research on this (cooperative) issue.”84 As part of 
New Democracy policy, Liu especially remarked that “the transfer of agriculture onto 
socialist lines, we envisage only on condition that agriculture has been provided an 
industrial base.”85 Mao seemed to agree with it, as he told Mikoyan “we have given 
land to the peasants, but we have not given them the commodities they need and 
which we do not have. If we do not develop industry, we shall not be able to supply 
the peasants with commodities.”86 The Second Plenary Session of CCP’s Seventh 
Central Committee, declared that “it is possible to lead the development of agriculture 
toward the direction of modernization and collectivization,” while “both at present and 
during a relatively long period of time in the future our agricultural and handicraft 
industry are and will remain dispersed and individualized in terms of the basic 
form.”87 Officially, Liu Shaoqi’s plan that encouraged individual rural economy and 
gave priority to increasing rural production over moving towards to collectivization 
was adopted. SMCs, not the mutual aid teams, were propagandized to be established 
in a large scale. 
Deeply in Mao Zedong’s heart, he was not fully convinced by the virtues of the 
New Democracy policy and he warned it was wrong to let peasants take their course.88 
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But for the time being, he did not involve himself much in rural issues and did not 
challenge Liu Shaoqi’s rural policy. Challenges for Liu were to come from cadres of 
lower ranks. 
Gao Gang - playing the ideological card 
The New Democracy policy was not unanimously supported among CCP cadres. 
Theoretically this policy was grounded on Lenin’s NEP theory. But in 1949, not many 
CCP cadres knew about NEP, as Bo Yibo recalled.89 Quite the contrary, many cadres 
were confused by the New Democracy policy and questioned the necessity of 
tolerating capitalism. As Liu Shaoqi acknowledged, “In the party there are people who 
are inclined to a leftist, voluntaristic, hasty construction of socialism. This tendency 
reveals itself in the fact there are those who draw up unrealistic plans in which they 
fail to allow for our possibilities.”90 Gao Gang, member of the politburo and chairman 
of the Northeast China Bureau, was one of them. He advocated following the Stalin 
model  as depicted in Stalin’s writings of 1920s and realizing the socialist 
transformation of agriculture and industry. In the northeast region, he raised a slogan 
“building a model of Soviet socialism.” Immediately, he was criticized by Liu Shaoqi 
for his “leftist” error.91 
Gao Gang in no way accepted this charge. He chose to play Soviet card. In the 
wake of the founding of the PRC, Gao Gang was of particular importance. In addition 
to his unchallenged authority in the northeast region, he was widely known for his 
close relationship with Soviet comrades. He had formed a particularly friendly 
relationship with Ivan Kovalev, Stalin’s special envoy to the CCP between 1948 to 
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1950. Kovalev referred Gao Gang as a “true comrade” and “an exceptional man.” 
Andrei Ledovsky who served as Consul- General in Mukden in the period 1950-52 
also admired Gao Gang and considered him an orthodox pro-Soviet Communist and 
sympathetic to the Soviet model of economic planning.92 Gao Gang did not waste 
these valuable resources. After he was criticized by Liu Shaoqi, details of this CCP’s 
internal discussion reached Stalin through Kovalev. Kovalev, by his own judgment or 
inspired by Gao Gang, further hinted that divergences in different economic plans 
among the CCP were in essence signs of political line struggle. He claimed that 
pro-American and anti-Soviet sentiments were rife in the CCP. Liu Shaoqi and Bo 
Yibo were among these who allegedly showed their pro-American sentiment. Kovalev 
accused Liu Shaoqi of scheming to make a groundless attack upon Gao Gang. In this 
report, Kovalev’s evaluations on CCP leaders, except on Gao Gang, were generally 
negative.93 Stalin appeared to disapprove of this report and later even gave this report 
to Mao Zedong to display his confidence to the CCP.94 Mao’s true reaction to this 
report and how he interpreted Stalin’s motives were not revealed. Gao Gang’s 
allegedly pro-Soviet sympathies and unusually close relationship with Soviet 
comrades might have doomed him to eventually fall, as Lovalev claimed and 
Ledovsky suspected.95 But Kovalev’s report must have alerted Mao of the political 
risk of appearing to encourage capitalism in China. After all, in 1950 Stalin was highly 
wary of the possibility of the rapprochement between China and the USA.  
Gao Gang continued to play Soviet cards. In February 1950, he wrote to Mao 
Zedong stating that Liu Shaoqi’s speech in Tianjin in 1949 exposed Liu’s view that 
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China could only follow the road of capitalism, not of socialism. Gao Gang warned 
Mao that such kind of views had generated negative influences both in the CCP and in 
the international communist community. Gao Gang further reported to Mao that his 
Soviet comrades did not think comrades Liu Shaoqi was a real Marxist.96 Now and 
then Gao Gang resorted to his Soviet comrades to justify his plans and charged those 
who disagreed with him as anti-Soviet. Indeed, the New Democracy policy did have 
generated suspects among the international communists. For example, Velio Spano, a 
prominent Italian Communist who traveled extensively in China, requested to have a 
confidential talk with the Soviet charge d’affaires in Beijing, P.A. Shibaev. 
Specifically, Spano wanted to talk with Shibaev, not as a Soviet diplomat, but as a 
member of the Bolshevik Communist Party. Spano declared that “blindness to the 
danger of capitalism swiftly regenerating itself and the underrating of the working 
class were typical of the majority of top functionaries in China he had talked with.”97 
Valuing its reputations in the international communist movement, for the CCP leaders 
ideological obligations were not merely a nominal concern. 
The support for an immediate transition to socialism was also common among the 
CCP rank and file. When Zhang Wentian strongly denounced the idea that considered 
organizing all peasants into mutual aid teams as the only way of preventing peasants 
from sliding to capitalism, many CCP cadres in the northeast region asked, “Since our 
goal is agricultural collectivization, why don’t we carry it out today?”98 Northeast 
Daily published an article claiming that the biased emphasis on peasants’ own 
preferences was in fact worship of the spontaneity of the masses movement and 
violated Mao’s assertion of not “letting peasants take their own course.” 99 Soon, in 
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January 1950, Zhang Wentian was reassigned to assume Chinese delegate to the 
United Nation. Zhang Wentian, with surprise, heard his new job from the broadcast. 
The northeast region now came under the full control of Gao Gang. 
In the summer 1949, after visiting collective farms in the Soviet Union, Gao Gang 
decided to focus on the agricultural policy for a breakthrough. He made a speech 
committing himself to bolstering the transition to collectivization by elaborating on 
Mao’s terms “get organized” and “actively developing (agriculture) towards 
(modernization and) collectivization.”100 He implied that putting off collectivization 
with the excuse of lacking machines was a mistake of “line.” On January 4, 1950, 
Northeast Daily published Gao Gang’s speech which expressed the intent to upgrade 
mutual aid teams further and promised to grant them financial privileges. It further 
called on mutual aid teams to challenge individual farmers. This article did not 
explicitly call for limiting individual farmers, but the implication was rather 
obvious.101 
Not surprisingly, Liu Shaoqi was not pleased with Gao Gang’s behavior. He 
considered that mutual aid teams in the northeast China were based on broken and 
impoverished individual economies and were not a good basis for socialism. He 
thought it was impossible for the present mutual aid teams to develop into future 
collective farms.102 In addition to internal critiques, Liu Shao did not neglect the 
Soviet channel. In the same month when Gao Gang’s article being published in 
Northeast Daily, Liu Shaoqi was interviewed by O.I. Chechetkina, a Pravda 
correspondent. In the interview, Liu clearly focused on peasant issues. He told 
Chechetkina, 
Wealthy farmers will help productivity increase and will supply towns with 
goods… The new wealthy farmers are only beginning to appear and should 
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not be curbed… If we try ordering capitalism to stop, it will get us nowhere. 
On the contrary, we shall make things worse by that, because millions of 
peasants will turn against our regime.103 
Chechetkina dutifully sent this report back to Moscow,104 yet we do not know the 
Soviet response. On August 26, 1950, Liu told Soviet Ambassador N.V. Roshchin that 
“we are most grateful to Comrade Stalin for his timely advice about improving 
relations with private capital, both urban and rural, about the treatment of wealthy 
farmers.”105 As Meliksetov notes, the political backing by Stalin was of tremendous 
importance for Liu Shaoqi.106 But Liu Shaoqi seemed not to highlight this point 
publicly. 
Numerous mutual aid teams were built in the northeast region and quite a few 
incidents of forcing peasants into mutual aid teams or squeezing individual farmers 
were reported. Yet no punishment was imposed on Gao Gang. He was later summoned 
to Beijing to assume the post of Chairman of the State Planning Committee. 
Gao Gang portrayed himself as an orthodox pro-Soviet comrade and justified his 
policy of “getting peasants organized” with the theory based on Stalin’s “On Several 
Problems of Leninism.”107 Of course, this does not mean that faith in Stalin’s theory 
alone drove Gao Gang to challenge Liu Shaoqi. Gao Gang probably was more 
motivated by his political ambition: at the time, he was conspiring to take over Liu 
Shaoqi’s position. The difference between Liu and Mao on New Democracy policy in 
general, and on agricultural cooperatives in particular,108 provided him with a chance 
                                                        
103 Arlen Meliksetov, “‘New Democracy’ and China’s search for socio-economic development routes 
(1949-1953),” 79-80. 
104 This report is kept in Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation. 
105 Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation, folio 0100, list 43, portfolio 10, folder 302, p. 
178. Quoted from Arlen Meliksetov, “‘New Democracy’ and China’s search for socio-economic 
development routes (1949-1953),” 80. 
106 Arlen Meliksetov, “‘New Democracy’ and China’s search for socio-economic development routes 
(1949-1953).” 
107 Liu Jianping, “Nongye hezuohua juece de guocheng jiqi zhengzhixue yiyi: xin zhongguo 1951” 
(Policy Decision in the Cooperative Transformation of Agriculture and Its Political Implications: New 
China in 1951), Kaifang shidai, no 2 (2003). 
108 Li Hua-yu and Arlen Meliksetov have discussed this issue in their works respectively. Many 
 49
 50
                                                                                                                                                               
to gain Mao’s favor. At the same time, we should not overlook the impact of Soviet 
collectivization theory, with which by 1949 CCP cadres were quite familiar with, at 
least in terms of language, thanks to Mao’s advocacy in the mid-1940s. A plan that 
differed from Mao would easily generate suspicion and confusion. Gao Gang further 
played Soviet card to attack Liu Shaoqi ideologically. The puzzle is that, as mentioned 
earlier, at this time Stalin himself was advising the CCP to accommodate capitalism, 
and Liu Shaoqi was following his suggestions; while Gao Gang used Stalin’s early 
work to attack Liu Shaoqi and was supported by his Soviet comrades who should have 
known Stalin’s attitudes well. What kind of role Stalin might have played has not yet 
been revealed.109 
Gao Gang was not the only who questioned Liu Shaoqi’s rural policy. Soon, Lai 
Ruoyu, a provincial leader of Shanxi Province will launch another battle against Liu 
Shaoqi. But unlike Gao Gang who played ideological card, Lai Ruoyu chose a 
different approach to advance his agenda, circuitously. 
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Chapter 2  Lai Ruoyu's challenge to the party center in the early 1950s 
Gao Gang was not the only high official who disagreed with Liu Shaoqi’s rural 
policy. Lai Ruoyu, the vice secretary of the CCP Shanxi provincial branch soon, 
followed Gao Gang, initiated a battle against Liu Shaoqi. Unlike Gao Gang, Lai 
Ruoyu chose to let peasants voice for his opinions. 
Assumptions and Challenges on Peasant Issues 
Lai Ruoyu and his fellow provincial leaders in Shanxi were, like Gao Gang, duly 
impressed by Soviet collectives. After the CCP won the civil war, some of them began 
at once to think about how to build socialism. A socialist countryside should move in a 
socialist direction, they believed.1 Unlike Liu Shaoqi, who suggested holding off for a 
while on building a socialist countryside, Lai Ruoyu declared on September 1, 1949, 
the day the Shanxi provincial government was established that “Our grand goal is 
modernization and collectivization. Without collectivization, there is no 
modernization. Those two are mutually related. We should now step by step move 
toward this goal.”2 
Four days later, Lai instructed his subordinate, Wang Qian, who was about to 
assume the post of party secretary of Shanxi’s Changzhi prefecture which belonged to 
CCP’s Taihang base area prior to 1949, to carry out investigations in this old liberated 
area. What were people thinking, what kinds of problems had they encountered, and 
what methods should the CCP employ to take the party’s work one step further. Lai 
explicitly told Wang Qian “You can ask other people to deal with other matters; you 
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must take this mission very seriously and find the correct answer.”3 Lai did not 
explain clearly what kind of answer he was expecting, but Lai’s trusted subordinate, 
Wang Qian, was likely well aware of Lai’s hopes. Upon his arrival in Changzhi in late 
1949, he initiated a series of investigations of rural conditions. What he discovered 
was more of a disappointing surprise than a pleasure. 
As chapter 1 discusees, despite the CCP’s long history of mobilizing peasants, its 
knowledge of peasants, especially of the peasant economy, was limited and biased. 
Peasants, in the party’s eyes, were predominantly viewed as a group that made up the 
main revolutionary force, not as individual producers. In fact, prior to 1949 it did not 
care much about the issue of rural production. The CCP cared more about how to 
redistribute output among peasants and had stressed the extraction of resources 
through rural class struggles rather than increasing rural production, as Chapter 1 
analyzes.4 However, in 1949 the CCP had to adjust to its new role as the ruling party 
and to consider ways of restoring rural order, improving rural production, and using 
tax measures to extract resources. Some CCP leaders were conscious of the new 
challenges. But their work was informed by certain fundamental assumptions about 
Chinese peasants.  
First of all, following a Marxist analysis of capitalist organizations, CCP leaders 
assumed that peasants always acted to maximize gains by rationalizing production. 
They deeply believed that all peasants would work hard and produce more if they 
possessed adequate production materials. Peasants, they thought, were open to the idea 
of continuously investing in production. With the party’s guidance, peasants would be 
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willing to collectively purchase new farm tools and apply new technologies to increase 
production. 
Second, party leaders believed that Chinese peasants had a strong sense of 
affiliation with land. In the CCP’s view, peasants were intimately connected with the 
land. Peasants would at all costs struggle to keep their own land. As Mao often 
claimed, the origin of peasant poverty resided in unequal land distribution. The CCP 
believed that as long as peasants held land, they would improve their living standard 
and move ahead.5 
Further, since it was the CCP that had distributed land to poor peasants and had 
appointed them to positions of village leadership, poor peasants and cadres would be 
grateful to the party and continue to serve the party, even if such loyalty conflicted to a 
certain degree with individual peasant interests. The party felt that assumptions of this 
sort were fully justified.  
However, academic research on the peasant economy has demonstrated the 
otherwise. For example, Chayanov convincingly shows that peasant economy can not 
be understood in a discipline that originated from the study of capitalist economy. 
Peasants produced for the satisfaction of the family consumption and made balances 
between producing more and enjoying the life. As for the cause of poverty, Chayanov 
emphasizes the high ratio of consumer and laborer was the fundamental factor.6 
Shanin highlights the multidirectional and cyclical mobility of peasants and reminded 
us the fatal effects of accidents.7 Both scholars ground their studies on Russian 
peasants and their approaches have yet been systematically applied to Chinese 
peasants. Nevertheless, their research has described to us the complexity of the 
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peasant economy and peasant society of which the CCP had rarely thought. James 
Scott further stresses on peasants’ “safety-first” principle in pre-modern era based on 
his research on Southeast Asia.8 Although having not read these studies, the CCP was 
about to learn the lessons from harsh realities, as investigations in Changzhi quickly 
showed. 
The Changzhi area was an old liberated region. Between the winter of 1948 and 
the spring of 1949, 96.3 percent of villages in its territory completed land reform, and 
land had been nearly equally distributed. Taking Yaozizhen village in Tunliu county as 
an example, of the 88 households in this village, the average landholding was 4.1 mou 
per person, and the average per capita output of grain was 3.6 dan.9 Former landlords 
and rich peasants on average owned 2.29 mou per person.10 According to official 
records, overall agricultural production had improved and total village output in 
two-thirds of the villages in the county now exceeded pre-war levels.11 If adopting 
Tanaka’s standard, peasants in Changzhi prefecture could not make ends meet. In 
accordance with Tanaka’s estimation, aid organizations and economists general define 
“self-sufficient” as equivalent to 45 to 51.1 catties of unhusked grain per month, 600 
catties per year.12 Peasants themselves considered 700 catties unhusked grain per year 
as the standard of subsistence.13 The secrets for peasants’ survival were income from 
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sideline work and from the hidden lands. The Party’s standard was much lower 
though, it considered 400 catties per year as the minimal income. Generally speaking, 
between 1949 and 1951 peasant livelihood improved.  
However, from the point of view of the state, the situation was not so 
encouraging. Liu Shaoqi’s cooperative plan did not work well. SMCs were established 
in various levels from provinces to villages. But they were operating as ordinary 
commercial shops and hardly played a role in connecting peasants with urban centers, 
not to mention its alleged function of regulating the peasant economy.14  
The biggest problem was rural cadres. In the Changzhi area this was a concern 
even before 1949. The radical land reform of 1946-1948 in the old liberated areas of 
North China, together with the rectification of cadres between late 1947 and early 
1948, had reconfigured the rural power structure. Overall, this movement was aimed at 
civil war mobilization15 and overwhelmingly favored “the poor and hired tillers.” 
Property and land were equally divided, more often to the advantage of the poor. 
Middle peasants were hit hard. Before land reform, in many old liberated regions it 
was mainly middle peasants who assumed, often through peasant elections, the post of 
village head. In part this was because they could afford to devote a bit less time to 
work, could calculate and articulate, could provide meals to supervisors and visitors, 
and could manage to resist orders from above. But during the party rectification, class 
background became the dominant criterion and many cadres of middle peasant origin 
were labeled “impure” and were intentionally pushed aside.16 In the Taihang liberated 
region, which later became part of Changzhi prefecture, nearly all village cadres were 
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relieved of duty.17 Poor peasants who shined in the political struggles and profited 
from the land reform came to power. Most of them were poorly-educated, 
radical-minded, and short-sighted. They were not particularly good at production nor 
did they have much moral authority. Their authority relied heavily on their ability to 
fight the “class enemy” and win party support. Cadres of district-level and higher rank 
were hit too. In Taihang, 1,800 out of 8,000 cadres were punished, one third of whom 
were expelled or put on probation. Moreover, to prevent nepotism, it was a common 
practice to relocate cadres. As a result, cadres often knew little about conditions in the 
places where they ruled and had little in common with local peasants.18 
In mid-1948, aware of the disruptions in agricultural production and chaos in the 
countryside, the CCP decided to protect middle peasants’ interests and curb the 
practice of equally redistributing rural property, now labeled as “agrarian utopian 
socialism.” The old working style was criticized, but the new one was not yet formed. 
With the end of the civil war in sight and land reform already completed, a large 
number of cadres were at a loss. They could not easily handle the new problems posed 
by peasants, they did not want to be constrained by party regulations, and, more 
important, they did not see the benefit of serving the party: “There is no more fat profit 
in revolution, so why should we suffer any more. Serving the people is not as 
appealing as working on my own land.” Afraid of being relocated further to the south 
and fearful of being drafted into the army, some cadres renounced their party 
membership, while others became deeply depressed. To encourage local cadres, 
prefectural leaders organized training classes to talk about the new direction of the 
revolution – guiding agricultural production and talking about the Soviet Union. Many 
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rural cadres were interested in the references to the Soviet Union, and said “Now there 
is something in the future to aspire to.”19 In 1950, the situation for cadres had not 
improved much. 
Officially, only cadres of township (xiang) and higher levels were considered state 
employees receiving salaries from the state payroll.20 So village cadres were not 
financially sponsored by the government. Thus when the civil war was over, many 
village cadres believed their mission was accomplished and that it was time to work 
for themselves. Working for the party was increasingly considered a burden. Quite a 
few CCP village cadres asked to resign so they could concentrate on farming their own 
land. For example, in Suyu village in Wuxiang county, Changzhi prefecture, during 
land reform there were 68 CCP members and 36 activists who petitioned to join the 
party believing that “only the CCP can save China.” But by 1951, there were only 22 
CCP members, half of whom did not engage in party affairs and many of whom 
believed they would live a happier life without the CCP.21 Wang Qian was particularly 
shocked by the fact that one party branch in Xianghuan county declared its own 
dissolution. The branch head said, “We have participated in fighting against the 
Japanese and against Chiang Kai-shek. Now the land has been redistributed, Japan and 
Chiang have been defeated. Our mission is over. Therefore our branch is dissolved.”22 
Wang Qian was deeply concerned. He considered such erratic behavior to be 
extremely dangerous and regarded the problem as the most troubling issue for the 
party.23 
Agricultural production was another issue of concern. After the war, the party 
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articulated a new mission for rural cadres - - to guide peasants to produce. Many 
cadres did not understand this assignment very well. They said peasants knew how to 
farm their land and required no guidance from the party. Or, more practically, they 
claimed they did not know how to guide peasants since there was no party directive 
from above, unlike the era of land reform in which the CCP issued oceans of 
directives. So long as cadres followed those directives, there was no need to worry 
about making mistakes.24 How to encourage cadres to be involved in guiding 
agricultural production became an “urgent and large issue that had to be addressed.”25 
In every farming season (spring, summer and fall), the provincial government needed 
to push counties to guide agricultural production. Counties then sent work teams26 to 
villages to check up on rural cadres. During land reform, a time when certain groups 
had benefited and certain groups had suffered, it had been relatively easy for the party 
to inspect real conditions because there were always local actors eager to show 
change. But when it came to increasing productivities, no one suffered when make 
believe “success” was reported. Consequently, positive (and sometimes unrealistic or 
exaggerated) reports prevailed. In short, it was fairly difficult for higher level leaders 
to know the truth.27 
Peasant attitudes did not please the party either. The CCP had anticipated that 
once peasants obtained their own land, they would be willing to purchase better tools, 
apply new technologies, and invest in the land. Contrary to this prediction, however, in 
most cases, post-land reform peasants, especially middle peasants, were reluctant to 
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focus all their efforts on farming or to invest in production. As a result, unit yields had 
not significantly increased. First, peasants had a living memory of the land reform of 
1946-48 and feared that their property would be “socialized” (equally redistributed) in 
the near future. Thus they were afraid of looking “outstanding” in production. They 
asked rhetorically: who is dreaming of accumulating wealth? It is enough to simply 
meet all one’s basic needs. The lesson they learned from the past was that “If your 
output increases one tenth, your burden will increase ten times.”28 The CCP 
immediately recognized this attitude for what is was, and quickly put forward such 
slogans as “work harder to accumulate family wealth” to appease peasants. But these 
slogans did little in ease peasant worries.  
In addition to their fears of being “socialized,” there was something more deeply 
rooted in peasant culture that prevented tillers from applying new technologies. James 
Scott convincingly shows that, based on his research in Southeast Asia, peasants 
“typically prefer to avoid economic disaster rather than take risks to maximize their 
average income.”29 Peasants tended to resist innovations because adopting new 
strategies might mean abandoning a system that they knew well and that involved 
minimal risks. Moreover, after land reform in North China, family holdings were 
fairly small and households contained fewer members.30 A family with fewer laborers 
and small plots saw itself as being in a tenuous situation and was risk adverse. A 
common attitude was “safety-first.” Increasing production was not a high priority for 
such a family.31 Although probably unaware of this sort of peasant psychology, the 
CCP was quite clear about the fact that few peasants could afford the cost of new 
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farming tools. What state agents and activists could do, Wang Qian soon figured out, 
was to organize peasants to buy tools collectively. But the question was how to 
manage such groups. 
After receiving some property allocations and no longer forced to pay rents, a 
large number of peasants did experience improved livelihoods. Middle peasants were 
the dominant group in the countryside. But from the point of view of the state, the 
changes that had taken place did not directly benefit other parts of the nation. Grain 
availability on the free market dropped off considerably. In pre-land reform times, it 
was not uncommon for a small group of wealthy households, mainly small landlords 
and so-called rich peasants, to supply as much as one-half or more of the entire surplus 
marketed by villages.32 In prewar Wuxiang county, Changzhi prefecture, for example, 
landlords and rich peasants made up 5.99 percent of the rural population, yet they 
provided 28.9 percent of total output. Middle peasants, on the other hand, often 
produced only enough food for themselves. In 1948, after land reform, 86 percent of 
the rural population in Wuxiang county was made up of middle peasants and they 
produced roughly 86 percent of total output. If one compares 1949 production to 
prewar yields, peasants as a whole produced 9.1 percent more grain, but the amount of 
surplus grain sent to the free market dropped dramatically. In Hanbi village, for 
instance, annual marketed grain in the prewar period amounted to over 800 dan, while 
in 1950 it dropped to 409 dan.33 Peasants were unwilling to sell their grain. They 
preferred to eat better and live better, or just build up their surplus supplies.34 Studies 
show that on average peasant consumption of grain increased from 370 catties per 
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capita in 1949 to 440 catties per capita in 1952.35 Grain procurement increasingly 
became the CCP’s major concern. 
Meanwhile, not all peasants had improved their lives after land reform. One of 
Wang Qian’s reports on five villages in Changzhi prefecture (Lucheng, Weijiazhuang, 
Beiliu, Chuandi and Shibutou) revealed that before land reform there were 329 poor 
peasant families. As a result of the 1946-48 land reform, 88 percent of them had risen 
to the level of middle peasants or upper-middle peasants. But within two years after 
land reform, 19 households had fallen back into the poor peasant category. The causes 
were diverse. Five households declined because of the death of laborers or livestock, 
four because of “laziness,” three because of mistakes in managing sideline work, and 
two because of increased family size. Conditions for former rich peasants and 
landlords now members of condemned groups, were even worse.36 Changzhi 
prefectural officials were now keenly aware that factors other than the lack of land, 
namely natural disasters, increases or decreases in labor power, marriage, laziness, and 
excessive indulgence, all could lead to poverty.37 These sorts of factors seemed 
unavoidable. But some investigators asked: was there a better way to deal with 
them?38 
Peasants did not hesitate to sell their land when encountering financial difficulties 
or non-farming opportunities. For example, the same report shows that 35 households 
were in the throes of selling their land and four had already completely sold out. A 
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small number of peasants went bankrupt or were unable to achieve family subsistence. 
Those people should not be left to starve. However, the customary relief system had 
been destroyed and the new one not yet established. The party itself did not want to 
directly assume the full responsibility of feeding the needy, partly because it did not 
possess such financial resources at that time. A new method was needed to 
accommodate the unfortunate and feed the hungry. 
Peasants not only decided how much to sell on the market, they also decided what 
kind of crops should be planted. Conditions varied in different regions. For example, 
in Sichuan province, if soil conditions permitted, peasants preferred to plant cash 
crops which were far more profitable than grain. Castor-oil plants and tobacco were 
popular choices. By contrast, in poorer Changzhi prefecture many peasants preferred 
to plant grain to feed the family and to avoid economic risks. It was not uncommon for 
peasant planting patterns to conflict with party plans. In the case of Changzhi, the 
Shanxi provincial government made it clear that it was in need of cotton and other 
cash crops. In Sichuan, to the government’s dismay, as cash crop production rose 
substantially, grain production fell proportionally. Finding a way to keep peasant 
planting practices in line with the needs of the state was a constant concern for 
provincial leaders.  
Another problem that cadres of all levels encountered was how to work out a 
concrete production plan. Within the framework of the sort of centrally planned 
economy the CCP intended to build in the early 1950s, each level of the system was 
required to make a plan and move ahead accordingly. Agriculture was no exception. 
From central party leaders down to village heads, each level had to compile an annual 
production plan. Each spring, local CCP cadres took tremendous pains to create 
production plans. Because of customary culture and illiteracy, peasants were reluctant, 
if not downright unwilling, to make plans of this sort. Pressed too hard, peasants or 
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rural cadres fabricated plans. And peasants rarely followed that phony plan. Instead, 
they laughed at such attempts. In short, for all practical purposes, individual family 
farming was inconsistent with a centralized national economy.  
Moreover, the CCP encountered an entirely new phenomenon in the countryside, 
that of surplus labor. The CCP had always operated under conditions of labor 
shortages. As a matter of fact, mutual aid teams were first organized during war time 
to meet a shortage of labor. Women were encouraged to step out of their homes and 
work in the fields. But when the civil war ended, the situation reversed itself. 
Non-military men were relieved from war-related service, and now women and 
landlords had to work, so household holdings per active tiller declined. 
Underemployment was widely reported across the nation. Furthermore, a large number 
of soldiers were scheduled to be demobilized in the near future. The problem of 
absorbing surplus laborers into rural society became an increasingly challenging task 
for regional leaders. 
But many rural cadres could not readily see a bright socialist future on the 
immediate horizon and had little aspiration to serve the party. Even when they wanted 
to serve, they asked for detailed directives as guidelines. Peasants were not 
enthusiastic about work; they consumed more and provided less to the market. The 
poor remained poor, with some becoming destitute. Some leaders believed class 
polarization was on the rise. “Lazy” peasants remained lazy and had no hesitation 
about selling the land they had received during land reform. The party had little 
control over peasants planting strategies. All of these were new and unanticipated 
phenomena. As had happened to the Soviet Union in the middle 1920s, before very 
long, it was resolved  that the existing structures must be changed, yet it took some 
time before the appropriate means of implementing this decision were found.39 
                                                        
39 Moshe Lewin, Russian Peasants and Soviet Power – A Study of Collectivization (New York. London: 
 63
Under such conditions, Wang Qian concluded that new policies and restructuring 
should be undertaken to move peasants along a socialist path once again. Peasant 
committees had been the best way to organize peasants for class struggle during the 
civil war era, but at this stage, few peasants were interested. A new organizational 
model that could organize peasants around economic issues and at the same time 
facilitate party political control was what he had in mind.40  
Having discussed this with Lai Ruoyu in advance, Wang Qian’s first response was 
to learn from the Soviet Union and to advocate the building of Soviet-style collective 
farms. However, knowing something about the tremendous damage done to the 
agricultural economy of the Soviet Union during the rapid collectivization movement 
of the early 1930s, Wang Qian hesitated. If the form of the collective farm was 
adopted immediately, peasant land and property would have to be taken from them. 
Would this lead to production declines and livestock massacres? Wang Qian had no 
answer and dared not implement collectivization. He decided instead to move ahead 
step by step, starting from the mutual aid team, a form Mao Zedong had fervently 
advocated in the mid-1940s and which was being promoted by Gao Gang in the 
Northeast, a place that influenced the ideas of key party leaders and informed national 
economic policy in the early 1950s.41 
Upgrading Mutual Aid Teams 
Wang Qian soon obtained support from the Shanxi provincial government for his 
proposal. In essence, Shanxi provincial leaders were closely following trends in the 
Northeast and on occasion went even further in the direction of collectivization. All 
along, though, Shanxi leaders offered numerous local reports and local data to 
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convince the central party of its regional wisdom.  
Gao Gang’s advocacy of building mutual aid teams amounted to resistance to 
New Democracy policies and thus angered Liu Shaoqi. When Shanxi provincial 
leaders sided with Gao Gang’s economic projections, they too conflicted with Liu 
Shaoqi. Unfortunately for the Shanxi locals, however, the direct superior of the Shanxi 
organization in the party hierarchy was the North China Bureau which was under Liu’s 
direct influence. Inevitably, as Shanxi provincial leaders marched toward 
collectivization, they consistently encountered obstacles and constraints that originated 
with the North China Bureau and Liu Shaoqi. Past research, mainly based on Bo 
Yibo’s memoir, has focused mostly on the heated disputes between Shanxi provincial 
leaders and Liu Shaoqi in the middle of 1951.42 But from the very beginning, well 
before 1951, Shanxi provincial leaders chose to confront the North China Bureau. 
On January 4, 1950, Northeast Daily published a speech by Gao Gang in which he 
declared a determination to upgrade mutual aid organizations and to offer them 
financial incentives. Not surprisingly, Liu Shaoqi was unhappy. On January 23 he told 
An Ziwen that mutual aid teams in Northeast China were based on broken down and 
impoverished individual economies. They were not a good foundation for socialism. 
He thought it was impossible for the present mutual aid teams to develop into future 
collective farms and hinted that to launch collectivization was a “left” opportunist 
mistake.43 When Mao Zedong was shown the record of Liu’s conversation with An 
Ziwen, he was not pleased, at least according to Gao Gang. But Mao did not intervene 
at this time.44 
Inspired by Gao Gang’s proposal, Shanxi leaders continued to actively consider 
how to upgrade mutual aid teams. In March 1950, they developed a new slogan about 
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“combining organizational mobilization with improving technology” to boost 
production and to guide peasants towards collectivization.45 But on April 28, the N
China Bureau sent directives requesting “the rectification of simple notions of agraria
utopian socialism,” making in clear that the right direction for rural developm
among peasants was a New Democracy in which the private economy was the main 
force. It should be respected.
orth 
n 
ent 
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The North China Bureau’s directive had nearly no effect on Changzhi prefecture. 
From May to June, at local conferences at various levels, the direction of rural 
development toward collectivization continued to be highlighted. According to Tunliu 
county estimates, in 1950 approximately 2000 to 3000 people had attended 
conferences hosted by the county focusing on the issue of rural development and 
stressing the need to organize peasants into mutual aid teams as a way of moving 
toward collectivization. The county party treated such reports as calls for political 
mobilization. But the report from Tunliu county also showed that at the village level, 
even after this round of “education,” most party members and village heads did not 
comprehend the meaning of the message, and nearly all peasants still wanted to work 
individually in a manner chosen by themselves.47  
On June 7, Shanxi Daily published Gao Gang’s speech at the CCP’s first congress 
in the Northeast region, one in which he again emphasized the building of mutual aid 
teams. In the same month, Shanxi Daily responded enthusiastically to Gao’s lead by 
publishing several articles that introduced success stories about mutual aid team 
experiments and discussed details about how to operate such mutual aid teams. One 
 
45 Shanxi Daily, March 5, 1950. 
46 Zhonggong zhongyang Huabei ju zhongyao wenjian huibian 1 ce (Collections of important 
documents of the North China Bureau of the CCP, vol 1) (hereafter as Huibian) (internal circulation), 
638-639. SPA. 
47 “Nongcun fangxian guanche zhuanti baogao” (October 30, 1950) (A special report on carrying out 
the direction of rural development), JCP, 24.1.1. 
 66
article entitled “Discussing a Couple of Problems in the Mutual Aid Movement in Old 
Liberated Areas” is of particular interest. This article questioned the notion that 
peasants had joined mutual aid teams in order to overcome difficulties in production, 
and the assertion that after land reform peasants encountered a few difficulties in the 
groups so they tended to withdraw from mutual aid teams. By contrast, this chapter 
argued that peasants withdrew because mutual aid teams could not meet their demands 
for enlarging and expanding development. The party should expand the function of 
mutual aid teams to attract peasants. For example, this article introduced the practice 
of collectively opening up wasteland.48 This triggered discussions and disagreements.  
One month later, another article in Shanxi Daily, this time citing developments in 
Xin county, advocated a new form of organizing peasants which was called the 
“agricultural cooperative.” In agricultural cooperatives, peasants, together with their 
private land, joined as share holders. Coop members farmed the land collectively, but 
land and output remained the property of owners. This form was considered by the 
prefecture as an advanced form and leaders were encouraged to extend it to other 
areas.49 
The North China Bureau promptly fought back. On July 10, it published in 
People’s Daily an editorial entitled “Striving for the Wealth of Peasants in North 
China.” This article asserted that the most urgent problem with respect to peasants was 
their reluctance to work harder due to fear of further redistribution of private property. 
The solution was to widely disseminate New Democratic policies and to assure 
peasants that accumulating wealth by working hard was fully justified, glorious, and 
encouraged by the government. A rich peasant economy was allowed, and prosperous 
peasants were protected by the law. The party’s job was to convince peasants that 
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socialism would come along only in the very distant future. Mutual aid teams and 
cooperatives should never be forced on people. Forcing farmers violated the principle 
of mutual benefit; that is, joining such groups was meant to benefit both the group and 
the individual. Further, the article forbade rural cadres from imposing hollow political 
instructions on peasants.50 On August 26, the North China Bureau once again sent out 
a directive calling for the curbing of “agrarian utopian socialism” and criticizing the 
practice of forcing peasants to “get organized.” Without identifying the target, this 
directive stated, “Some branches have not seriously implemented the North China 
Bureau’s directive on rectifying the simplistic idea of agrarian utopian socialism. They 
are expected to carry out a deep investigation and thoroughly overcome this 
problem.”51 It was not hard to figure out who “some branches” referred to.  
Shanxi provincial leaders again chose to ignore the directive. Instead, they turned 
in a report (that will be analyzed later in this chapter) to the North China Bureau 
which stated that the restrictions placed on mutual aid team formation were based on 
the fact that such groups could not meet peasant demands for increasing production. 
But in fact, they insisted, many peasants did not want to withdraw from mutual aid 
teams. So, according to Shanxi leaders, what the party should do is guide mutual aid 
teams and actually expand their functions.52 In November, Changzhi prefecture was 
able to publish a report on mutual aid in People’s Daily in which the practice of 
collectively purchasing farming implements was recommended.53 This article was a 
landmark in the Shanxi provincial leaders early, some said premature, march toward 
coop formation and collectivization and brought national attention to Changzhi. 
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One detail that was not noted in those promising reports was that local cadres in 
Changzhi prefecture had been reported to higher-ups for their ignorance and 
commandism, factors that facilitated the implementation of radical polices. Cadres of 
district and lower levels knew little or nothing about central policies. Believing that 
“communism” would arrive within two to three years, they did not care about peasant 
rights to private property. Fearing the specter of rural class polarization, in many areas 
they forbade trading in land. Predominantly siding with poor peasants, they did not 
hesitate to infringe on the rights of middle peasants. As for mutual aid teams, they 
regarded them as administrative organizations designed to control peasants. As for 
how to deal with peasants, that was easy. Peasants were “like pecans, you have to 
smash them to get what you want.” Others cadres said, “Thousands of words do not 
work as well as one slash.” Eight cadres in Changzhi were exposed as leaders who had 
oppressed people to death. In addition to violence, they had also organized numbingly 
long conferences to “persuade” peasants. When it came to organizing peasants into 
mutual aid teams, they simply asked peasants, “The Chairman Mao requested you to 
get organized, so why don’t you follow his instruction?” “What kind of people do not 
support Chairman Mao?”54 Few peasants dared to be labeled as anti-Mao and thus 
meekly followed orders. Certainly, the attitudes of local cadres toward peasants and 
socialism produced high rates of “organizing peasants” which provided Changzhi 
prefecture with the sort of positive data it wanted. 
Losing Touch with Reality 
Changzhi got its national reputation because of a series of reports. Acting on 
Wang Qian’s orders, counties in Changzhi prefecture submitted numerous reports 
supporting the development of mutual aid teams. Quite a few of them reached the 
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Central Committee of the CCP and some were even published in the People’s Daily. 
But during the transmission of the reports from the counties to the central government, 
messages that were already tendentiously formulated were further distorted to meet the 
needs of various groups. This becomes clear when one compares three such reports 
and understands how the information was spun and thus “perfected” during the 
process of transmission from the local to the central level and finally to the public. 
One of the major investigations Wang Qian ordered was carried out in six villages 
in Wuxiang county, Changzhi prefecture. The statistics based on this investigation 
generated several influential reports. On August 7, 1950, Wuxiang county submitted a 
summary entitled “Investigation of the Movement to Organize Mutual Aid Teams and 
Agricultural Production in Six Villages in Wuxiang county” to the agricultural 
department of Shanxi province. Basing its analysis on this report, on August 25, 1950 
Shanxi province submitted a report entitled “Investigation of Villages in the Old 
Liberated Areas of Wuxiang county” to the North China Bureau. This report was later 
published by Shanxi Daily on October 12, 1950. On November 14, a Changzhi 
prefecture report “On the Current Situation and Problems Associated with Getting 
Organized” was published in People’s Daily. 
The original Wuxiang county report summarized developments and new problems 
in the six villages under investigation. After land reform, middle peasants comprised 
86 percent of the rural population. Rural production had recovered and agricultural 
output in 1949 had surpassed the prewar record by 9.1 percent. Peasants improved 
their livelihood. Now, 14 percent of households were able to store 10 dan of surplus 
grain, 6.7 percent stored over 5 dan, and 33.5 percent stocked over one dan of surplus 
grain. At the same time, 47.2 percent of households could barely feed themselves and 
6.5 per cent could not meet their needs. The main problem, as far as this report was 
concerned, was the increase in labor surpluses. So the report suggested expanding 
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investments in agriculture, that is, putting more effort into careful planting in order to 
absorb surplus laborers. It mentioned that class polarization had begun and land sales 
were taking place. 4.33 percent of households were involved in land sales, with a few 
even selling all their land. This report noted that in areas where peasants had been 
organized and were helping each other, the pace of class differentiation was somehow 
slower, and the scale smaller. But it also acknowledged that the pace and scale of 
polarization was closely related to whether peasants could acquire loans and credit. 
Thus the report petitioned the state to grant peasants more credit and loans. This report 
discussed next the issue of mutual aid teams. The fact was that mutual aid teams were 
in the process of contracting. Fewer households participated in them. Investigators 
also noticed that a significant number of mutual aid teams were organized on the basis 
of sharing livestock. Peasants of the same economic status were more likely to form a 
mutual aid team, they said. But these groups tended to deny access to seniors and 
females, and failed to make long term production plans. According to the report, the 
reasons were, first, that peasants feared that their property would be “socialized” in the 
near future, thus they did not want to invest in farming. Second, with more surplus 
labor, there was no need to get organized to overcome difficulties. Finally, rural cadres 
did not place much emphasis on organizing peasants.55 
In general, while stressing the need for prosperity in the countryside, this report 
acknowledged certain problems, such as surplus labor. It was aware of the fact that 
most peasants did not want to form mutual aid teams and explained the economic 
considerations involved. It affirmed neither peasant desire for mutual aid teams nor 
any call by them for party guidance. Quite the contrary, it implied that many peasants 
had refrained from withdrawing from mutual aid teams simply because they were 
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afraid of being labeled “laggards” by the party. They chose to maintain the form in 
name only. Agreeing to the necessity of organizing peasants into mutual aid teams, this 
report did not highlight the socialist future or the long term goal of collectivization. 
Rather, it suggested that the party provide more economic incentives in order to attract 
peasants into mutual aid teams so as to get them to produce more. Obviously the 
original report regarded the mutual aid team as an economic form, and nothing more. 
In Shanxi’s report to the North China Bureau, the basic statistics were in accord 
with the Wuxiang county report, but its focus on the nature of peasant problems and its 
analysis of the issues were different. The focus shifted to the alleged problem of class 
polarization and the phenomenon of land concentration. It highlighted the claim that 
some families had doubled their land holdings in two years, which was by no means a 
gradual development. It urged the party to be alert to such a trend. As for the mutual 
aid teams, it claimed, after investigating certain cases and reviewing the overall 
picture, that all villages that had “gotten organized” had fewer or no land transactions. 
It also discovered that mutual aid teams were heading in different directions. Certain 
teams were developing fast and very well, the report insisted. Acknowledging that 
many mutual aid teams were in decline, the Shanxi report stated that the downswing 
did not mean that peasants were unwilling join mutual aid teams. Quite the contrary, 
peasants were reluctant to leave mutual aid teams. A common reaction of peasants 
was, “Chairman Mao is right, we must get organized.” The writers asserted that after 
the party had led peasants to acquire land, peasants had improved their political 
consciousness and had gradually formed the habit of working collectively. Thus they 
reached the following conclusion. Although peasants as small producers were inclined 
to work individually, they had the potential and even the desire to be organized along 
more socialist lines. So what the party should do is follow Chairman Mao who said the 
serious issue was the education of peasants. The report was confident: “When we did 
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it right, there was no problem getting peasants organized.”56 
Unlike the internal Wuxiang county report, this provincial one was published in 
Shanxi Daily and thus circulated quite widely in public arenas. It told of peasant 
aspirations regarding mutual aid teams and proposed the nurturing of peasant culture 
in the direction of increasingly collective work styles. It also portrayed the 
reemergence of class polarization as an urgent issue in the countryside, and called on 
the party to focus on and eradicate the problem. As a consequence, many other 
problems in the countryside were downplayed in the article, if not totally neglected. 
The Changzhi prefectural report, which appeared in People’s Daily, painted an 
even simpler picture. First, it presented rural life as filled with abundance and wealth. 
Without providing supporting statistics, it said that in the Changzhi area advanced 
villages had produced 50 percent more, or doubled their prewar output. Peasants were 
getting rich and had more surplus grain. For example, in Wulihou village the majority 
of village households had stocked surplus grain in amounts greater than five dan. Also, 
the article asserted, there was abundant “idle money” or capital available in the 
countryside which needed to be properly channeled by the party. The present situation 
was one in which the peasants were demanding further developments, yet the party 
could not offer the guidance they needed. So, peasants embraced the idea of “working 
individually” (dan gan), and mutual aid teams were falling apart. Such phenomena 
were dangerous. If they were allowed to continue, only a few peasants would become 
rich while most peasants would go bankrupt. Rural cadres, they warned, must not 
ignore such a situation. The Changzhi report quoted Mao’s writings in the mid-1940s 
and claimed that the party must fight the idea of “leaving peasants alone,” and resolve 
to put peasants on the road to collectivization. Shanxi employed two methods. One 
was to combine mutual aid teams with new technology by having peasants purchase 
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farm tools collectively in mutual aid teams. According to the article, these methods 
had been shown to work well and a revolution in agricultural production had already 
started. In a final section, the report discussed whether rich peasants should be allowed 
into mutual aid teams.  
    This People’s Daily report was quite different from the first two. For instance, the 
statistics it used were inconsistent with those cited in the first two reports. It was too 
good to be true. Even if the numbers were valid, they could not represent the typical 
situation. Second, the report did not rely on data to make its claims. Instead, it simply 
quoted Mao’s words to prove its points. Moreover, the Changzhi report was 
ideologically driven, and from beginning to end discussed the long term goal of 
collectivization. From this point of view, the peasant tendency to work individually 
and the presence of rich peasants in the community were considered “bad” 
phenomena. The report formally declared that those who preferred to work 
individually stood in opposition to the goal of collectivization and it expressed a clear 
resolve to curb the trend. Of all the reports, this one reflected the least about rural 
realities. Sadly, this was the most influential report and when it was published in 
People’s Daily its message reached the whole nation.57 Subsequent reports out of 
Shanxi followed the tone of the Changzhi report and often went further.  
By comparing the three reports, it is possible to see that during the process of 
transmission of information from the local to the central level, and from internal 
circulation to the public circulation, reality was sacrificed and messages were distorted 
further and further. The development of agricultural production in the countryside was 
exaggerated, especially in the Changzhi report, to convey a single message: it was 
time to prioritize ideological agendas since the economy had already been improved. It 
is likely that Changzhi prefectural leaders were aware of the exaggerations. In an 
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internally circulated summary of the agricultural production of Changzhi prefecture, a 
note was added underscoring the fact that agricultural production in 1949 was only 
slightly higher than prewar levels, and that the data showing an increase of over 40 
percent were not reliable at all. This summary concluded that one-third of villages had 
not yet reached their prewar levels of production.58 
Meanwhile, such phenomena as alleged class polarization and land sales were 
increasingly highlighted, while their complex causes, such as natural disaster, personal 
difficulties, and the lack of credit, were entirely overlooked. The causes were not 
analyzed, yet the solution was said to be crystal clear: form mutual aid teams and get 
peasants organized. The diversity of views among peasants was not explored. Instead, 
peasants were simply categorized into two groups: those who wanted to work 
individually to accumulate family wealth and those who wanted to form mutual aid 
teams but did not receive meaningful assistance from the party. Although no data or 
research findings were provided to support the claim, the Changzhi report argued that 
deep in their hearts most peasants expressed a desire to enroll in mutual aid teams and 
be guided toward collectivization. So it was the responsibility of the party to work 
ever harder to educate and lead peasants. The fact that many peasants were in 
desperate need of credit and loans was not highlighted. On the contrary, it was the 
myth of abundant idle money floating around in the countryside and available for 
investment that was underlined. In sum, the story was that peasants had reached a 
bottleneck in rural production and were in need of guidance for further development. 
Only mutual aid teams could help peasants improve their lives while taking the right 
road in the direction of collectivization. Mao’s writings on mutual aid and China’s 
socialist future was reiterated and regarded as self-evident.  
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Once the task of guiding peasants toward collectivization became a central issue, 
mutual aid teams were no longer viewed as merely economic organizations, but as 
political and ideological symbols. Many pressing issues in the countryside were 
neglected, and the need to move toward collectivization in the future justified the 
necessity of developing mutual aid teams in the present. The disbanding and breakup 
of mutual aid teams was thus increasingly regarded as a serious concern that needed to 
be addressed at once. The party was assigned the political task of swinging into action. 
The higher a report reached, the simpler its message was. The complex problems 
encountered by the peasants in Wang Qian’s internally circulated investigation were 
increasingly downplayed, if not totally overlooked. During the process of 
communication and channeling, politically motivated interpretations with a specific 
purpose were injected, one after another. Although real peasant mentalities and 
conditions were not accurately presented, nearly all reports left the misleading 
impression that they represented the views of peasants and often employed peasant 
voices and language. Plans, suggestions, and innovations were commonly presented as 
coming directly from peasants or as the party’s earnest responses to peasant requests.  
The challenge for scholars who seek the truth is to pay more attention to the 
intentionally ignored messages contained in the reports. But contemporary leaders did 
not have easy access to grass roots reports. In the case of Mao Zedong, a large number 
of reports he saw had been subjected to round after round of censorship, editing, and 
interpretation. The complexity of rural realities faded away in the process of 
communication. What peasants were thinking was not as important as what they 
should be thinking. In the end those faulty reports proved sufficiently plausible to 
convince Mao that he had found one possible solution once and for all. 
In fact, even the original Wuxiang county report was produced for a specific 
purpose: to promote mutual aid teams. It did not fully reflect what peasants were 
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thinking and what peasants were in need of. We can say with certainty that the 
situation was far more diverse and complex than the picture crafted for the reports. 
Moreover, the situation varied dramatically in the different regions of China. In short, 
peasant problems could not be resolved by any one solution. But it is still worth asking 
whether any peasants were interested in forming mutual aid teams. 
The answer is, yes, there were such peasants, like Geng Changsuo and his 
followers in Wugong village in neighboring Hebei province, who formed mutual aid 
teams and even cooperatives as early as the mid-1940s.59 But such mutual aid teams 
were purely economic organizations and the goal was to make money. Their secret of 
success resided in developing sideline industries, not in increasing agricultural 
production. Once the party intervened to incorporate political goals or apply political 
principles, many of these promising enterprises were doomed in economic terms. It is 
fair to say that in 1950 in places where there was no special guidance, the 
overwhelming number of peasants were reluctant, if not resistant, to joining mutual 
aid teams. A case in point is Li Shunda of Changzhi prefecture. In 1949 Li Shunda was 
a national model laborer and the head of Xigou village, Wuxiang county. Later in the 
coop movement of the mid-1950s he emerged as the most recognized model laborer in 
the nation, and he was granted the honor of talking to Chairman Mao. He was the very 
symbol of the cooperativization movement and there was even a documentary film 
about him. But in 1949, even his mutual aid team was in the process of disintegration 
and Li was considering moving into town. This worried Changzhi prefecture whose 
leaders decided to redouble their special guidance when it came to Li and his village. 
In late 1949, the party branch of Wuxiang county sent cadres to help Li. A work team 
of cadres from different levels was established in Li’s village. This team gave Li 
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suggestions, helped him conduct research, discussed issues with him, made working 
plans for him, and most importantly, manufactured reports for him. Changzhi county 
even assigned Li a secretary to host receptions and to help him study the experiences 
of other villages. In addition to the investment of personnel, a large amount of material 
support was also sent Li’s way.60 It was with such unflagging support that Li Shunda 
soon became a national star in the early 1950s. 
Decades later, an interview with Tao Lujia, the present day propaganda minister of 
Shanxi, shed considerable light on the situation in the early years. Tao was asked, “Did 
peasants practice cooperative farming or have such aspirations?” He replied candidly, 
“Peasants themselves did not have such aspirations. The key was our guidance.”61 
Clashing with Liu Shaoqi and the North China Bureau 
Following Changzhi prefecture’s November declaration, on December 30, the 
Shanxi provincial government submitted another summary of its mutual aid movement 
to the North China Bureau. According to this report, mutual aid teams flourished. For 
example, in the Changzhi area, up to 75 percent of peasants had joined mutual aid 
teams, and agricultural production had increased substantially. As a survey of 57 
villages claimed to show, total output now surpassed the prewar level by 80 percent. 
As mutual aid teams deployed new farming implements and made efficient use of 
labor, unit yield improved significantly. Moreover, they asserted, in order to meet the 
needs of increasing production, quite a few mutual aid teams had collectively 
purchased large farm implements, and some teams took the initiative to collect 
community funds for further investment and group welfare.62 
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In Changzhi’s reports, everything about the mutual aid teams appeared promising. 
Nevertheless, the truth was not so reassuring—as Shanxi leaders knew all too well. 
The idea of combining mutual aid teams with new technology was rather hollow and 
had very little practical result. It did little to reverse the trend of mutual aid team 
breakups into farming by individual households, a point that even Lai Ruoyu had to 
admit.63 “Experience had proven that, without proper guidance, peasants would not 
get organized.”64 So the key solution, cadres decided, was to guide peasants. Yet 
guiding peasants itself was not an easy task. Village cadres kept asking questions such 
as, “How should we guide peasants while respecting the principle of voluntarism?” 
and “If this principle (voluntarism) is to be honored, mutual aid teams should be 
allowed to disband.”65 It was often the case that they simply lacked the confidence, 
experience and willingness of leading those “hoodlums.” Not surprisingly, some 
merely convened a meeting to announce this policy of “getting organized” and made 
no follow-up effort to enforce it.66 Changzhi prefecture cadres repeatedly instructed 
village cadres to publicize good examples so other peasants would follow them, but 
other than this modest suggestion, no approaches were provided; and more often than 
not, good examples were not created. Village cadres needed guidance on the 
day-to-day conduct of the affair. 
Other than follow instructions, some substantial ingredients had to be introduced. 
In the winter 1950, cadres of Changzhi prefecture raised a new call asking peasants “to 
purchase new farming tools and to conquer the surprising difficulties.” To substantiate 
this call, mutual aid teams were requested to collect community funds from members. 
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Another concern underlying this new policy was the unanticipated outcome of the 
boom of mutual aid teams: well-off peasants were making use of the form to exploit 
the poor. Since hiring laborers was considered politically risky, “cunning” rich 
peasants set up mutual aid teams as a screen and recruited poor peasants to work in 
them.67 Changzhi prefecture cadres were not comfortable with this development and 
decided to place some restrictions upon such activities. Wang Qian figured that 
collecting community funds [Gongji jing] would curb the development of the rich 
peasant economy within mutual aid teams. To discourage rich peasants, he set forth 
three rules: the funds were collected according to the amount of private land held by 
peasants, but were shared equally among all members; if a member withdrew from a 
team, he was not allowed to take away his share of community funds; the funds were 
used to cover the expenditures of production and community welfare. Beginning in 
December 1950, the practice of collecting community funds was enforced within 
Changzhi prefecture area.  
Peasants resisted it. Without doubt, taking money out of peasants’ private pockets 
was unpopular with them. Peasants with relatively more land were resentful; they did 
not concur with the idea that they could not take their shares out when they exited the 
team; they disputed the use of the community funds. However, despite peasants’ 
opposition, Wang Qian concluded that “community funds might possibly lead peasants 
towards agricultural collectivization while at the same time keeping rich peasants out 
of the mutual aid teams.”68 The practice was nevertheless continued. 
In February 1951, Wang Qian went further. The fact that some good mutual aid 
teams now had more public assets, partly due to the forced accumulation of 
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community funds and partly due to the rewards in kind those good mutual aid teams 
received from the local government proved to Wang Qian that “as mutual aid teams 
operate well, the accumulation of public assets is inevitable.”69 Observing how 
difficult it was to collect community funds from peasants, Wang Qian predicted that, 
collecting community funds would be much easier in agricultural producers’ 
cooperatives in which funds would be deducted from the incomes before being 
distributed to individual peasants.70 
Depressed by the number of mutual aid team breakups, but encouraged by those 
new phenomena like community funds and the accumulation of public assets, Lai 
Ruoyu became aware that mutual aid team movement had reached a turning point. He 
reasoned that the only method to prevent them from collapse was to actively exhort 
them to move even further towards higher level socialist organizations. Following 
Wang Qian’s suggestions, in March 1951, Lai proposed setting up experimental 
agricultural producers’ cooperatives in Changzhi prefecture.71 Details of building 
those experimental agricultural producers’ cooperatives will be discussed in chapter 3. 
Lai Ruoyu’s report instantly upset the North China Bureau. During the course of 
the Changzhi mutual aid and coop conference, a North China Bureau inspection team 
arrived on the scene and recommended not to start the trial in haste, as chapter 3 will 
discuss. Wang Qian did not change his plan. No compromise was reached. Instead, the 
opinions of both sides were written down and submitted to the North China Bureau. 
When the work team discussed this issue with Lai Ruoyu, Lai explicitly sided with 
Changzhi and reasserted his claim that the disagreements were related to different 
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attitudes towards private ownership.72 
The North China Bureau placed some constraints on Shanxi leaders and decided 
to convene a conference on mutual aid and cooperatives in five provinces and cites in 
North China to discuss the issue of building agricultural cooperatives. Informed of this 
upcoming conference, Shanxi provincial leaders met and approved Lai Ruoyu’s draft 
regarding “Upgrading Mutual Aid and Cooperative Organization” and promptly 
submitted it to the North China Bureau. In this report, Lai alleged that mutual aid 
teams had reached a turning point. They might decline, they might become rich 
peasant organizations, or they might be promoted in ways that advanced a socialist 
agenda. Lai proposed upgrading mutual aid and cooperative organizations in order to 
check the “the spontaneous tendency” of the individual peasants and to further 
destabilize and eventually eliminate the private ownership system. He insisted that 
accumulating communal investment funds and distributing profits according to labor 
were two key principles.73 But such efforts to weaken the private sector touched Liu 
Shaoqi’s most sensitive nerves. Liu and the North China Bureau retaliated 
immediately. The North China Bureau first questioned the data contained in the 
Shanxi report, and then directly and personally criticized the Shanxi representatives.  
During the conference on mutual aid and coops, the majority of attendees 
criticized the Shanxi report because it was inconsistent with New Democracy policies 
and because agricultural cooperatives were said to be manifestations of utopian 
socialism. Under New Democracy, it was wrong to eliminate private ownership. There 
could be no true collectivization without mechanization. Some participants blasted 
Wang Qian for “cutting a fine figure” (chu fengtou). After the conference, Liu Lantao, 
                                                        
72 Tao Lujia, “Mao Zhuxi zhichi Shanxi sheng shiban hezuoshe” (Chairman Mao supported Shanxi 
province in the building of trial cooperatives), Shanxi nongye hezuohua, 635-654. 
73 “Ba laoqu huzhu zuzhi tigao yibu” (April 17, 1951) (Upgrading the mutual aid organization one step 
further in the old liberated areas), Huibian, 35-36. 
 82
head of the North China Bureau, told the Shanxi representatives that “Comrade Liu 
Shaoqi does not agree with Shanxi’s report. When you return, tell the provincial 
branch not to endorse the errors in the report. You should read some related books and 
report back to the North China Bureau.”74 
The North China Bureau’s critique generated disputes among Shanxi provincial 
leaders. In a standing committee meeting of the CCP Shanxi branch, Cheng Zihua, the 
chairman of the Shanxi government, supported the North China Bureau and said there 
was no need to discuss the issue of the direction of rural development. Shanxi should 
follow the instructions of the North China Bureau. Lai disagreed. He reiterated that the 
issue that the old liberated area should focus on was how to consolidate mutual aid 
teams, upgrade them and steer them toward collectivization and modernization. Wang 
Qian then gave a particularly important talk. Referring to some model cases in 
Changzhi prefecture as relevant examples, he asserted that rural cadres who did not 
actively lead peasants were the cause of the decline of mutual aid teams. He 
highlighted positive peasant affiliations with mutual aid teams. More importantly, he 
widely quoted Mao’s earlier writings and CCP directives of the 1940s that advocated 
mutual aid teams and collectivization to underscore the necessity of getting peasants 
organized. He acknowledged that peasants seemed enthusiastic about the individual 
economy, but insisted they also wanted to get better organized and increase 
productivity. Rural cadres were advised to take active note of this latter characteristic. 
Moreover, he reminded cadres of the important role played by new agricultural 
equipment in liberating production. In the end he concluded that insuring the right 
direction of rural development meant doing more than forming mutual aid teams. 
Coop formation should be initiated.75 
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Lai Ruoyu won his debate with Cheng Zihua. As a matter of fact, Cheng Zihua 
was soon transferred to a post outside Shanxi.76 Lai drafted a reply to the North China 
Bureau in which he virtually rejected its charges, emphasizing that his suggestion was 
just an experiment.77 The disputes between Lai Ruoyu and Liu Shaoqi from May 1
to July 1950 have been well recounted by Bo Yibo.
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adhered strictly to the policies for economic construction that the party had adop
1949. He introduced two principles that lower levels were to follow. First, no attempt 
should be made to undermine private ownership in the countryside, and, second, 
mechanization was a prerequisite for full scale collectivization. Liu Shaoqi further 
accused those who wanted to begin collectivization in the countryside of pursuing
“utopian socialism.” But some of the important details related to the confrontat
not adequately addressed in Bo Yibo’s memoir. 
Presumably irritated by the stubbornness of the Shanxi provincial leaders and in 
all likelihood concerned with pressures arising from the Gao Gang camp, that is, 
people who held ideas like those espoused by the Shanxi leaders and who seemed also 
to be challenging his position, Liu Shaoqi was furious. Bo Yibo’s writings do not do 
full justice to the extent of Liu’s anger. On May 7, Liu Shaoqi asserted at a national 
propaganda conference that it was virtually impossible to guide China’s agriculture 
towards socialism by organizing mutual aid teams or agricultural cooperatives. Liu 
actually identified the target of his criticism when he declared that “Comrade Lai 
Ruoyu did not accept the critique of the North China Bureau, therefore he made huge 
mistakes.” Liu sternly advised other comrades to maintain their faith in the party, 
refrain from embracing localism, and avoid fighting against the center. Otherwise the 
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state center would exert organizational discipline and punishment.79 In the next two 
months, and on several different occasions, Liu attacked Lai Ruoyu and the Shanxi 
government. Even Bo Yibo, who clearly sides with Liu Shaoqi, concludes that it was 
inappropriate and politically insensitive, if not wrong, for Liu Shaoqi to severely 
criticize a provincial government on so many occasions without consulting Mao and 
other CCP leaders.80 
However, Lai was not intimidated. During his debate with Liu Shaoqi, Lai sent 
petitions to the central CCP and to Mao himself. He instructed Shanxi officials to 
ignore directives from the North China Bureau and proceed as previously planned 
until they received a reply from Mao, as will be discussed in the chapter 3.81 One 
explanation for such boldness was that at this moment Lai was in contact with Chen 
Boda, Mao’s secretary and highly trusted advisor. Lai was informed by Chen that Mao 
was interested in Gao Gang’s Northeastern experiments for building socialism in the 
countryside. Mao said, as Marxists, “We should focus on the new phenomena of 
socialism.”82  
In response to Liu Lantao’s order to read more books, Shanxi leaders read more 
Marxist classics, but they did so for the purpose of further supporting their own 
proposal! They discovered that in Capital Marx had said “All fully developed 
machinery consists of three essentially different parts, the motor mechanism, the 
transmitting mechanism, and finally the tool or working machine,” and “The tool or 
working machine is that part of the machinery with which the industrial revolution of 
the 18th century started.” 83 Lai Ruoyu concluded that new “tools” such as big farm 
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equipment made of iron and pulled by horses were the “working machines” Marx had 
referred to. Compared to China’s traditional farming tools made of wood, the new 
tools represented a significant improvement. Organizing cooperatives and encouraging 
the use of such new tools was an important part of the process of mechanization. 
Tractors, he quipped, should not be regarded as the only modern machine of relevance 
to rural people. As for the question of when to start moving peasants into collective 
farms, Shanxi leaders found yet another theoretical text. Engels once said, “It will 
serve us nought to wait with this transformation until capitalist production has 
developed everywhere to its utmost consequences, until the last small handicraftsman 
and the last small peasant have fallen victim to capitalist large-scale production.”84 In 
this sense, Liu Shaoqi’s support of the development of New Democracy capitalism 
was rebutted. Further, in order to justify their views about the rules that should govern 
coop formation, Shanxi leaders highlighted Engel’s ideas about the transformation of 
small peasant private enterprises and private property into cooperative enterprises and 
property as the best method of liberating peasants.85 Taking Marx and Engels as their 
theoretical forefathers, Shanxi leaders were confident that their plan had nothing to do 
with utopian socialism. 
The debate between the North China Bureau and Shanxi leaders continued. 
During the debates, Liu Shaoqi made his ideas increasingly clear. He did not regard 
mutual aid teams as a form that paved the way for socialism, but as a means of 
increasing productivity. It was wrong to widely recommend agricultural cooperatives. 
Agricultural cooperatives themselves had no future. Rich peasants, he argued, would 
surely flourish and even control the village if the party could not constrain them. For 
the next decade or more the party should not think about building socialism in the 
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rural sector. But Liu Shaoqi eventually crossed the line in the eyes of Mao Zedong and 
Mao intervened.  
Set the tone: The First National Mutual Aid and Cooperation Conference 
Mao Zedong did not clearly address on why he chose at this point to support 
Shanxi leaders. But certainly, Shanxi leaders’ proposal of building agricultural 
producers’ cooperatives inspired him. As chapter 1 analyzes, in the 1940s, Mao 
regarded mutual aid teams as the first step towards the collective farm. Although Mao 
was quite certain about the jumping-off point and the terminal (collectivization), he 
had no idea on what’s the between. Shanxi’s trial of agricultural producers’ 
cooperatives, to Mao, ideally bridged the two points of his grand version of China’s 
path to collectivization. Agricultural producers’ cooperatives made Mao’s vision 
suddenly viable. Mao Zedong highly valued the form of agricultural producers’ 
cooperative, as he frankly stated, 
Without agricultural collectivization, there is no way to achieve 
industrialization. China is an agriculture-based country, industry is scarce. 
There are four hundred million peasants that formed one hundred million 
households. It is very difficult to take command of those one hundred million 
households, it is like catching a fish from an ‘ocean of peasants.’ We have to 
have them organized.86  
Mao made it clear that one way to organize peasants was in the agricultural 
producers’ cooperative, “we should not give it up simply because we have no 
machines. It is like our army, should we not fight if we don’t have modern 
weapons?”87 
 No doubt Mao acted upon Shanxi’s proposal. Mao held a private talk with Liu 
Shaoqi, Bo Yibo, and Liu Lantao. He explicitly endorsed Shanxi leaders. Presumably 
impressed by the success of Shanxi leaders in finding theoretical support in Marxist 
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classics, Mao based his own position on Stalin’s statements in Foundations of 
Leninism. Mao asserted that just as the British putting-out system had provided the 
foundation for a new set of production relations associated with industrialization, the 
Chinese mutual aid teams could perform a similar function in the creation of new 
production relations associated with socialism.88 Convinced or not, Liu Shaoqi, Bo 
Yibo and Liu Lantao appeared to have been “persuaded by Mao’s arguments” and 
abruptly abandoned their viewpoints. 
Mao instructed Chen Boda to convene the First National Mutual Aid and 
Cooperation Conference in September 1951. Liu Shaoqi wrote a keynote speech, but it 
was shelved and never discussed. Instead, Chen Boda’s “Resolution on Mutual Aid 
and Cooperation in Agriculture (Draft)” (hereafter as the Draft) was adopted as the 
keynote message. From then on, Liu Shaoqi ceased to actively comment on the 
cooperative issue and seldom published his thoughts about it.89 Indeed, at the time a
in subsequent years, Liu made repeated self-criticisms of his “mistakes” on the issue
of cooperatives.  
nd 
 
                                                       
In Chen’s Draft, peasants’ desire to work collectively and to join mutual aid teams 
was accentuated. After the conference, Mao consulted with Zhao Shuli, a highly 
respected writer on peasants and rural life, about the Chen’s draft. Zhao replied 
candidly and simply, that peasants had no desire to join mutual aid teams; they only 
wanted to work individually. Stimulated by Zhao Shuli, Mao instructed that the Draft 
should also affirm that many peasants preferred to work individually. Consequently, 
the Draft was rewritten. The first paragraph of the revised version declared that the 
enthusiasm of peasants after land reform was related to a combination of aspects of 
both the individual economy and cooperative labor. 
 
88 Bo Yibo, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu, 191, translated by Li Hua-yu in Mao and the 
Economic Stalinization of China 1948-1953, 153. 
89 Liu Jianping, “Nongye hezuohua juece de guocheng jiqi zhengzhixue yiyi: xin zhongguo 1951.” 
 88
Draft modified the original plan of transition to socialism in rural sector. Although 
acknowledging peasants’ dual natures, apparently, it announced to nurture peasants’ 
nature of working collectively and implied to discipline their inclination of working 
individually. It was not easy for cadres to figure out this point wrong, by carefully 
reading the text.  
Second, Draft clarified the point that it was from now, not ten years later, to transit 
to socialism. It did not elaborate on when the party should immediate start the 
transition, yet the tone of “let’s act earlier than later” had been implied, and seemed 
correctly received by its readers. 
Most important, inspired by Shanxi’s proposal, a path toward collectivization 
came into shape in the draft: started from mutual aid teams, followed by the 
agricultural producers’ cooperative modeled from Shanxi’s prototype, and end with a 
more advanced agricultural producers’ cooperative which should be a collective farm 
of complete socialist nature. Soon, this formula would be formally presented as a 
three-stage path to be strictly followed, from mutual aid teams to lower-stage 
agricultural producers’ cooperative to higher-stage agricultural producers’ 
cooperative.90 
The produce of this draft was rather arbitrary. It neglected an important reality: 
most peasants were not enthusiastic about farming. Moreover, peasant preferences for 
working individually were only recognized after Zhao Shuli’s frank feedback. The 
draft was heavily influenced by the series of reports that had appeared in Shanxi and 
was based more on what the party wanted peasants to be than on what peasants 
themselves wanted. Nevertheless, this draft served as the foundation of a series of 
future movements, and its assertion of the dual nature of peasants was never 
questioned during the Mao era. The notion that peasants were willing to work 
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collectively inspired the party’s expressed desire to guide them, while the notion that 
peasants were traditionally inclined to work individually alerted party members to 
their responsibilities to guide peasants.  
The first stage of mutual aid team and cooperation movement in the early 1952 
thus was about to commence. 
Chapter 3  The first stage: experiments and diversity 
Let’s go back and see how the plan of building experimental agricultural 
producers’ cooperative worked out in Changzhi prefecture. 
Wang Qian and his vision of agricultural producers’ cooperatives 
In March 1951, Lai Ruoyu proposed to build experimental agricultural producer’s 
cooperatives in Shanxi. A rough plan was, in these cooperatives, peasant members 
would pool their land and farme collectively; net profits would be distributed 
according to both labor and land input. In addition, community funds would be 
collected and public assets would be accumulated; the socialist principle of 
“distribution according to labor” was to be put into practice.1 This form was inspired 
by the cooperative farms that were established sporadically in the 1940s. As chapter 1 
points out, most of those cooperative farms had failed. However, by exclusively 
referring to the allegedly successful ones, mainly “Jia Baozhi land and conveyance 
cooperative,” Shanxi leaders appeared to be confident. Moreover, Lai Ruoyu argued, 
his plan was grounded in the fact that peasants had already accumulated community 
funds and public assets. But he knew, as chapter 2 shows, this “fact” existed merely 
because it had been imposed by Changzhi prefecture.  
The decision to introduce experimental agricultural producers’ cooperatives was 
evidently made from the top-down, starting at provincial and prefecture levels. Unlike 
their treatments of expanding mutual aid teams, this time, Lai Ruoyu and Wang Qian 
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did not disguise their direct involvement and did not bother to pretend that their plans 
came from peasants’ initiatives. Following Lai Ruoyu’s proposal, Changzhi prefecture 
cadres convened a mutual aid and cooperative conference for the heads of mutual aid 
teams to discuss the details of creating and operating experimental agricultural 
producers’ cooperatives. Wang Qian certainly dominated the conference and virtually 
set the rules for the whole event. 
On March 27, 1951, Wang Qian made a passionate appeal stating that the 
ultimate goal for the Chinese countryside was collectivization and modernization, that 
communal purchases of farm implements would advance collectivization, that the 
acquisition of community funds would allow for the accumulation of more collectively 
owned property, and that group farming would undermine the age old peasant 
tendency to work in individual households. In order to facilitate agriculture’s transition 
towards collectivization, he called on peasants to form the experimental agricultural 
producers’ cooperative, a form supposedly more closely associated with full-fledged 
socialism. Not only did he draw up the general blueprint for agricultural cooperatives, 
he also spelled out specific rules. He recommended that peasants to pool at least 
two-thirds of their land into the cooperatives and farm it collectively. Profits would be 
distributed mainly according to labor input, and supplemented by a component linked 
to individual land input. Community funds would be collected and would not return to 
members if they withdrew. Wang Qian was also cautious. He made it clear that certain 
qualifications were to be met before launching the trial: all experimental cooperatives 
should be formed by good party cadres and good model laborers; they should be built 
in areas with relatively good natural resource so to guarantee the high yield and they 
should be geographically close to the party headquarters so the party could provide 
timely assistance.2 
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As chapter 2 points out, the North China Bureau was alert to Lai Ruoyu’s 
proposal and tried to place some constraints on it from the very outset. So the Bureau 
sent a work team to attend this conference. The work team immediately raised quite a 
few concerns and disagreements on Wang Qian’s plan. 
First of all, the work team pointed out, the timing was bad. Peasants had not been 
informed of a clue what was going on, mutual aid teams had no material preparation, 
and the spring sowing season already started, so starting the trial in the year (1951) 
was premature and imprudent. Making such a suggestion was sensitive to peasants’ 
needs, and more importantly, followed the CCP’s custom of mobilizing peasants. Here 
a Catch-22 for the CCP to mobilize peasant needs to be introduced: the party can 
launch political movements of any kind among peasants during the slack season 
(usually the winter when no land work needs to be done), but the party need to 
terminate the movements as soon as the spring sowing season starts and let peasants 
farm the land undisturbed: failure in spring sowing will doom the whole year, and 
affect the next year. In this case, Wang Qian was so zealous that he completely waived 
this rule. The stakes were too high to let this rule stand in the way. 
As for the community funds, the work team feared that it would constrain rich 
peasants and was concerned that the principle of “sharing it according to the labor” 
would generate conflicts among peasants. The work team also questioned the ways of 
using the funds. It strongly opposed to Changzhi’s plan of retaining the funds to the 
mutual aid teams when members withdrew, which to the work team, had violated the 
principle of private ownership that Liu Shaoqi was endorsing.3 
Wang Qian and his fellows did not accept the suggestions. They claimed those 
                                                                                                                                                                
baogao” (March 27, 1951) (Report on building the experimental agicultural producers’ cooperatives at 
the meeting the representatives of mutual aid teams in Changzhi), Huibian juan, 274-276. 
3 “Chungeng gongzuodui shanxi xiaozu guanyu Changzhi zhuanqu huzhu daibiao huiyi qingkuang de 
baogao” (March 30, 1951) (Shanxi branch of the spring planting work team on the mutual aid and 
cooperation conference of heads of mutual aid teams in Changzhi prefecture), SPA, C 54. 2003. 47. 
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suggestions “diverged in principle aspects” from their approval.4 On the one hand, 
they filed reports to the North China Bureau to defend their proposals, which 
eventually triggered the debate between Liu Shaoqi and Lai Ruoyu, as chapter 2 
discusses; on the other hand, Wang Qian continued to proceed with his plan and issued 
more regulations. 
On March 29, 1951, Wang Qian gave the closing talk further elaborating the rules 
of operating agricultural cooperatives. In his version, each cooperative should consist 
of approximately 20 households; the proportion of profits that were to be distributed 
according to land input should be lower than the land rent of the time which was 
around 30 percent; landowners at their own costs were responsible for supplying seed 
and fertilizers, later for agricultural taxes; last, 20 percent of the total profit should be 
collected as communal including investment funds, public welfare funds, and 
education funds. Wang Qian insisted on the principle that if a member withdrew from 
the cooperative, he would not be allowed to take his share of these funds. Cooperative 
heads would be compensated for their non-farming labor. Then Wang Qian promised 
state loans and reduced taxes from the government as financial incentives. In the end, 
Wang Qian warned mutual aid team heads not to spread the news among the 
countryside in order to avoid chaos.5 
From the very beginning, agricultural producers’ cooperatives manifested the 
characteristic of favoring labor value over land value. If Wang Qian’s formula was 
adopted, land input would hardly bring any profit to land owners. A rough calculation 
is as following: after 20 percent deduction of community funds, the land input would 
receive 24 percent of the land output ( 80 percent * 30 percent). The taxes combining 
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the state agricultural tax and local additional taxes ranged from 15 percent to 25 
percent of land output, the expenditures on seed, fodder, and fertilizers could easily 
take 20 percent of the output. It was apparent that the cost for land would exceed the 
earnings from land.6 Even so, according to the official records, after the conference, 
all attendees agreed that agricultural cooperatives could better increase rural 
productivity: many mutual aid team heads signed up for the experiment. After careful 
weighing their options, Changzhi prefecture cadres selected seven of them to form 
agricultural producers’ cooperatives. Later three more were added, thus the ten 
experimental agricultural producers’ cooperatives were selected.7 It was obvious that 
at the beginning Changzhi prefects had opted for caution believing the quality was far 
more important than quantity. Meanwhile they limited the scope of experiments so 
they were capable of, with the resource, ensuring a dazzling success. A telling episode 
is that the most prominent model laborer Li Shunda, who of course volunteered to sign 
in, was not accepted by the prefects. They feared that a possible failure of Li Shunda 
would draw too much attention and dampen the whole trial, given Li’s nation-wide 
reputation and influence.8 
Changzhi’s experimental cooperatives: perfect cases  
In April 1951, when the North China Bureau and Liu Shaoqi were attacking 
Shanxi leaders for proposing to introduce agricultural producers’ cooperatives, as 
chapter 2 outlines, experimental agricultural producers’ cooperatives had already been 
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established in Changzhi prefecture. The founders of these cooperatives moved quickly. 
Take Wuxiang county as an example. The mutual aid and cooperative conference for 
heads of mutual aid teams in Changzhi prefecture closed in the end of March. On 
April 5, Wuxiang county started to call for volunteers. On April 20, in three villages 
four cooperatives were already formed, all of which were founded on former mutual 
aid teams. In Wuxiang county cadres’ own words, “we have spent hundredfold efforts 
to consolidate the cooperatives.”9  
Within this brief span of time, eighty-seven households joined the four 
cooperatives and pooled 77.9percent of their and. All of them were middle peasants. 
Of the 87 households, 35 were the CCP party members and 12 were the comsomol 
members. In respect of income distributions, 50 percent of total land output would be 
contributed to labor input, 30 percent to land input and 20 percent to community 
funds. For the sideline income, 20 percent would be collected as the community funds, 
and the rest would be distributed only according to labor input. Land owners needed to 
take care of taxes and miscellaneous items such as seed and fertilizers. Quantitatively 
the arrangement exactly complied with Wang Qian’s suggestion. In each cooperative, 
one cooperative head and one (or two) deputy head(s) were selected, plus a secretary 
who took notes and made accounts. As analyzed earlier, such kind of arrangements 
virtually left no profit for land input. Peasants knew it. Nearly all elderly peasants in 
Wuxiang county did not believe cooperatives would run well. The father of a deputy 
village head in Jianzhang village openly questioned the formula. He asked, land input 
would bring no net income; other investment needed large financial input, loans 
needed to be paid back, in cooperatives there was no benefit for peasants at all. In 
addition, a cooperative needed to feed four cadres who did not farm but demanded 
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income; how could it possibly be done? Not to mention the common sense that even 
family members in custom were to be disparted [Feniia], so how could 20 or 30 
households manage to work together? Troubles were on the way, he predicted.10 But it 
turned out that there were peasants who registered themselves into the cooperatives, 
on their own. Didn’t they know how to calculate? 
The answer is of course they knew how to calculate. Indeed, they had their 
various ways of calculating. According to a Wuxiang county report, peasants joined 
the cooperatives for at least four reasons. Political ambitions drove 45 households, 
mainly party members and village activists, to join the cooperatives. Their political 
aspirations and their views of the future convinced them to follow the party’s call 
closely. It is true that some young attendees did not do the economic accounts: they 
had non-material aspirations in the long term. Another group of fifteen households 
were less progressive. But they did not want to be left behind politically, yet they did 
not want to endure big economic losses too. Seven households were wavering back 
and forth. They assumed that they would end up with some economic loss, but they 
were afraid of being considered politically backward which would bring more harm. 
After “being inspired and educated” by the party members.11 They ultimately decided 
to join; yet this was a painful decision. The third group was those who were not 
inclined to haggle. They were either relatives of cooperative heads or had fostered 
good relationships with those heads whom they trusted. So they were easily 
“persuaded” into the cooperatives. 13 households fell into this category. The fourth 
groups adopted a very different approach. Its members were well known among their 
native villagers for their canniness and were fond of calculations. They carefully 
calculated every detail and foresaw the pure economic gains, then they put themselves 
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in the cooperatives. Some would take advantage of the cooperatives’ distribution 
formula, such as those households that had extra laborers while holding small amount 
of land. Others were purely opportunists. Their past of dealing with the CCP 
convinced them that in whatever experiments the CCP called for, if you joined at the 
very beginning, you would very likely be rewarded with a handsome profit, because 
the CCP would make sure those experiments did not fail.12 Bearing a variety of 
calculations, eighty seven households in Wuxiang county formed four cooperatives, all 
expecting good rewards.                                        
The majority of peasants in Changzhi were not optimistic about those 
experiments. As a matter of fact, they were irritated. Most village cadres were in a 
dilemma. Their superiors encouraged them to join cooperatives, yet they knew they 
would suffer economic losses in cooperatives. They feared that they would be forced 
to join cooperatives. They knew, if cooperatives failed, they were doomed for the 
whole year. Those with abundant land or with land of good quality did not want to join 
cooperatives. The most irritating impact was that the long-standing fear of 
communism seemed to become a reality: private property was to be collectivized! 
Some peasants immediately held back their investments in land. Villagers with 
cooperatives, and their neighboring villages, watched those experiments with fear. 
In the face of sharp critique from above and deep doubts from below, the stakes 
on the ten experimental cooperatives were high. Wuxiang county heads were keenly 
aware of it, as were Changzhi prefects. Wuxiang county heads helped the four 
experimental cooperatives in their region make a production plan for 1951 in which 
total production would at least double. They placed strict constraints on the 
withdrawal from cooperatives: yes, the principle of volunteerism was honored and 
members were allowed to withdraw, but, they added that, if a member was to 
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withdraw, he could not take out his land for the year. Other restrictions were also 
created, such as regulations with tons of details governing the working of individual 
peasants.13 
In May 1951, Wuxiang county submitted a follow-up report to Changzhi 
prefecture informing of the success of the four cooperatives. Within a month, the 
cooperatives had figured out methods to substantially increase their output. One was to 
plant more cash crops, the other was to focus on sideline work. Four cooperatives 
doubled or tripled their cash crop planting areas, mainly for cotton and tobacco. 
Together they planted 183.3 mou cash crops, accounting for one eighth of the sown 
area. More importantly, they tried to find work for those surplus laborers. Surplus 
laborers had become the most pressing issue for peasants themselves, if not for the 
party yet. Take Yaoshanggou village cooperative (the head was Wang Jinyun) as an 
example. The cooperative consisted of 28 full laborers. To take care of 367 mou sown 
area, 10 laborers were more than enough. What would the other 18 laborers do? The 
cooperative figured out, they could conduct sideline work, they could raise pigs, make 
terrines, make vinegar and sell eggs. Or, they could even be full-time workers at cities 
nearby, the cooperative planned. 14 
Of course, assistance from the party was extremely crucial. On April 27, Wuxiang 
county party branch and Wuxiang county government both delivered congratulation 
letters to the four cooperatives declaring that the party and the government would be 
their strong supporters and assuring them all kinds of aids. Within a month, two loans 
of 12 million RMB total worth (old currency), were granted to Yaoshanggou 
cooperative.15  
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In October, those efforts bore fruit. at least on paper. For example, in 
Yaoshanggou cooperative, the average unit yield per mou was 1.8 dan, 25.5 percent 
higher than the unit yield of 1950, which was 1.47 dan. This number was 12 percent 
higher than the highest unit yield of the mutual aid teams of the same village. Sideline 
output was even higher. Overall, yield per capita was 1485 catties (sideline products 
were converted into grain), which was 73.4 per cent higher than that in 1950, and 33 
per cent higher than that of mutual aid teams in 1951. Still this achievement had not 
fully fulfilled the original production plan Wuxiang county set for it.16 
When it comes to net income distribution, surprisingly, the formula set forth by 
Wang Qian was modified by peasants themselves. After rounds after rounds of 
discussions among cooperative members, a more flexible formula was adopted. This 
plan rewarded labor input and land input equally and dramatically reduced the amount 
of community funds. The community funds were levied progressively. The rates 
ranged from 2 percent to 15 percent.17 In addition, peasants were allowed to take out 
most of their community funds with them if they withdrew. Distribution based on land 
input ranged from 37 percent to 42 percent of land output, while remuneration based 
on the amount of work done should account for no more than 56 percent and no less 
than 48 percent. Land owners were compensated by the cooperative for their 
supplying of seed, fodder and fertilizers. 
The final distribution in Yaoshanggou cooperative was as follows: the total 
income (agricultural income and sideline income) was 693 dan grain. 328 dan were 
given to labor input, 136 dan were given to land input, 106 dan were paid for rents of 
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cattle, fodder, seed and fertilizers, 51 dan was collected as the community funds and 
70 dan was used to pay back state loans. All households of the cooperative earned 
more than they had in 1950, yet the degree of the increase varied. Those with less land 
but more laborers doubled their income, and those with more land slightly received 
more. 
The outcome was promising. The same report listed ten reasons that cooperatives 
should do better than any mutual aid team and any individual farmer, mostly due to the 
advantages of large-scale cultivation and the advantages of sideline work. At 
theoretical level, it was an impressive case. By pooling land together, strips were 
abolished, land were consolidated and extra acreage were obtained. Meanwhile, more 
rational cropping patterns could be introduced and more surplus laborers could work 
on sideline. In the future, those theoretical reasons would be presented as 
accomplished facts and be constantly repeated. Of course, the report also attributed the 
success to the consistent assistance from the local party leaders, which indeed was 
indispensable, as will be discussed later. Then the report raised several suggestions to 
consolidate and develop the cooperative. First of all, it pointed out that the unit yield 
of land that members kept as the private portion (Ziliu di) was not as high as that of 
the pooled land, and members easily got into conflicts with each other on when to 
work on their private portion, and when on pooled land. After democratic discussion, 
it was agreed upon that the private portion should be reduced to 5 percent per 
household, and limited to the least fertile land.18 Second, the report admitted that half 
of surplus laborers, roughly speaking, had not been used. So a more scientific way of 
allocating surplus laborers was to be found. Third, the cooperative heads worked so 
hard that the efforts they had put in were worth much more than they received, so the 
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report urged to weigh the work of cooperative heads differently and better compensate 
them.19 
Nearly all other nine cooperatives in Changzhi prefecture were just about as 
successful as the Yaoshannggou cooperative, according to the official accounts. Nearly 
all documents on the ten experimental cooperatives accessible now in archives have 
left records indicating an unqualified triumph. The counties where those cooperatives 
were located each submitted a report to Changzhi prefecture, Changzhi prefecture then 
wrote a summary for each cooperative, and summated them to higher authorities 
together with an overall account. Not surprisingly, during the process of reporting, the 
figures were inflated. Take the reports on the Yaoshanggou cooperative as an example. 
Wuxiang county reported to Changzhi prefecture that the unit yield of the 
Yaoshanggou cooperative was 1.8 dan, but Changzhi prefects raised the figure to 2.6 
dan when reporting it to Shanxi province. In addition, Changzhi’s report emphasized 
that the Yaoshanggou cooperative had devoted itself to organize peasants to study 
politics, to discipline them, to carry out criticism and self-criticism and to educate 
them to incorporate personal interests to state interests,20 which were not mentioned at 
all in Wuxiang county’s report. Again, the reports drafted by higher authorities had 
influence on issues at higher levels. Based on Changzhi prefecture’s version, a special 
folder was compiled for this set of documents. They would be frequently referred to 
during the high tide of cooperativization movement in the middle of 1950s. Decades 
later, a collection entitled “Several historical documents on the trial and the 
development of agricultural producers’ cooperatives in Changzhi” was published.21 A
chapter 2 analyzes, the reporting system suffered from overaggregation of info
s 
rmation. 
                                                        
19 “Wuxiang Yaoshanggou 1951 nian shi ban nongye shengchan hezuoshe de zuihou baogao.” 
20 “guanyu 10 ge nongye shengchan hezuoshe de zongjie” (November 1951) (Summary on the ten 
agricultural peoducers’ cooperatives), SPA, 53.1.1  
21  Shanxi Rural Political Affair Ministry, Several historical documents on the trial and the 
development of agricultural producer’s cooperatives (Shanxi, 1977). 
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At each level the data collected lost precision. The exact statistics provided by v
rarely went beyond the prefectures. 
illages 
At the experimental stage, it was apparent that the ten cooperatives were 
established because of orders from above and were closely monitored by the cadres of 
counties and prefectures. Nevertheless, peasants were not merely passive receivers. To 
join or not, peasants calculated carefully and made their own decisions. For a limited 
time, peasants’ own decisions were honored. There were peasants who volunteered to 
join cooperatives. Political ambitions, respect and fear towards the CCP, personal 
bonds, economic considerations and opportunism all played their roles. 
Further, to a certain degree peasants also managed to modify the rules to their 
advantage. The best example was the rate of community funds. Few peasants liked this 
idea: 20 percent of total output being taken away from them surely was galling to 
peasants – it nearly equaled the tax rate. The course of negotiations between peasants 
and local party cadres has not been documented, but peasants did end up with a much 
lower rate. This change was later acknowledged by the party. The North China Bureau 
commented in early 1952 that the community funds should range from 1 percent to 5 
percent of total income, it should not significantly affect peasants’ annual earnings. 
Peasants also succeeded in increasing their return on land input. Landowners managed 
to have the cooperative compensate for the cost of seed, fodder and fertilizers, which 
in original plans were shouldered only by land owners. The rate of community funds 
and the remunerations on land input and labor input implied different underlying 
political views about the degree of socialism and the need for material incentives. 
Those changes were ultimately acknowledged by the local government and later 
became a common standard from which many agricultural producers’ cooperatives, 
both inside and outside of Shanxi Province, took models.  
Despite various attitudes among members to the forming of each cooperative, 
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they all expected it to be profitable and did their best to make money out of it. They 
had figured out that the right methods were to plant more cash crops and to develop 
sidelines. Given the large number of surplus laborers, the latter obviously was the key. 
In the early 1950s (until 1952), peasants paid the same agricultural tax on cash crops 
as on grain, and sideline products bore no tax at all.22 In reality the operation of 
cooperatives was highly economically driven, with political pursuit and ideological 
superiority towards socialism playing their roles mainly in reports submitted to the 
administrative hierarchy. 
To a certain degree, the earliest agricultural cooperatives were what the peasants 
and local officials made of them for their own gains. 
Critiques and not so perfect cases 
The achievements of those ten experimental cooperatives were nearly too 
dazzling to be true. However, so far no documents have been discovered to disprove 
those achievements. To help us make a fair judgment here I will only provide some 
circumstancial information, some with the advantage of knowing what happened later. 
A crucial factor with which we need to be concerned is how the agricultural tax 
was collected. Taxation in China in the early 1950s was a complex issue. It varied 
dramatically at different years, in different regions, and varied even more between 
rules and their implementations. A definitive conclusion on this issue is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. For our purpose, very roughly speaking, in Shanxi province, 
before 1952, in theory, agricultural tax was collected upon a fixed base, yet the rate 
differed each year, adjusted to the needs of the party. Taking into accounts factors like 
the amount of sown land, the fertility of soil, planting custom, and harvest of normal 
years, the “should-be normal yield” (Changnian yingchan liang) for each household’s 
                                                        
22  Zhongguo nongmin fudanshi, 44-80. 
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land was set after a democratic discussion among peasants. Then this number was 
ratified by the local government. Each year a household paid certain portion of this 
base number, according to the tax rate of that year, which ranged from 15 percent to 25 
percent, as the agricultural tax.23 The actual yield played a relatively minor role in the 
way the tax was calculated. In practice, it was even simpler, probably due to the low 
literacy of rural cadres. In 1949 and 1950, in Shanxi each mou was required to pay 22 
catties of millet as the state agricultural tax and 5 catties of millet as the local 
additional tax; in 1951 and 1952, the state agricultural tax was 21 catties per mou, with 
a certain amount of local additional tax.24 So the amount of taxes peasants actually 
paid had little to do with their actual output. In other words, no matter how high land 
yield peasants claimed they had attained, they were not required to pay more than the 
fixed amount. In the short term, fabricating a high yield would not cost peasants a 
penny; quite the contrary, if the unit yield was high enough to impress local cadres, 
local government was likely to reward peasants with a bonus, sometimes a draught 
animal or sometimes a expensive farm implement, which by no means were trivial. 
Furthermore, having their names known to local leaders could easily bring peasants a 
bunch of benefits, such as priority in obtaining government loans, being nominated as 
model laborers, etc. The model laborers would be provided chances to travel to the 
provincial capital, to Beijing, or even abroad. In addition, promoting “core elements” 
after a campaign had become a normal practice for the party, so local activists tended 
to over-fulfill established goals to gain promotions and benefits.25  
For peasants in Changzhi prefecture, presenting a better performance was even 
more attempting. As an old liberated region, since 1949, Shanxi provincial 
                                                        
23  Zhongguo nongmin fudanshi, 47. 
24 Zhongguo nongmin fudanshi, 76-77. This tax system started to change in 1952 and the amount of 
tax was increasingly linked to the land’s actual output. 
25 Yu Liu, “Why did it go so high? Political mobilization and agricultureal collectivization in China,” 
740. 
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government had relocated a large number of cadres out of Shanxi to the south to help 
administer new liberated regions; at the same time the Shanxi administration 
infrastructure itself was expanding. As a consequence, the administrative personnel 
were in shortage. So in August 1951 the party branch of Shanxi province decided to 
enroll over ten thousands new state cadres.26 In Changzhi prefecture, the plan was set 
between 1951 and 1952 to develop 1000 new cadres of peasant origin who would be 
fully relieved of agricultural work, two hundred of them would be selected from rural 
model laborers.27 Peasants aspired to become state cadres because a peasant’s life was 
too full of hardship: total dependent on a natural environment which was harsh and 
unpredictable, he was at the mercy of adverse natural conditions; cultivating land itself 
was exhausting; and his spells of intense hard work and a life lived in villages kept 
him far removed from any center of civilization.28 For him, acquiring a government 
job meant he could be part of the state payroll system and say farewell to the harsh 
living style as a peasant. Each month he would receive a fixed salary that was enough 
to feed the family; he no longer needed to worry about the weather. For once, his 
dream now had a chance to come true, and this might be his only chance of his long 
life. Encountering such a tempting and rare opportunity, rural party members, village 
model laborers and activists were eager to take advantage of it. As a peasant, the ways 
with which they could acquire superiors’ attention were rather limited. Now those 
experimental cooperatives that their superiors cared about so much provided them the 
channel to interact with county heads and the CCP cadres of even higher ranks, a 
chance to make themselves known. For this chance, peasants had little hesitation to 
                                                        
26 “Wei yingjie xin de jianshe gaochao daliang peiyang tiba ganbu de tishi” (August 18, 1951) ( A 
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inflate production figure to call attention to themselves.  
Considering the low risk and the high return, peasants commonly inflated data. 
Although at this experimental stage (1951), so far there is no document exposing such 
a practice in the ten cooperatives, one year later, many of them would be exposed to 
have falsified accounts, as chapter 5 will show. For example, Yaoshanggou 
cooperative was a well known case of overreporting the harvests in 1952. 
While I found no documents to disprove the perfect records of Changzhi 
prefecture (located in southeast of Shanxi Province), reports on the northwest region 
of Shanxi, drafted by the investigation team dispatched from the central government in 
October 1951, presented stories dramatically different from the products of Changzhi 
prefecture. 
In northwest Shanxi, 1951 was a bad year in terms of weather. Drought, flood, 
hail and frost hit the region one after another. Not counting the areas that were totally 
deprived of products, on average the northwest region only produced 40 percent of a 
good harvest. Five percent to 15 percent of the rural population could not make ends 
meet. The shortage of grain was estimated to reach 105,000 tons. Relief aid was 
urgently needed. Peasants petitioned the government for loans, for an exemption for 
the tax they owned to the state for the year of 1948 and to help them sell sideline 
products. Local governments did not react promptly. In Hequ County, 9 old villagers 
committed suicide. Health care was always a serious problem. Peasants could not get 
medical treatment at all, according to a local saying, “Death is the only cure.”29 In 
Xing County, 1400 children died of measles in 1950. It was common that peasants 
held grudges against rural cadres. Upon the arrival of the investigation team from the 
central government, common peasants poured in to complain about rural cadres. At the 
                                                        
29 “Jin Sui Fen Tuan de zong he bao gao” (October 10, 1951) (Summary report of Jin-Sui work team), 
SPA, C55. 1003. 3. 
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same time, rural cadres had their complaints too, saying “it is messy at the bottom.” 
“We just cannot handle such a large amount of diverse requests from above.”30 
What happened in the northwest of Shanxi Province was not unique among the 
old liberated regions in north China. The same happened in Yan’an, the holy land of 
the CCP revolution. An investigation report revealed that in May 1951, overall 
agricultural production in Yan’an had not reached pre-war (pre-1937) level. Peasants 
were living on substitutes. Most rural cadres and peasants were not interested in 
mutual aid teams, and some formed false mutual aid teams simply to fool the regional 
cadres. Model laborers exaggerated their production data to save face. For example, 
Wang Jinxian only produced 2 dan in the village welfare lot, but he reported to have 
produced 20 dan.31  
The absence of any mention of the problems, or the local cadres’ success in 
remedying the problems, in Changzhi’s reports, suggests the favorable reports did not 
reflect the whole scene. But leaving aside our suspicion, let’s play the innocent. 
Assuming that the data Changzhi prefecture provided were authentic and peasants did 
produce much more in cooperatives, could they have sustained their high production?  
First of all, please note that in cooperatives’ calculation, agricultural taxes were 
not included. With a 15 percent to 25 percent tax, households with more land barely 
increased their income, if any. Meanwhile, few reports acknowledged the significance 
of government loans. In the case of Yaoshanggou cooperative, it obtained at least 12 
million worth in government loans, which could purchase 670 dan of grain at the local 
market. This number nearly equaled the total output of the cooperative in 1951, 
combining both agricultural products and sideline products. Such a high government 
investment was a common policy in the ten cooperatives. For example, another 
                                                        
30 “Jin-Sui fen tuan de zong he bao gao.” 
31 Neibu cankao, July 13, 1951. 
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experimental cooperative, Guo Yu’en’s cooperative in Pingshun county, received a 
loan of 6.8 million that was the equivalent of 51 per cent of its total output; the 
interests of the loan accounted for 59 percent of the increased agricultural production 
of the cooperative. In both cases, two cooperatives had no way to pay back the state 
loan in the same year: they could barely afford the interest. Paying back state loans 
soon became a severe burden for cooperatives. Further, such excessively high 
government investment could hardly extend to a wider range. The North China Bureau 
was already agitated by this feature, imploring local governments to limit their 
investments to agricultural producers’ cooperatives.32 
    The most promising part of the cooperative economy was its ability to organize 
surplus laborers to conduct sideline works. However, in most cases, even cooperatives 
could not find enough jobs for all laborers. The prosperity of sideline work depended 
on villages’ dynamic interactions with urban markets. We now know, the urban 
markets were shrinking dramatically after the founding of the People’s Republic of 
China.33 Very soon, finding a short term job in cities would become more difficult and 
later illegal, after the household registration system was adopted and ration supply 
system was enforced. How could cooperatives make full use of those surplus laborers? 
Planting a larger portion of cash crops was another way to increase income. Indeed, if 
the high production of those experimental producers were authentic, the key secrecy 
was planting more cash crops. Planting cash crops in an excessive portion was 
possible in 1951 when the central government was in need of industrial materials like 
cotton and encouraged peasants to plant them. But in 1952, the trend was reversed. 
The central government made it clear in its annual plan that “grain output must be 
substantially increased, it’s planting acreage in no way can be reduced.” Accordingly, 
                                                        
32 “Huabeiju nongye shengchan hezuoshe de qingkuang yu jingyan” (Situations and lessons of 
agricultural producers’ cooperatives in the North China Bureau), Huibian, vol. 2, 586-589. 
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cash crops should not exceed their 195 1 portion.34 In 1952, a higher tax would be 
levied on cash crops. The degree to which cooperatives could seek profits from cash 
crops would become more and more restricted. As a matter of fact, in 1953, Changzhi 
prefecture was criticized for its stresses on planting cash crops. In its five year plan, it 
estimated to increase its cash crop sown area from 590,000 mou to 2,230,000 mou, 
while to cut down its grain crop sown area from 8,490,000 mou to 6,910,000 mou. 
Disproportionably increasing cash crop planting brought severe pressure on state’s 
grain supply plan. Shanxi province was furious when discovered that it had to support 
more grain to villages than to the cities.35 
From the moment cooperatives started running, administrating them was a 
problem. How were labor inputs to be calculated? Who should work on a specific 
piece of land? How to make sure every member worked as hard as others? Most of the 
time, cooperative heads did not farm land, so how to weigh their input? Draught 
animals were borrowed from individual members, so how to compensate them and on 
what basis? How much land should each family keep as their own private portion 
(Ziliu di)? Those questions were definitely difficulty to answer, yet peasants cared 
about them and spent days an nights arguing with cooperative heads on every detail. 
Cooperative heads were overwhelmed, so were local cadres. For their convenience, 
some even suggested pooling all of peasants’ land into cooperatives, purchasing all 
livestock and farming implements from cooperative members once and for all, and not 
linking cooperative heads’ income with their labor input of farming. One after another, 
those suggestions would be put into practice in the mid-1950. During the 
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reexamination they were simply explained as “leftist” errors, yet with documents of 
the early stage we know that they were not purely ideological. They had their roots in 
every day practices of operating a cooperative. In other words, they were part of the 
mechanism of cooperatives. 
The ten cooperatives were all composed of middle peasants. Given the formula of 
distribution favored labor input, poor peasants who tended to have less land should 
have been the group that were most enthusiastic to join the cooperatives. But it was 
not the case in reality. The reason was not documented. It seems likely that either poor 
peasants refused to join, or the cooperative heads refused to admit poor peasants. The 
party was not ready for this surprise.  
Indeed, deeply in Shanxi cadres’ heart, they knew that they had not listened to any 
opposition, they knew they had not given close attention to local conditions and 
regional diversity, and they knew they had over-estimated the popularity of mutual aid 
teams and agricultural producers’ cooperatives. On crucial issues like land input 
compensations, community funds and public assets, “leftist” ideology overrode 
observations of concrete results. Yet for the next two years, they tried to conceal those 
problems and only presented the bright stories of the ten experimental producers.36 
What if agricultural cooperatives had been left to peasants themselves? It is hard 
to address this question properly and directly. But some cases in Sichuan province 
might provide us some vague ideas. Sichuan province was liberated in 1950 and was 
considered a “backward” region in terms of the CCP’s strength. In the early 1950s, the 
CCP’s penetration of rural Sichuan was relatively weak. In Zizhong county of 
Sichuan, in spring 1952, in response to the party’s call of building experimental 
agricultural producers’ cooperatives, 25 cooperatives were established. Most of them 
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were organized by village heads after they attended a party meeting in Zizhong county. 
But the county heads seemed not to have provided much guidance to those 
cooperatives, and various rules were set by peasants themselves. Of the 25 
cooperatives, only two survived after the fall harvest of that year. Of the two survivors, 
Sun Xianhe’s cooperative was the most influential one and was better documented. 
Take Sun Xianhe’s cooperative as an example. In spring 1952, the cooperative was 
formed and members were required to pool all their land. The land peasants registered 
during land reform was counted as shares, regardless of the actual amount of land 
peasants had and of the variations in the land’s quality. Such an arrangement worked 
to the disadvantages of the middle peasants who usually had land of better quality and 
occasionally owned some unregistrated land, but this arrangement was a good way to 
avoid disputes since each household had their land certificate identifying the amount 
of the land. Later cooperative members complained about the inconvenience and 
asked for some private land to plant vegetables, so each family took a small share 
(roughly 2percent) of land back. Cooperatives purchased members’ draught animals 
with credits and put the animals to collective use. After the harvest, the cooperative 
could not pay back those credits and the cooperative went in deep debt. Then the debt 
was transferred to the poor members who did not own livestock originally. The most 
interesting part was the distribution rule of Sun Xianhe’s cooperative. A fixed wage of 
labor was decided by the cooperative, which was only half catties rice per work point, 
five points per day as the maximum. Sideline income was listed under land output, so 
land owner would take shares of sideline products too. As a result, in Sun Xianhe’s 
cooperative, labor input only accounted for 20 per cent of total income, land input 
accounted to a much larger portion. In essence it was a cooperative that hired laborers, 
with relative low wages. Sun Xianhe’s cooperative thus provided us some peasants’ 
perceptions of how a cooperative should be operating, yet details of this cooperative 
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were not recorded. This case might give us some hints on how peasants would have 
managed cooperatives if they were given full control.37 
In Zizhong county, the overwhelming majority of cooperatives were controlled 
by middle peasants, although it was not rare that poor peasants were the nominal 
heads, for the convenience of acquiring state loans. Middle peasants definitely played 
the key role, and they knew it. As one cooperative head, who was a party member and 
a middle peasant, said, “only we, middle peasants, are able to coordinate them, poor 
peasants, because we have the resource.”38 The key distinction was between “we” 
(middle peasants) and “they” (poor peasants). All cooperatives in Zizhong county, 
except the Sun Xianhe cooperative, were divided into “upper courtyard” and “lower 
courtyard.” The former accommodated middle peasants and their property, the latter 
accommodated poor peasants and their stuff. The former accused the latter of being 
lazy, the latter were jealous of the former for being rich. They did not trust each other 
and spied on each other. Fights between the two “courtyards” easily led to the collapse 
of cooperatives.  
Poor peasants did not ally themselves with cooperatives. When there was a sign 
of trouble, poor peasants were often the first ones who jumped out and firmly claimed 
the right to withdrawal. Of course, some middle peasants formed cooperatives to 
exploit poor peasants, but poor peasants were not purely passive. Some of them were 
in fact active in forming cooperatives, mostly aiming at taking advantage of those 
peasants with better resources yet with bad class background. Sadly such kinds of 
cooperatives tended to collapse even sooner.39 
Compared with Changzhi’s ten experimental cooperatives, those cases of failures 
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were well-kept secrets of the local governments, and only came to light later through 
research in local archives. 
    In summary, although the real conditions of those ten experimental agricultural 
cooperatives are not fully known to current researchers, at the time they were hailed 
by leaders as pure successes. 
The first wave of mutual aid and cooperation movement: Diversity 
When Shanxi was building its pioneering agricultural producers’ cooperatives, 
organizing peasants into mutual aid teams was put on the state’s agenda. In September 
1951, the Draft was passed. The Draft proposed a three-stage plan to move peasants up 
from mutual aid teams to lower stage agricultural producers’ cooperatives and to 
advanced agricultural producers’ cooperatives. It further set a target of having 40 
percent of the rural population organized into mutual aid teams by the end of 1952.40 
Following the direction Mao Zedong just pointed out, on October 14, 1951, the 
Northeast China Bureau, headed by Gao Gang, issued “the report on the mutual aid 
and cooperation movement in the northeast.” This report called the party members to 
be alert of peasants’ inclination of working alone and discipline it. Three days later, 
Mao endorsed Gao Gang’s plan and ordered it to be widely circulated.41 In December 
1951 Mao sent the Draft to party committees at various levels for trial implementation. 
Between winter 1951 and spring 1952, a political education campaign was carried out 
in order to convince peasants that “getting organized” was necessary not only to 
increase production, but also to achieve collectivization. 
In February, 1952, the State Council issued the “Decisions on Agricultural 
Production in 1952” demanding that “in old-liberated regions 80-90 percent of rural 
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population should get organized in 2 years; in new-liberated regions this task should 
be completed in 3 years.”42 Cautiously upgrading a few mutual aid teams to 
agricultural producers’ cooperatives was also recommended. Following this directive, 
each province set its own plans. The Agricultural Ministry and the People’s Bank 
issued decrees declaring that state loans should be given to peasants’ organizations and 
should be utilized collectively. A lower interest rate was provided as a stimulus to 
those who got organized.43 The first wave of national mutual aid and cooperation 
movement unfolded. 
As the “getting organized” wind blew over the country, it is time for us to go 
beyond the border of Changzhi prefecture and observe how peasants across the nation 
responded to the call.  
Although Mao Zedong had specifically instructed CCP cadres to “take mutual aid 
teams and agricultural producers’ cooperatives as important issues,”44 for the time 
being, party cadres of county level and higher did not regard this movement as the 
most urgent issue. They were overwhelmed with the “three-anti” movement that 
started in late 1951. The “three-anti” movement was directed against three sets of 
vices: corruption, waste and obstructionist bureaucracy. The targeted groups were 
party member themselves, bureaucratic officials and the mangers of factories and other 
businesses. This movement was first launched in late 1951 in the northeast China, 
under the direction of Gao Gang, and then spread to the rest of China.45 Being 
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targeted, party members themselves were fully engaged in this campaign.46 At the 
same time, the party made it clear that the “three-anti” movement was not going to 
extend to the countryside. As the North China Bureau instructed, although the 
corruption at district and village levels was extremely severe, the three-anti movement 
should not be extended to district or lower levels. The tension on the county level was 
heating up already. Considering conditions in the countryside were so complex, the 
Bureau feared that once the fire kindled in the countryside, the party could not easily 
contain it. So the North China Bureau ordered, if anyone discovered any village 
starting the “three-anti” movement on its own, the county should immediately send a 
work team to put it down. Village cadres were not encouraged to confess their 
corruption; common peasants were not allowed to make accusations of corruptions in 
their home villages.47 So the “three-anti” movement did not directly hit party m
of low ranks.
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48 With the ongoing three-anti movement, cadres of county and higher 
ranks rarely cared about other issues. Even in Changzhi prefecture, when the three-an
movement began, many county cadres ceased to go to villages for two months.49 
Without frequent interventions from above, village cadres took control of mutual aid 
teams and cooperation movement. In north China, during the spring of 1952 more t
3000 agricultural producers’ cooperatives were organized, most of which were 
organized by village heads, rural activists and peasants, without the guidance from
above.50 
 
46 The influence of this campaign was far more than eliminating corruption, waste and obstructionist 
bureaucracy. This campaign hit capitalism and capitalists hardly, as chapter 4 will discuss. 
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49 Neibu cankao, March 20, 1952. 
50 Neibu cankao, June 18, 1952. 
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Rural cadres and peasants were left alone. Rural cadres’ responses to the call were 
diverse. Many cadres showed little interest and did not care about “getting organized.” 
For example, in many regions of Sichuan province, after land reform was completed, 
rural cadres primarily focused on increasing agricultural productivity, saying “to carry 
out land reform we should rely on poor peasants; to increase rural productivity we 
need to rely on middle peasants.” In selecting model laborers, they took agricultural 
productivity as the only standard regardless of farmers’ class backgrounds. As a result, 
90 percent of the model laborers there were middle peasants and rich peasants . Local 
cadres merely overlooked the assignment of guiding peasants into mutual aid teams.51 
Some even did not believe mutual aid teams had a bright future and treated it 
casually.52 
Some responded to the call zealously. They seemed to have regarded it as a 
political movement and calculated according its political advantage rather than 
prospects for economic improvement. For example, in Guizhou province, located in 
southwest China, peasants were informed that “Building mutual aid teams is an order 
from above. Everyone must join. Those who refuse to are trying to make trouble for 
us.” The party secretary of one village told peasants, “If you don’t join mutual aid 
teams, you are not led by the CCP. Unless you go to Taiwan, this is an order from the 
state (that you have to obey).”53 In Jiangxi province of southeast China, many 
peasants were informed that joining the mutual aid teams was a constitution of 
obligation.54 In the northeast, village cadres created a slogan “Joining agricultural 
producers’ cooperatives is following Mao Zedong’s road, not joining it is following 
Truman’s (American president’s) road.” In 1951, Chinese troops were fighting against 
                                                        
51 Neibu cankao, July 5, 1952. 
52 Neibu cankao, July 5, 1952. 
53 Neibu cankao, Sept 21, 1952. 
54 Neibu cankao, April,22, 1952.. 
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American in Korea, and American president Truman and Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan 
were the symbols of evil. Taking their side was doubtlessly counter-revolutionary and 
was considered a crime. No one wanted to be labeled like that. Some village cadres 
even publicly announced that “if you don’t join mutual aid teams now, when socialism 
arrives, you will be forced to write confessions.”55 
In such a context the decision was not hard to make. Quickly a large number of 
mutual aid teams and agricultural producers’ cooperatives were established across the 
nation. Nor surprisingly, a large number of them were extremely short-lived; many 
only existed on paper in reports. For example, by August 1952, the number of mutual 
aid teams in Hunan province increased from 1000 to 10000. But investigation showed 
that most of them were only notional and had little validity. Another example is from 
Ba County. Its head claimed that it had established 13,000 mutual aid teams, but it 
turned out later that all except 15 percent of them were complete fakes. It was not rare 
that mutual aid teams were formed in a meeting convened by rural cadres and were 
disbanded immediately after the meeting.56 In No.1 village of Taihe county, 18 mutual 
aid teams were established in the morning and 10 dissolved in the afternoon of the 
same day. For the remaining 8 mutual aid teams, members did not even know who was 
the head of their teams.57 To fulfill the quota, in some counties of Southwest China, 
rural cadres formed mutual aid teams according to administrative affiliation totally 
regardless of peasants’ own willingness, then reported the “achievement” to their 
superiors. Such kind of mutual aid teams did not go into effect at all. Sometimes, 
coercion in addition to verbal threats was employed. The most frequently used method 
was to hold peasants in a meeting for days until they acceded to join mutual aid teams. 
Nevertheless, the degree of violence was mild. Excessive violence was rarely reported. 
                                                        
55 Neibu cankao, June 18, 1952. 
56 Neibu cankao, August 25, 1952. 
57 Neibu cankao, July 5, 1952. . 
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To make their names known, a few rural cadres were willing to go further than the 
Draft had indicated. Cases of “rash tendency” were reported. Some villages were 
reported to be entirely collectivized, with land, horses, houses, grain and even 
clothes.58 But such extreme “rash” attitudes did not spread widely. Reports on it were 
sporadic. 
A good example is Muliu village of Shanxi. In order to have their village reported 
in the newspaper, a demobilized soldier, the village head and one party member 
decided to build a collective farm instead of a mutual aid team. Their plan was: pool 
all land together, have peasants work together and eat together. The harvest would be 
collected together and stored in two warehouses; its members would be provided what 
they needed; every day, members would work for 8 hours, study for 6 hours and rest 
for 8 hours. With this plan in mind, the three organizers held a village meeting calling 
for “organizing a collective farm and practicing socialism.” Peasants kept silent when 
asked for their opinions. Then the organizers accused those who had refused to join of 
being unpatriotic. Some peasants acceded, while others remained skeptical. Eventually 
the three organizers were criticized.59  
At the same time, probably more rural cadres treated this movement as purely 
economic, partly because the Draft had emphasized to increase production, partly 
because of their own economic status. Many cadres used economic incentives to 
attract peasants. Offering agricultural loans to mutual aid teams and agricultural 
producers’ cooperatives was quite common. “The government will lend peasants 
whatever a mutual aid team needs,” rural cadres promised to villagers. In this way, 
Junchu county organized 18 mutual aid teams. But after being granted agricultural 
loans, 16 of them immediately disbanded.60 More importantly, since there were no 
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59 Neibu cankao, July 8, 1952.  
60 Neibu cankao, August 25, 1952. 
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specific instructions on how to manage mutual aid teams, rural cadres were inclined to 
give peasants more “freedom.” Peasants were able to make their own rules. 
Peasants’ responses varied as well. Rural activists, model laborers and some party 
members usually were the first group that answered the party’s call. Like in Changzhi 
perfecture, their motivations were multiple: their faith in the CCP, their habits of 
following the CCP closely which so far had been proved to be rewarding, their 
aspirations for honor and respect, their ambition to get involved in local politics, and 
the lure of material prizes. All of these gains could be significant. Good performance 
in a mutual aid team or agricultural producers’ cooperatives substantially increased 
their chances of being selected as model laborers, which not only increased their social 
status, but also reinforced their actual control over the village. There were reports that 
model laborers with good reputations dared to challenge local cadres of higher ranks, 
even to resist their orders. Moreover, political prestige could bring them and their 
family’s enormous benefits. For example, Geng Changsuo, a national icon in forming 
mutual aid teams in Hebei, managed to find his sons comfortable jobs in big cities 
through his networks with the party cadres he built during extensive meetings he had 
joined.61 
For common peasants, economic issues were important, especially for middle 
peasants. Agricultural loans were tempting, of course. In many regions, especially 
those old liberated regions, agricultural loans were almost exclusively given to mutual 
aid teams and agricultural producers’ cooperatives. Prizes and honors were bestowed. 
As a matter of fact, from the end of 1951, the title of model laborers was highly 
recommended, if not restricted, to heads of mutual aid teams and agricultural 
producers’s cooperatives, and so were the rewards. The mutual aid teams or 
agricultural producers’ cooperatives could be nominal, but the prizes were not. For 
                                                        
61 Edward Friedman, Paul Pickowicz and Mark Selden, Chinese Village, Socialist State. 
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example, the first established mutual aid team in Jieyang County of Guangdong 
province in 1952 was rewarded with a buffalo.  
Rural people of bad class background tended to make alliance with people of 
good class background. It was reported that rich peasants, and sometimes former 
landlords, volunteered to join a mutual aid team and offered to lend, even transfer their 
draught animals and tools to peer members. They were making economic sacrifices in 
hopes of befriending and seeking protection from the majority. In many cases, rich 
peasants and landlords were greeted sincerely and warmly by mutual aid teams and 
agricultural producers’ cooperatives. 
Further, if managing well, peasants could profit more from mutual aid teams. By 
making distribution rules of their own, middle peasants, sometimes allied with rich 
peasants, “exploited” laborers and made more money than working alone. In cases 
when economic gain was the main motivation, mutual aid teams and agricultural 
producers’ cooperatives were controlled by middle peasants. Such kind of organization 
either intended to exploit laborers by paying them less or simply shut the door to poor 
peasants. 
Keshan county, located in northeast China, is a good case showing us how the 
movement was carried out economically. Tong’an village was a relatively wealthy 
village in Keshan County. In 1952, there were 73 middle peasants, 21 upper middle 
peasants, 6 rich peasants, and 49 poor peasants and hired laborers in this village. Four 
out of 6 rich peasants were party members. One was secretary of village party branch, 
one was former deputy village head and one was a provincial model laborer. They 
were engaged in “capitalist” business and at the beginning they were not interested in 
leading the mutual aid teams and agricultural producers’ cooperatives movement. But 
ultimately quite a few mutual aid teams and agricultural producers’ cooperatives were 
formed in which rich peasants played major roles. Economic calculation was the 
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driving force. Investigation of eight agricultural cooperatives in Keshan county 
revealed that most cooperatives were controlled by rich peasants. In terms of 
distribution, most of them enormously favored land input and production material 
input; seven of them hired laborers in the summer to farm. Further, mutual aid teams 
and agricultural cooperatives were used by rich peasants as a screen to exploit the 
poor. Rich peasant Wang Fa, together with three other wealthy families, established a 
mutual aid team. This team also admitted 5 poor peasants as team members. Five poor 
peasants were living at Wang’s home, following his orders and working for him. 
Although those 5 people were essentially hired laborers and followed Wang’s orders, 
they were reported as mutual aid team members and one of them was the nominal 
team head. Under a similar system, rich peasant Chen Qingshan gained 20 percent 
more income in a agricultural producers’ cooperative in 1952 than in 1951 when he 
hired two laborers. According to the report, Chen himself did not cultivate land at all. 
It was by no means uncommon that under the name of mutual aid teams, rich peasants 
hired laborers and paid them wages even lower than the market price. Moreover, all of 
them despised poor peasants. For example, Wang Fuqing’s mutual aid team originally 
consisted of 8 rich families and 4 poor families. When the poor families were unable 
to support themselves in the sowing season, they were expelled from the mutual aid 
team. In other mutual aid teams, the poor managed to stay, but their land was usually 
the last cultivated.62 
Rules of mutual aid teams and agricultural producers’ cooperatives varied 
dramatically from place to place. Some favored land input, while others favored labor 
input, some required the accumulation of more community funds regardless peasants’ 
complaints, while others did not. Despite different rules, there were problems in 
common. Members fought with each other over the distribution of resources, which 
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often led to the disruption of the organization. Nearly all mutual aid teams and 
agricultural producers’ cooperatives lacked democracy and were controlled only by 
one person. Finance was messy. Few members wanted to work hard and fewer wanted 
to help other members. One phenomenon that particularly disappointed the party was 
the lack of improvement in peasants’ cultural world. Even in those mutual aid teams or 
agricultural producers’ cooperatives that claimed to be successful, peasants’ old 
mentality remained, they continued to be selfish. They only sought individual profits 
and short-sighted objectives. Mutual aid teams and agricultural producers’ 
cooperatives did not care about, or perhaps sometimes did not dare, training peasants 
of the principles of socialism. One village head in north China said “I got peasants 
organized, but I dared not to talk more broadly about the future of socialism. If I did 
so, peasants would not join.” Even cadres at the county level did not attempt launching 
socialist education for peasants.63 
The situation in Shanxi Province was not necessarily better. Officially mutual aid 
teams and agricultural producers’ cooperatives appeared to have mushroomed. By 
spring 1951, 278 agricultural producers’ cooperatives had been established in 
Changzhi prefecture, and the number of peasants who got organized rose from 52 
percent of the rural population in 1951 to 80 percent in 1952. But even Shanxi 
provincial leaders had to admit things were not perfect. For example, the 
developments were not balanced. In some counties, 95 percent of peasants had been 
organized, yet in others where rural cadres did not care about the mutual aid and 
cooperation movement, the rate was less than 10 percent. As for cooperatives, one 
third of them distributed resources more according to land input than to labor input, 
which was against the fundamental principle of agricultural producers’ cooperatives 
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set by Wang Qian.64 As in other regions, many peasants formed nominal mutual aid 
teams of no validity to cover their activity of individual farming, some aimed at those 
material incentives. It was extremely rare that peasants raised their political 
consciousness. Political education on collectivism was scarce, peasants’ improvement 
in mentality was close to zero and they remained extremely selfish: taking advantage 
of other members’ illness; working others’ cattle to death; only pursuing profit. As 
peasants said, “get organized to accumulate the family fortune.”65 
    In Changzhi prefecture, problems were striking too. It occurred frequently that 
members used mutual aid teams to exploit others. It was common that drought animals 
were rewarded proportionally, too much in the party’s standard. In Luchengxi village, 
one herd of cattle was calculated as equal to 11 human laborers. In this way, to the 
party’s eyes, better-off peasants, with their possession of drought animals, were 
exploiting the poor. Secondly, female laborers received less than half of male laborers. 
One quarter villages in Changzhi prefecture did poor in developing mutual aid teams, 
over 5000 mutual aid teams were purely notional and had little validity: they either 
lacked the team leader or lacked a production plan. Many “mutual aid teams of 
individually farming” were created. As peasants summarized, “(mutual aid teams 
were) formed in spring, loosened in summer, collapsed in fall. (The pattern) will 
repeat next year.”66 
Forcing peasants to join mutual aid teams and agricultural producers’ 
cooperatives, treating the movement as a political event, commandism, making false 
registrations, tempting peasants with economic incentives, rash tendency – all the 
                                                        
64 “Bo Yibo, Liu Lantao tongzhi guanyu huabei  ongye huzhu yundong de fangzhen he renwu xiang 
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66 Changzhi diwei guanyu bannian lai nongcun shengchan huzhu hezuo yundong zonghe baogao (June 
30, 1952) (Changzhi prefecture’s report on the mutual aid and cooperation movement of the last six 
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phenomena would be repeated again and again in the future cooperativization 
movement. Still, compared with what happened later in the cooperativization 
movement, the first stage of mutual aid and cooperation movement had certain unique 
features. 
First of all, the lack of intervention or direction from the CCP at higher levels 
(county and higher) was significant. Rural cadres at the village levels played the 
leading role and mainly responded to themselves. They took into account their 
personal interests and local specifics more fully than cadres at higher levels later did. 
At the same time, because the policy itself tried to balance between increasing 
production and moving toward socialism, local cadres could interpret the policy in a 
way they preferred. Ideology was not dominating. Many cadres chose to take it as an 
economic movement and gave priority to rural production. 
To a larger degree, peasants’ choices were left to them. Except in areas where 
local cadres were extremely powerful and faithful to the state policy, which was not 
very common, peasants could choose to join a mutual aid team or agricultural 
producers’ cooperative or not. At least they could choose to organize a nominal one 
which did not affect their lives too much. The rate of fake was extremely high. 
Because the Draft did not provide details on how to build a mutual aid team, 
there was plenty of room for manipulation. At the local level, rural cadres and peasants 
together shaped the system and managed to profit from it. They could better 
accommodate this movement to their local conditions and protect themselves. Peasants 
were rational. They made their choice after careful calculations. For instance, some 
peasants chose to form their own organizations to avoid being organized by 
outsiders.67 Individual farmers were not commonly discriminated. 
Despite the central government’s stress on the socialist nature of mutual aid 
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teams, very few peasants were aware of it. It was very rare that peasants got organized 
because of their political consciousness.68  
In short, during this wave, although commandism did occur, the degree of 
violence was quite limited. Not closely supervised by superiors, rural cadres played 
important roles. Peasants had the capacity to monitor the movement to their advantage 
and protect their own interests. At this stage the movement was less influenced by 
ideology than economic factors. 
 
 
 
68 Neibu cankao, April 29, 1952. 
Chapter 4  Second stage: under the shadow of the three-anti movement 
Gao Gang: launched attacks upon capitalism 
Despite of the party’s effort to protect the countryside from the turmoil of the 
three-anti movement, rural society was deeply impacted by the campaign. For a short 
term, the direct impact was in favor of most peasants. Since corruption was a standard 
occurrence in the countryside, local cadres were profoundly concerned, if not scared, 
by the movement, so they worked unusually cautiously and avoided upsetting 
common peasants. Chapter 3 briefly analyzes such kind of “relaxed” attitudes. Cadres 
in Shanxi were no exception.1 For example, it was discovered later that in spring 1952 
rural cadres there were reluctant to intervene in peasants’ production plan in the fear of 
generating unnecessary grudge.2 
But, at the same time, the three-anti movement fostered an atmosphere of 
constraining and eliminating capitalism. The attacks upon corrupted capitalists 
immediately extended to all capitalists and the capitalist activities. The media, in 
response to the central government’s call, somehow went beyond the scope set by the 
central government. Even influential party publications, like Xuexi (Study) magazine, 
could not well manage to stay within the confines of the party intentions. The first 
three issues of Xuexi in 1952 all published articles that completely denied the necessity 
of preserving capitalism in the New Democracy stage and that focused only on the 
“anti-revolutionary” nature of capitalists. They implied that the national capitalists 
should be eliminated as a class. Xuexi magazine were later internally criticized by the 
Central Propaganda Ministry for its “leftist” errors,3 but it faithfully reflected a 
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3 Jian She (April 9, 1952), no 154. 
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general sentiment of the time that disapproved of every aspect of capitalism. The 
media regarded rich peasants as capitalists in the countryside, and pressed to constrain 
their activities.  
In January 1952, Gao Gang, at an internal meeting of the Northeast China 
Bureau, addressed the issue of the “direction of agricultural production.” He explicitly 
pointed out that phenomena like corruption, waste and bureaucracy, were 
fundamentally rooted in capitalism. The rightist trend that tolerated the development 
of capitalism was severely encroaching on the party. Gao Gang was particularly 
concerned with the direction of the development of agricultural production. To him, 
the attitude not to curb peasants’ tendency of becoming rich peasants, the attitude not 
to immediately guide peasants towards collectivization were rightist errors. 
Essentially, these attitudes denied the leadership to the proletarians among peasants 
and gave in to the growing capitalism. If they were to be allowed, Gao Gang warned, 
ultimately the countryside would walk down the old road of capitalism. Then Gao 
Gang continued to categorize several common actions among peasants as the capitalist 
activities: borrowing and lending money, hiring labors, engaging in trade in the pursuit 
of profit, individual farming, employing material prizes as incentives and providing no 
political education on socialism. By quoting passages of Lenin, Stalin and Mao 
Zedong, Gao Gang labeled the attitude that treated the mutual aid and cooperation 
movement passively as a rightist error. He announced that “The primary task was to 
convert the current small producers’ economy step by step into an agricultural 
cooperative economy.” To attain the goal, Gao Gang prohibited party members from 
engaging in capitalist activities, as listed above, and urged them to actively participate 
the mutual aid and cooperation movement. He concluded that in the party the elements 
of capitalism and rich peasants must be cleaned up.4 
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On January 24, 1952, Gao Gang’s address was published in People’s Daily, under 
the headline “Overcoming the encroachment of capitalism in the party, combating the 
rightist-trend ideas in the party.” Regarded as an indicator of the political wind, this 
article was widely cited and caught tremendous attention within and outside of the 
party. Starting in April 1952, peasants’ various practices in the mutual aid and 
cooperation movement, as discussed in chapter 3, came under the scrutiny of regional 
leaders, in order to weed out the elements of capitalism. The two most commonly 
criticized capitalist activities in the mutual aid and cooperation movement were hiring 
laborers and admitting rich peasants. To fight back, the East China Bureau forbad 
agricultural producers’ cooperatives and mutual aid teams to hire laborers or admit in 
rich peasants. If some members sincerely wanted to keep rich peasants in their teams, 
they should be patiently “educated.”5 The Central Committee endorsed this assertion 
with minor amendments.6  
Under the intense atmosphere, the mutual aid and cooperation movement moved 
into a new stage. In May 1952, the Northeast China Bureau formally brought forth a 
proposal to build agricultural producers’ cooperatives on a large scale. It issued a draft 
entitled “launching the agricultural cooperativization movement” claiming that there 
were two directions of agricultural development in northeast China. One was along the 
old road of capitalism due to peasants’ past experiences as individual farmers. Quite a 
few of party members had become rich peasants, rich peasants had profound influence 
                                                                                                                                                                
(Overcoming the encroachment of capitalism in the party, combating the rightist-trend ideas in the 
party), People’s Daily, January 24, 1952. 
5 “Huadong ju guanyu zai nongye huzhu hezuo zhong duidai funong wenti de yijian” (April, 1952) 
(The East China Bureau’s comments on how to treat rich peasant problem in the mutual aid and 
cooperation nmovement). Jianshe, no 159.  
6 Amendments are: if other members indeed needed rich peasants’ production materials, rich peasants 
could be allowed to stay, yet they should by no means exploit others; meanwhile, mutual aid teams 
purely consisted of rich peasants were not real mutual aid teams, they should be dismissed. “Zhongyang 
Guanyu zai nongye huzhu hezuo yundong zhong duidai funong de zhengce wenti de zhishi” (April, 
1952) (The Central Committee’s directives on the policy of how to treat rich peasant in mutual aid 
movement), Jianshe, May 14, 1952. 
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over other peasants. Party cadres, who should have been alert to this tendency, ignored 
it. The other direction was along the road of “getting organized,” from mutual aid 
teams, to agricultural producers’ cooperatives, and ultimately to the collectivization, as 
advocated by Chairman Mao. Without explaining why the former direction was not to 
be followed, the draft stated that the notion of allowing the rich peasant economy to 
prosper was completely erroneous; the rich peasant economy must be curbed. The fact 
that this report did not bother to explain why capitalism had to be curbed reflected the 
reality that by then conducting capitalism was already commonly regarded as 
incorrect. This draft also announced that tractors or horse-dragged farm implements 
would be widely adopted across the northeast region and that the agricultural 
producers’ cooperatives would be adopted as the major form of the mutual aid and 
cooperation movement.7 
Compared with earlier documents this draft raised some new points. The annual 
agricultural production plan of 1951, issued by the State Council in February 1952, 
explicitly declared that the rich peasant economy was permitted, labor hiring was not 
constrained, and short-term labor hiring was recommended.8 The Draft, issued in the 
end of 1951, also acknowledged peasants’ right to work individually. In contrast to 
them, the Northeast China Bureau’s draft condemned peasants’ tendency of working 
individually as an activity of capitalism. It urged rural cadres and the party members to 
be alert of the rich peasant economic activities and to refrain themselves from 
engaging in them. Most importantly, this draft identified agricultural producers’ 
cooperatives, instead of mutual aid teams, as the major form of the mutual aid and 
cooperation movement. Bearing those new elements, this draft was endorsed by the 
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Central Committee in Beijing and was sent to all regional bureaus, provinces, and 
prefectures. 
Activities like hiring labor, borrowing and lending money, buying and selling 
land, engaging in trade and individual production were all categorized as acts of 
capitalism and to be eliminated. These developments implied that, in effect the party 
had taken the position that the individual economy in the countryside was a force for 
capitalism, and it anticipated the danger that individual peasants’ prosperity would 
have an adverse effect on the development of the mutual aid and cooperation 
movement.9 
Consequently, the party carried out a number of investigations to check the 
development of capitalism in the countryside, most of which tended to highlight the 
degree of the development of capitalism. For example, in Shanxi province, during 
summer 1952, the party launched at least three series of investigations: the 
investigation on the development of capitalism in the countryside, the investigation on 
class relationships in the countryside and the investigation on the potential of 
agricultural productivity. The first two aimed at digging out the deep degree to which 
capitalism had invaded the countryside, the last, as a supplement to the first two, was 
an excessively optimistic estimation of the rural development under socialism. In the 
years to follow, those investigations would serve as the statistical ground for a series 
of socialist transformation movements. The party shaped those investigations with 
specific purposes and adopted the strictest standard to judge the activity of capitalism. 
Under the tense circumstance, even the North China Bureau, which in 1951 worked 
bravely to protect certain “rights” of capitalism, now had to bend, and agreed to 
constrain capitalism.10 
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The changes were not merely in propaganda. They reinforced, if did not cause, the 
extension of the three-anti movement into the countryside. By May 1952, the 
three-anti movement in cities had produced tremendously adverse effects on 
productivity: the national capitalists had fully given up, many abandoned their 
enterprises and fled; the national economy was at a standstill; and urban 
underemployment escalated sharply. Many CCP leaders felt the pressure and decided 
to shut down the movement in urban areas. It was decided then to extend it to the 
countryside, yet in the countryside how it should be proceed was not clear. 
The North China Bureau, with some reluctance, agreed to extend the three-anti 
movement to the countryside. As usual, it was prone to prudence. It suggested to start 
the three-anti movement in the county level and did not launch the three-anti 
movement in the district and village levels until after the fall harvest. With respect to 
the methods, the measures employed in the cities should not be adopted, the North 
China Bureau declared. Instead, the party rectification should be used. Aware that the 
targets of the three-anti movement (corruption, waste and bureaucracy) were too 
common in the countryside to be pursued, the main aim of this movement, as defined 
by the North China Bureau, was not to punish cadres who had committed violations in 
the past, but to prevent them from practicing the errors. Most cadres could get through 
the movement by making self-criticism.11 Siding with cadres against common 
peasants, the Bureau decided that cadres should not have to return ill-gotten gains to 
peasants or redistribute them as “victory fruits” among peasants, a standard practice 
during the land reform. Ultimately, the movement should end up with an improved 
                                                                                                                                                                
nongcun ziben zhuyi fazhan qingkuang he duice de baogao” (Semptember 6, 1952) (Comrade Bo 
Yibo’s report to Chairman Mao and the Central Commiittee on the Policy Research Office of the North 
China Bureau’s findingd of situations and solutions in the development of capitalism in the countryside), 
Huibian, 611. 
11 In principle, the punishment should be minimized, and no decapitation should be employed. Actions 
in villages were verbal, no violence would be permitted, no beating, no arresting, no binding. 
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agricultural production plan for the next year.12 Apparently, the North China Bureau 
did not intend to shape the three-anti movement into an anti-capitalism campaign, nor 
connect it with the mutual aid and cooperation movement. 
However, local agents had different orientations. For example, cadres in Changzhi 
prefecture immediately regarded the anti-rightist approach as the central pillar of this 
movement, and used Gao Gang’s article as the guideline. Changzhi prefecture 
reported, “under the influence of the three-anti movement, more than 80 percent of 
party branches had studied comrade Gao Gang’s article ‘Overcoming the 
encroachment of capitalism in the party, combating with the rightist trend ideas in the 
party,’” they “rigidly criticized these rightist mistakes, combated the ideas of rich 
peasants.” As a result, mutual aid teams developed into a new stage, and party 
members vigorously registered themselves into mutual aid teams and agricultural 
producers’ cooperatives.13 Perhaps this was a strategic move. It is not impossible that 
local cadres purposely switched the focus of the movement so as to protect 
themselves. By focusing on the elements of capitalism, they could either distract 
others’ attention to the rich people, or make up for their errors of corruption by taking 
a firm stand against capitalism. Such kind of orientation was not rare. As a matter of 
fact, the Northeast China Bureau openly endorsed it. 
The Northeast China Bureau pointed out that in the three-anti movement, it was 
inadequate to solely focus on anti-corruption and to overlook the existence of 
capitalism in the countryside. Corruption and bureaucracy indeed stemmed from the 
thought and the practice of capitalism. Therefore the true target of the three-anti 
movement in the countryside was the thought and practice of capitalism. The 
Northeast China Bureau ordered to combine the three-anti movement with the party 
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rectification. The key issues were: to fight against the capitalist trend within the party 
and to press the development of the rural economy through cooperativization. At the 
county level, although it was necessary to combat against corruption, wiping out 
capitalist thought was certainly indispensable. At the district level and lower, the main 
task was to check those exploitative deeds and thoughts. By comparison, checking the 
corruption was a minor issue.14  
The Central Committee of the CCP endorsed this decree and distributed it to all 
counties for trial.15 This decree sent out a clear signal to combine the issues of the 
three-anti movement and the party rectification movement with the mutual aid and 
cooperation movement as a whole. Given the political orientations of the three-anti 
and party rectification movement, by this point, the mutual aid and cooperation 
movement was hardly regarded as an economic event. Together they would be 
deployed with the full range of resources and administrative action, as shall be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
The North China Bureau tried to make a compromise between its plan and the 
Northeast China Bureau’s plan by setting anti-corruption, anti-waste and 
anti-bureaucracy as the primary task, and anti-capitalism as the secondary task.16 S
dual approaches left plenty room for subjective interpretations in the implem
For example, Shanxi province defined the party rectification movement as a 
combination of education on communism and of a campaign against rightist trends 
within the party. Changzhi prefecture further set the aims as eliminating exploitive 
uch 
entation. 
                                                        
14 “Zhonggong zhongyang dongbei ju guanyu xianqu cun ji zhengdang yu dui dang yuan gugong 
fangzai deng wenti de zhishi (draft)” (August 12, 1952) (The Northeast China Bureau’s directive on the 
party rectification at the county, district and village levels, and on the issues of party members hiring 
laborers), JCA, 84.1.1. 
15 “Zhonggong zhongyang dongbei ju guanyu xianqu cun ji zhengdang yu dui dang yuan gugong 
fangzai deng wenti de zhishi (draft)” 
16 “Guanyu ganbu gongzuo he zhengdang jiandang gongzuo zhong de jige wenti” (September, 1952) 
(Several problems on cadre issues and party rectification/reconstruction). Jianshe, no 179 (October 10, 
1952). 
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thoughts and deeds, correcting the direction of rural development and ensuring al
party members were aware that mutual aid and cooperation was the only right path to 
socialism.
l 
s 
ist and 
nt, 
s 
ill 
                                                       
17 Consciously or otherwise, the mutual aid and cooperation movement wa
then profoundly involved in the party rectification movement. Combating right
securing a socialist future became the new core for each party member. For example, 
cadres in Chengjiashan village of Shanxi province, in the past had no interest in the 
mutual aid and cooperation movement. But to meet the party rectification requireme
they demanded every party member to join cooperatives. When some party member
showed their reluctance, cadres said: “After receiving three lashes an old donkey w
climb a mountain; do you want five lashes?”18 The three anti movement and the 
rectification movement imposed direct political pressure on local cadres to push for 
mutual aid and cooperation movement. In October 1952, the second National 
Agricultural Work Conference was convened and demanded that 60 percent of the 
rural populating be “organized” by the end of 1953. In November, the party center 
decided to establish Rural Work Department in Beijing to monitor the nation-wide 
mutual aid and cooperation movement.  
A new stage had arrived. 
This time, village cadres were no longer the leaders of the mutual aid and 
cooperation movement. Instead, they became the first target. Cadres of district and 
county levels threatened village cadres with force, beat them, on occasion even 
disbanded whole villages to press rural cadres to implement the party order. Under 
enormous pressures, village heads themselves had to press the peasants even harder. 
 
17 “Changzhi diwei guanyu nongcun zhengdang gongzuo jihua” (October 25, 1952) (Changzhi 
prefecture’s plan on rural party rectification), JCA, 92.1.1. 
18 “Xiang Liu Lantao tongzhi de baogao” (April 21, 1953) (Report to Comrade Liu Lantao), JCA, 
146.1.1. 
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Power of the Soviet model 
One phenomenon that particularly disappointed the party was the lack of 
improvement in peasants’ mentality. The party’s diagnosis was the lack of guidance 
from the party and the lack of socialist education, so it decided to reinforce the party’s 
guidance. However, even party members had only vague ideas of what socialism was 
and knew little about collectivization. To correct peoples’ view of socialism, to 
connect mutual aid teams and agricultural producers’ cooperatives with China’s 
socialist future and to make sure the movement was on the right track, again the CCP 
turned to Soviet models for demonstration. 
In April 1952, Agricultural Ministry and the North China Bureau sent China’s 
first major agricultural delegation, consisting of officials, peasants, and agriculturists, 
to the Soviet Union to visit Soviet collective farms. They returned to China in 
September 1952, just in time to help the CCP launch the mutual aid and cooperation 
movement. In the first half of 1952, the lack of guidance from the party, the lack of a 
standard model, and the lack of education on socialism were the main problems that 
concerned the CCP. This delegation provided a timely opportunity to cope with these 
problems. With their own experience in the USSR, delegates were expected to show 
Chinese what a socialist country should be like, to convince peasants of the bright 
future of collectivization, and to enlighten cadres about how to lead a collective farm. 
So upon their returning, the delegates were busily engaged in spreading the idea of 
collectivization and socialism on various occasions. The media, from the People’s 
Daily to local newspapers, immediately focused on those events and took this chance 
to carry socialist education. Hebei Daily illustrates how the Soviet collective farms 
were presented in local media. 
On Sept 23, a full page of Hebei Daily was dedicated to interviewing peasant 
delegates. The headline was “the road of the Soviet peasants is the road of Chinese 
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peasants.” Model laborer Yu Luoshan told the reporter that although he was a member 
of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, before the trip he had thought that 
Sino-Soviet friendship meant that the Soviet Union had aided China to defeat Japan 
and sent specialists to help China’s economy. He did not believe China should follow 
the Soviet road to socialism. But in this trip, he saw that Soviet peasants were living in 
paradise. Although working collectively, they had their own separate families. 
Husband, wife, and kids were living in a big house with a private yard. One family 
that Yu visited had a house of three rooms, one warehouse, one stockyard and owned 
one horse, 10 sheep, two cows and a 5-mou private plot. In 1951 they produced far 
more than enough to feed themselves. Soviet farmers were no longer worried about 
food, clothing, natural disasters, or having too many children to feed. As a matter of 
fact, there was nothing to be worried about because rural productivity was so high in 
collective farms. In China it took a 5-member family more than 10 days to reap 15 
mou of grain and everyone was exhausted; while in Soviet collective farms, 5 people 
driving one tractor and two combines could reap 900 mou grain in one day, and 
everyone enjoyed sunshine on the tractor. What a contrast! Yu concluded that Chinese 
people must follow the Soviet road if they wanted to live a happy life.19  
Yu’s narrative was very typical of all those interviews. When it came to 
describing the Soviet collective farms, their prosperity, material abundance, high 
productivity and farmers’ paradise-like everyday life were emphasized. The images of 
every household being able to keep a large amount of private property, the miracle of 
tractors, and the Soviet government’s subsidies for children were striking. In 
interviewees’ comments, nearly all of them emphasized how they turned from doubt to 
full faith in socialism. Interview titles spoke for themselves, “Collectivization and 
mechanization led Soviet peasants to happiness,” and “We should follow the Soviet 
                                                        
19 Hebei Daily, Sept 23, 1952. 
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People’s road.”20 Pages of photos of Soviet collective farms, farmers, and tractors 
were displayed in newspapers and exhibited publicly. 
Those delegates toured around to give lectures to inspire local cadres and 
peasants’ enthusiasm to build agricultural producers’ cooperatives. The responses were 
impressive. Peasants were curious and anxious. What concerned peasants most was 
the detail of running a collective farm. They asked, “What stuff was to be 
collectivized?” “How was land nationalized?” “Do collective farmers own their 
homes?” “How do collective farmers sell their surplus products?” and “Do individual 
farmers exist in the USSR?” Obviously peasants were eager to know the distribution 
principles of collective farms. It is likely that the peasants who attended the lectures 
were rural cadres and activists. The extent to which common peasants knew about the 
Soviet collective farms through the media was probably more limited, but the effects 
of the Soviet models on rural cadres was rather significant. 
The secretary of fourth district of Da city Jing Naiwen was a case in point. He 
was a member of the delegation to the Soviet Union. Before he went to the Soviet 
Union, he knew little about socialism and was reluctant to guide peasants. He admitted 
that peasants’ understanding of China’s socialist future was increasingly ambiguous 
and he himself did not have faith in mutual aid teams. But after he visited the Soviet 
Union, he came to know what socialism should be and was now convinced that the old 
pre-Revolutionary activities “were all politically backward,” and that “peasants did not 
know the superiority of socialism and did not know the advantage of collectivization.” 
He was confident that peasants would no longer be interested in becoming a rich 
peasant once they saw the power of collectiveness. Comrade Jing believed he finally 
knew how to educate peasants and cadres. He told a reporter that in the near future he 
would talk about how peasants in his district had improved their understanding of 
                                                        
20 Hebei Daily, Sept 23, 1952. 
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socialism after he educated them.21 Jing was not the only cadre who was inspired by 
this trip. As a matter of fact, the party seized this chance to launch an education 
campaign on patriotism, on getting peasants organized and on China’s socialist future. 
This time, the mutual aid and cooperation movement was definitely treated as a 
project with significant political meaning. 
In October, in Hebei province, at each level of the party branches, a cadre was 
specifically assigned to take charge of the mutual aid and cooperation issue. The 
secretary of each county was required to make a report every other month and the 
secretary of each village had to convene village meetings regularly to educate 
peasants. On October 17, Hebei Daily published a report on how rural branches of 
Daming county educated peasants. In Xiaohu village, Daming county, the party 
members convened village conferences in holidays to educate people. They told 
peasants that producing more grain was not for the benefit of the peasants themselves, 
but to support the state. They instructed peasants to make a production plan not 
according to peasants’ needs but according to the need of the state.  
Taking the Soviet collective farms as the model, “getting organized” became more 
political. First, it was formally announced that transitioning from mutual aid teams to 
agricultural producers’ cooperatives and to collective farms was the only path to 
socialism. Then, taking Soviet people as the model, Chinese people were told to work 
harder for a better living. Furthermore, getting organized or not was now a matter of 
the party line: everyone would go either on Soviet road to socialism or on a road 
toward capitalism. As the report concluded, “all political activities should focus on 
mutual aid teams and agricultural producers’ cooperatives.”22 Counties in Hebei 
province were instructed to educate peasants of the meaning of socialism, of the 
                                                        
21 Hebei Daily, Sept 25, 1952.  
22 Hebei Daily, Oct 17, 1952. 
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direction of the rural economy and of the significance of getting organized.23 
The month from Oct 17 to Nov 17 of 1952 was named “Sino-Soviet Friendship 
Month.” Newspapers published a series of articles to introduce the Soviet experience, 
with titles such as “Soviet peasants are farming land with machines,” “The Soviet 
Union is the most advanced country of the world,” “ What kind of country the Soviet 
Union is,” “Thank the Soviet Union and learn from the Soviet Union,” and “The 
happy life of Soviet collective farmers.” In addition to the description of the 
paradise-like life of Soviet farmers, a new theme developed: Soviet peasants’ happy 
life was the result of collectivism. Soviet peasants contributed to making the country 
rich while at the same creating a happy life for themselves.. They were willing to hand 
in more of their property to the collective, which Chinese peasants consistently refused 
to do.24 In following months, slogans such as the “Soviet road of collectivization is 
our peasants’ bright future,” were widely disseminated repeatedly. 
At the same time, the party claimed that Stalin’s last work, Economic Problems of 
Socialism in the USSR, showed in detail how the transition from socialism to 
communism would be achieved and demanded that Chinese learn and master Stalin’s 
ideas for guidance on how to construct a new life.25 Learning from the Soviet 
experience was getting more and more formal. For example, on Nov 10, in Beijing the 
Agriculture Ministry, the Ministry of Water Resources and other central institutions 
invited Soviet officials and specialists to address the history of Soviet collectivization 
and answer questions on the operation of collective farms.26 
The Soviet models were displayed across China, education on socialism prevailed 
and regulations of mutual aid teams and agricultural producers’ cooperatives were 
                                                        
23 Hebei Daily, Oct 30, 1952 
24 Hebei Daily, Oct 30, 1952. 
25 Hebei Daily, Oct 29, 1952. 
26 Hebei Daily, Nov 13, 1952. 
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specified. Compared with the first stage in spring 1952, economic factors were no 
longer the main concern. The concern for the correctiness in politics dominated. Rural 
cadres were no longer the leading figures. Rather, they became the targets of socialist 
education and were pressed to serve the party rather than to protect their villagers. 
Taking Soviet collective farm as the ultimate model, the large amount of public assets, 
the advantage of large-size production and the myth of socialism, were getting 
associated with China’s mutual aid and cooperation movement. The media, cautiously 
yet firmly, justified the message that for the state’s interest, sometimes individuals 
would have to endure some personal loss. Soviet peasants had done it; it was now 
Chinese peasants’ turn. 
Shanxi Province: moving ahead 
By spring 1952, agricultural producers’ cooperatives were still in the trial stage. 
Except in Shanxi province and the northeast region, in other regions building a 
agricultural producers’ cooperative required the permission from the province. The 
number of agricultural producers’ cooperatives was very small. In Shanxi province and 
the northeast China region, the regulation was looser. For example, in Shanxi, to build 
a agricultural producers’ cooperative needed the permission from the district level, 
whereas in northeast region, it was the county level. Nevertheless, in all regions, 
prudence was stressed. Formally certain premises were set to be met. Although 
slightly varied region by region, they largely resembled the criteria set by Wang Qian. 
In brief, in the first half of 1952, agricultural producers’ cooperatives were little more 
than a showcase. The main form was mutual aid teams.27 
However, under the circumstance of the three-anti movement and the party 
rectification, enlightened by the perfect examples of Soviet collective farms, the 
                                                        
27 Ye Yangbing, Zhongguo nongye hezuohua yundong yanjiu, 230. 
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mutual aid and cooperation movement entered into a new stage. This chapter will take 
Shanxi province as an example to show how the new stage took off in 1952. 
The influence of Gao Gang’s January address was far-reaching. Local cadres with 
acute political sensibility already noted the changed atmosphere and tried to adopt the 
new doctrine. For example, on January 29, Gao Gang’s article was republished in 
Shanxi Daily. In March, Shanxi Daily published one column under the headline “All, 
come to learn Comrade Gao Gang’s article and defeat the capitalists’ attack upon the 
countryside.”28 As the editorial pointed out, Gao Gang’s article was extremely 
important and bore great significance in guiding the mutual aid and cooperation 
movement in Shanxi province.29 District and county cadres began to report their 
achievements in learning Gao Gang’s article. For example, Pinshun county of 
Changzhi prefecture reported that it would organize cadres of all levels, the party 
members, and members of mutual aid teams to study comrade Gao Gang’s article, in 
order to criticize and eliminate capitalism and to alter the “rightist error” in the mutual 
aid and cooperation movement.30 Pinshun county even managed to have this action 
reported in People’s Daily.31 In the following month, “after studying comrade Gao’s 
article,” over 500 mutual aid teams asked for permission to form agricultural 
producers’ cooperatives.32 In May, People’s Daily published another report about the 
development of the mutual aid and cooperation movement in Shanxi claiming that 
after intensely studied comrade Gao Gang’s article, in many counties, all the party 
members had joined mutual aid teams.33 
As comrade Gao Gang’s article was widely studied, common party members and 
                                                        
28 Shanxi Daily, March 17. 
29 Shanxi Daily, March 17. 
30 Shanxi Daily, March 17, 1952. 
31 People’s Daily, April 13, 1952. 
32 Neibu cankao, April 25, 1952. 
33 People’s Daily, May 8, 1952. 
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peasants raised questions on how to implement Gao Gang’s agenda. Shanxi Daily then 
created columns to answer those questions. For example, one female party member 
posted that, her husband was sick and was unable to farm land. There was no laborer 
in her family, so she hired a laborer. But according to comrade Gao’s article, the party 
members should not hire laborers. What could she do to survive? Shanxi Daily 
answered, she should fire the laborer and join a mutual aid team. Another peasant 
asked, “Comrade Gao Gang said that in mutual aid teams the party members should 
take care of other peasants in predicaments. How should this rule be practiced?” 
Shanxi Daily answered that the mutual aid teams were prohibited from excluding 
families with difficulties; instead, mutual aid teams should give them some special 
preference if needed.34 On a volunteer basis, mostly peasants tended to form mutual 
aid teams with partners of similar economic status and were unwilling to admit poorer 
partners. Such a tendency was to be discouraged under the new guidance. This time 
political correctness would be underscored. Volunteer principle and economic 
necessity should not take precedence over political concerns. 
Counties and villages started to check the “capitalism activities” in their 
territories.35 Kinds of “deviations” that had been tolerated in 1951 were no longer 
acceptable in summer 1952: they must be curbed. The party’s solution to these 
problems, as always, was that the party must reinforce its control over peasants and 
guide peasants towards collectivism.36 In Changzhi prefecture, inspections were 
imposed upon those agricultural producers’ cooperatives established in 1951. Two 
findings were made. First, the cooperatives had placed excessive emphasis on sideline 
work and ignored agricultural work. Cooperative members had preferred to engage in 
trading rather than to open up wasteland. Another finding was, according to the report, 
                                                        
34 Shanxi Daily, June 20, 1952. 
35 Shanxi Daily, March 17, 1952. 
36 Neibu cankao, April 29. 
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as land and laborers were pooled together, peasants wanted to pool their livestock and 
farm implements too. But cooperative heads were unwilling to meet peasants’ request. 
The report concluded, those heads could not handle peasants’ request with bravery.37  
In summer 1952, the mutual aid and cooperation movement revitalized and grew 
further. The boundary of prudence was crossed. On July 26, the CCP’s Shanxi branch 
set up a Mutual Aid and Cooperation Direction Committee, headed by Tao Lujia, to 
take charge of the mutual aid and cooperation movement. Upon its establishment, the 
committee issued a report demonstrating the advantages of agricultural producers’ 
cooperatives compared with mutual aid teams; in agricultural producers’ cooperatives, 
with larger size and more laborers, modern agricultural technologies, such as tractors, 
and large-scale rural construction, such as irrigation, were to be applied. The potential 
of land and laborers was to be realized in a full strength, and peasants’ income might 
double compared to that of mutual aid teams. Further, the committee claimed, 
agricultural producers’ cooperatives could better educate peasants on collectivism and 
political study. On average, one cooperative subscribed to 7-8 newspapers. This report 
discovered that peasants in cooperatives had increasingly identified the cooperative’s 
interests with their own interests, and considered cooperative members their relatives. 
Agricultural producers’ cooperative would not only lead the rural economy towards 
collectivization and modernization, it would also serve as an excellent school of 
political and cultural education. Therefore, the committee concluded, facts had proven 
that agricultural producers’ cooperatives were of unlimited attraction to mass peasants: 
it was time to energetically promote it.38 
On August 20, Shanxi Daily published an editorial entitled “the Chinese 
                                                        
37 Neibu cankao, June 26, 1952. 
38 “Shanxi Sheng 1952 nian shang bannian jianli yu fazhan nongye shengchan hezuoshe de qingkuang 
he jingyan” (Situations and lessons of Shanxi Province in building and developing agricultural 
producers’ cooperatives in the first half of 1952), Huibian juan, 315-320. 
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Communist Party is the organizer and the instigator of leading peasants towards 
cooperativization,” which explicitly pointed out that the party’s central political task in 
respect to its rural duties was to lead the mutual aid and cooperation movement. This 
article represented a turning point. Previously, as chapter 2 analyzes, the party’s key 
task in the countryside was to guide peasants to produce more and increase rural 
production; but at this point, politics had replaced economy as the central concern. 
In the same month, for the first time, Shanxi Daily started to publish articles to 
introduce Soviet collective farms and to praise Soviet agronomists. In September, 
Chinese peasant delegates’ visit to the Soviet Union was highlighted. In November, 
articles on Soviet experience and Soviet models reached a new high. In the same 
month, the first collective farm in Shanxi province, the “Changzhi Sino-Soviet 
friendship collective farm” was established. One month later, the first tractor station in 
Shanxi was established, also in Changzhi. 
On October 10, 1952, the new secretary of the CCP’s Shanxi branch Gao Kelin 
criticized the mutual aid and cooperation movement for its unbalanced development. 
Gao Kelin analyzed the reasons for the “unbalance,” as first, local leaders lacked close 
inspection and monitoring over the countryside and often were deceived by false 
reports; second, they did not go into villages to lead peasants; third they had not 
mastered the method of winning over peasants by showing them good examples. Gao 
Kelin then demanded in-depth inspections of rural conditions. He implied that 
prudence had been important in the past, but it was no longer the main issue.39 In 
December, he further declared that the peasants who had not yet organized were the 
ones who still dreamed of capitalism, and he called to fight firmly against the rightist 
error of failing to organize peasants.40 
                                                        
39 “Zai zhonggong shanxi shengwei kuoda huiyi shang de zongjie baogao” (October 10, 1952) 
(Summary report in the enlarged meeting of the CCP Shanxi Provincial committee), Huibian juan, 321. 
40 “Zai quansheng nongye fengchan laodong mofan daibiao dahui shang de baogao” (December 19, 
 145
From July on, Shanxi Daily created numerous columns to broadcast rules for 
operating agricultural producers’ cooperatives, ranging from the use of community 
funds to the enforcement of the distribution rules. In general, those rules were either 
too complex and well-balanced to be applied correctly or too idealistic to be 
implemented at all. For example, the principle of voluntarism always was asked to be 
honored, as well as the principle of favoring the labor and providing aids to the poor. 
As cases in Chapter 3 have shown, the two principles more often than not were not 
mutual reinforcing. 
Since prudence had been out-dated, the emphasis on faster pace and larger size 
took priority. From cadres at the county level, down to village level, all believed the 
larger, the better. Meanwhile, the ongoing education campaigns on socialism was 
simply understood as to cultivate local cadres’ antipathy for the individual peasant 
economy and drive them to overlook the fact that after land reform private farming 
continued to be the dominant factor in agricultural production and the chief mode of 
existence in rural areas. Ignoring these realities, the need to replace private ownership 
with some “socialist” elements was stressed. For example, without bothering to 
examine the conditions of the countryside, the head of Licheng county of Changzhi 
prefecture, raised the slogan “to achieve the complete cooperativization in three 
years.” When cadres of lower ranks told him that peasants did not want to form 
cooperatives, he criticized them for their rightist errors. The county head did not waste 
his time in discussing details of running cooperatives, he did not study the criteria 
Changzhi prefecture had set forth to build a cooperative, and he completely ignored 
the feedback from district cadres. He simply insisted on building more cooperatives. 
To produce more “socialist elements,” Licheng county cadres ordered every 
long-lasting mutual aid team in the county to plant eight mou of collectively operated 
                                                                                                                                                                
1952) (Report on the provincial conference of the model labors representatives) Huibian juan, 323-324.    
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high-yield land. Peasants were forced to pool their land of good quality in this 
category. To meet the requirement, some mutual aid teams had to rent high-yield land 
from outside. The commitment to “eliminate small private economy” stemmed the 
passion for public assets, and the obsession of collectivism trampled the voluntary 
principle. Furthermore, located in Changzhi prefecture, cadres in Licheng county 
sensed the pressure to compete with Wuxiang county that frequently had its name 
mentioned in newspapers. As Licheng cadres said, if they (Wuxiang county) could do 
it, why could not we? Without doubt, these attitudes affected cadres of lower ranks.41 
Cadres at the county level rarely cared about the operation of those cooperatives, 
so long as the task was fulfilled, especially during the party rectification process. As 
peasants complained, “Cadres of county level don’t come down to the townships; 
cadres of district level don’t come down to villages, village heads don’t farm land, and 
common peasants don’t sleep because of continuous meetings.”42 
Pressed by the supervisors in the county, cadres of districts and villages, usually 
with lower literacy and poorer understanding of politics, had a very simple 
understanding of the policies. Immediately after the party rectification movement, to 
prove that they had been “corrected,” rural party members forced peasants, and 
themselves, to build agricultural producers’ cooperatives, regardless of peasants’ 
resistance. Cadres seemed to have commonly held the idea that once the agricultural 
producers’ cooperative was established, they had fulfilled the requirement of the 
rectification movement and need to do no more. Strictly speaking, what they had 
learned in the party rectification movement should be mainly applied to party 
members, not to common peasants. But in practice, rural cadres usually applied what 
they had just learned to common peasants. Some party members simply told villagers, 
                                                        
41 “Xiang Liu Lantao tongzhi de baogao” (April 21, 1953) (Report to comrade Liu Lantao), JCA, 
146.1.1. 
42 “Xiang Liu Lantao tongzhi de baogao.” 
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“in three years, private ownership will be eliminated, all production materials will be 
collectivized,” and “all people should get organized.” Theoretically, all agricultural 
producers’ cooperatives were supposed to be built upon good mutual aid teams, but 
this rule was totally ignored in Licheng county. 58 out of 98 cooperatives built in late 
1952 had nothing to do with mutual aid teams; CCP members formed them arbitrarily 
to fulfill the requirement.43 
Meanwhile, Shanxi province and Changzhi prefecture continued to build up their 
national reputation as pioneers in the mutual aid and cooperation movement. Now and 
then People’s Daily published reports on them. In addition to reports mentioned above, 
in June, People’s Daily reported the success of the first ten experimental agricultural 
producers’ cooperatives in Changzhi prefecture, especially their continued progress in 
1952. The report marked two new developments: enhanced political education for 
members and the increased public assets. According to the report, as peasants pooled 
land and laborers together, they demanded that their production materials should be 
pooled together too. The report concluded that it was time to “step by step resolve the 
contradiction between collective management of production and private ownership of 
production materials, which is the key to improve the cooperatives further.”44 In the 
same month, the success of Guo Yu’eng cooperative in Changzhi prefecture was 
published in People’s Daily, which was later set as a national model for agricultural 
producers’ cooperatives. The “advanced” features of this cooperative were more land 
pooled in, more peasants joined (members increased from 18 households to 46 
households), more public assets, and better collective working habits.45 In the same 
year, the chief editor of the People’s Daily Fan Changjiang wrote a pamphlet 
describing the experience of Guo Yu’eng cooperative. This pamphlet was published by 
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45 People’s Daily, June 3, 1952. 
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the People’s press and was circulated widely.46 
Thanks to Gao Gang, party members were no longer allowed to work individually, 
which meant there would no right to withdraw from a mutual aid team or agricultural 
producers’ cooperative. For example, Li Shunda mutual aid team, one of the most well 
known mutual aid teams in the nation, in December 1951, decided to convert to a 
agricultural producers’ cooperative. Some old members chose to withdraw. Lu 
Quanwen was one of them. Lu, born a poor peasant, had made his way up to middle 
peasant status by working hard and had become a party member. He concluded that 
“based on the soil conditions in our village, there is no more room for higher yield, no 
matter how well we get organized.” He was allowed to withdraw. But after Gao 
Gang’s January address, under the investigation of the direction of rural development, 
Lu’s action was reexamined carefully and criticized publicly. Every party member in 
Li Shunda’s cooperative studied Gao Gang’s article and then one after another 
denounced Lu. In the end, Lu Quanwen burst into tears, crying, “I was wrong. I 
betrayed the party, I betrayed Chairman Mao, and betrayed comrades’ help and 
education.” He apologized for his pursuit of personal profit and joined Li Shunda 
cooperative.”47 Like many other good examples in Changzhi, this episode was 
reported in People’s Daily. 
In July, an article entitled “the steady development of agricultural producers’ 
cooperatives in North China” was published in People’s Daily. Again, Shanxi was 
presented as an example. The five criteria Wang Qian had set for the ten experimental 
cooperatives, as discussed in chapter 3, served the basis of the criteria of building 
agricultural producers’ cooperatives in North China.48 In August, Changzhi’s example 
of how to involve rural cadres in the mutual aid and cooperation movement was 
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introduced in People’s Daily.49 In September, the development of mutual aid teams in 
Shanxi, mainly in Changzhi prefecture, was reported in People’s Daily,50 and in 
October, Shanxi’s experience of building agricultural producers’ cooperatives was 
again endorsed by People’s Daily.51                                                       
According to those reports, the mutual aid and cooperation movement moved 
ahead in Shanxi province smoothly and swiftly. By September, 56.3 percent of 
households in Shanxi had got organized. Public assets had increased substantially. 
Many mutual aid teams had made annual production plans, combined sideline work 
with land farming, adopted advanced technology to farm land, and estimated a 
dramatic increase of their income.52 At the same time, peasants’ mentality had been 
improved and they had a better understanding of collectivism. Aware of the 
advantages of agricultural producers’ cooperatives, more and more peasants had 
voluntarily asked to form agricultural producers’ cooperatives. As peasants said, 
“agricultural producers’ cooperatives are like a train, and the party is like the 
locomotive; they lead us walking towards a society of happiness.”53 In Changzhi 
prefecture, over 1000 agricultural producers’ cooperatives were established in the fall 
1952. The achievement appeared dizzying. Yet along with the rapid advancement, the 
rash tendency emerged, with severe consequences. 
Rash tendencies 
Although in theory the three-anti movement and party rectification movement 
were confined to CCP members, in practice the criteria the party set for the party 
members were widely applied to masses of peasants. In mass media, it was announced 
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50 People’s Daily, Sept 3, 1952. 
51 People’s Daily, Oct 20, 1952. 
52 People’s Daily, Sept 3, 1952. 
53 People’s Daily, Oct 20, 1952. 
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that hiring laborers and money lending were forms of exploitation that should be 
prohibited. Rich peasants were to be beaten, as had happened to landlords in land 
reform. Individual farming was considered capitalism, and as cadres informed 
peasants, “Individual farming takes you towards the road of capitalism that only leads 
to death.” Peasants were supposed to get organized; individual farmers were no longer 
to be tolerated, but to be despised. Slogans were posted like “Do you farm 
individually? Individual farming is backward; it is the barrier to socialism,” and “there 
is no future for individual farmers; They will be isolated, be washed out and be the 
shame.”54 Not surprisingly, these words were capable of producing results; and once 
again, rural cadres displayed their ingenuity in “mobilizing” peasants. 
For example, in Jincheng county of Changzhi prefecture, a wide variety of 
measures were used to attack individual farmers, ranging from financial boycott to 
psychological discrimination. Financial boycott was widely applied. Individual 
farmers were neither granted any state loans nor other aids. In addition, they were 
assigned to shoulder a larger share of local miscellaneous levies. For instance, a 
mutual aid team as a whole needed to subscribe to one newspaper, while the individual 
farmer was required to subscribe one for his own family, regardless of whether he was 
literate or not. Even if individual farmers did not use the newly cooperative-purchased 
farm implement, they were forced to pay for a share of the implement. In many cases 
individual farmers were forbidden to use village facilities such as wells or mills. 
Discrimination went far beyond economic methods. Organizationally, individual 
farmers were separated and often were categorized with landlords. In some villages 
individual farmers were forced to make personal reports twice a day to the village 
head. Psychological discrimination might be even harder to bear. In village 
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rectify the incorrect propaganda on the mutual aid and cooperation). Jianshe, no 181. 
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ceremonies, either marriages or funerals, individual farmers were forced to carry a big 
drum on their backs, which in old customs was considered humiliating and done only 
by slaves.55 Facing these pressures, many individual farmers gave up and decided to 
join a mutual aid team, preferably one that was notional. 
To peasants’ surprise, this time, joining notional mutual aid teams was not enough 
to fulfill the party requirement, partly because now cadres of district and county levels 
might come to inspect, partly because now the mutual aid teams were no longer the 
party’s favorite form. This preference had been clearly demonstrated in media and 
Shanxi leaders’ speeches. Although certain criteria were set as the basis for building 
agricultural producers’ cooperatives, and on principle, building a agricultural 
producers’ cooperative needed the permission from county cadres or even prefects, in 
practice, many local cadres pushed for a agricultural producers’ cooperative to 
demonstrate their progressiveness. 
As discussed in chapter 2, the mutual aid team was mainly a form of labor-sharing 
among peasants and it could be “created” on paper by merely listing a number of 
peasants as a team. It did not necessarily involve any surrender of property. But the 
agricultural producers’ cooperative was a form that required peasants to pool parts of 
their property as the initial investment. So once peasants registered, they were asked to 
hand a certain amount of property into the agricultural producers’ cooperative. 
Collecting money was much harder than just listing peasants’ name on paper. In 
addition to threats in words, rural cadres had to resort to violence. They developed a 
series of methods to “persuade” peasants to join mutual aid teams or agricultural 
producers’ cooperatives. 
Since the ultimate goal of socialism had been clearly displayed, with the reference 
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of Soviet examples and by the party rectification movement, peasants’ long-standing 
notion that socialism was to socialize property seemed to be confirmed.56 Rural ca
held the blind faith that the more public assets, the better the cooperative would be. In 
the course of developing agricultural producers’ cooperatives, publicly owned assets 
were blindly expanded. Regardless of the criteria set by the central decree, in the eyes 
of local cadres, the difference between mutual aid teams and agricultural cooperati
was that cooperatives collectivized peasants’ livestock and farm implements. I
reported in almost each county that some cooperatives had collectivized all thei
members’ land, livestock and farming tools. For example, among over one thousand 
new agricultural producers’ cooperatives established in Changzhi prefecture in fall 
1952, 76 percent of them had collectivized all of their members’ livestock and farm
implements.
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57 Even old farm tools and old furniture were acquired by the cooperatives 
regardless of whether there was any need for them. In some villages even bucket
scrap iron were demanded for the cooperative. The extreme case was that some 
cooperatives even took the lumber peasants saved for their coffins –something many 
seniors cared about most.58 According to an incomplete statistical account of Qinshui 
county of Changzhi prefecture, in 43 cooperatives, 496 livestock that were 
collectivized were of no help for the cooperatives at all. A variety of measures w
developed to “ensure” peasants pooled their livestock into the cooperatives. As
first step, a deadline was set, such as “cattle need to be turned to the cooperative in 
five days, horses in seven days. After the deadline, all the rest would be confiscate
Second, those who refused to hand in their livestock were publicly criticized and 
 
56 “Linfeng zhuanqu huzhu hezuo yundong zhuanti baogao” (May 7, 1953) (Linfeng prefecture’s 
special report on the mutual aid and cooperation movement). SPA, C29.1.17. 
57 “Jiuzheng nongye shengchan hezuoshe fazhan zhong de mangmu maojin qingxiang” (March 1953) 
(Rectify the impetuous tendency in the development of agricultural producers’ cooperatives). Jianshe, 
no 205. 
58 “Jiuzheng nongye shengchan hezuoshe fazhan zhong de mangmu maojin qingxiang.” 
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repeatedly roll-called. Third, often a quota was set to be fulfilled by villagers. Fo
all hidden property was searched for and if discovered was confiscated by the 
cooperative without any compensation.
urth, 
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After peasants agreed to hand their property to the cooperative, more problems 
arose. First of all, supposedly private property should be compensated, yet there was 
no standard for the rate of compensation or the process of who should make the 
decision. It was determined case by case. In most cases, the compensation was 
underestimated: They “collectivized farm cattle for public feeding and public use at a 
very low price, and such payment was not made to the owners for a long period of 
time;” Sometimes poor peasants just “used the cattle of middle peasants at no cost.” 
During the campaign against capitalism, it was a standard practice that the interest of 
poor peasants were over-emphasized at the expense of that of middle-peasants.60 
There were, occasionally, cases that the cooperative used high prices to persuade 
peasants, or peasants succeeded in bargaining. In either case, the cooperatives needed 
to pay peasants, with credits, for their property, and the process of payment took years 
or forever. As one woman campaigned, “the cooperative is getting richer, the 
household is getting poorer.”61  
Sadly, often such actions were endorsed by cadres at higher levels. For example, 
the mutual aid team requested Su San, a middle peasant, alone to pay for a plough the 
team wanted to buy. Su San refused and petitioned to the district cadre. The district 
cadre said, “Your money is useless if it was kept at your home. You need to donate it 
to realize its potential.” Su San had to sell his grain reserve to pay for the plough. Of 
 
59 “Guanyu huzhu hezuo mangmu maojin qingxiang diandi jiyao” (May 12, 1953) (Accounts on the 
impetuous tendency in the mutual aid and cooperation movement), SPA, C29.1.16. 
60 Gao Huamin, “Rectifying the Problems of Impetuosity and Rash Advance in the Agricultural 
Mutual Aid and Cooperativization Movement in 1953,” The Politics of Agricultural Cooperativization 
in China, 61, 
61 “Guanyu huzhu hezuo mangmu maojin qingxiang diandi jiyao.” 
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course, he decided not to produce more grain. Such kind of case was not rare.62 
 Taking care of livestock was always a problem. In most cases, the burden of 
feeding livestock was not fairly divided. Peasants who had just suffered significant 
losses with respect to their private property tended to care much less about the 
property of “others.” As a result, fat livestock became skinny and skinny ones were 
dying. In one cooperative in Huguan county of Changzhi prefecture, 14 livestock died. 
As peasants sarcastically commented, “see, this is the advantage of the agricultural 
producers’ cooperatives, in no families could so many livestock die.”63 This 
phenomenon not only occurred in Changzhi prefecture; it took place across China, 
from northeast China to the central south China.64 
More often than not, taking members’ property was not enough. Those newly 
established agricultural producers’ cooperatives, following the example of the ten 
cooperatives in Changzhi, were not shy in demanding state loans. As an “advanced” 
form, their requests usually were granted. Consequently, they ended up with huge 
debts, often to the degree they could not even afford the interests payments. But this 
phenomenon was not unique; the first ten experimental agricultural producers’ 
cooperatives had done the same. 
Enlarging public assets was only one aspect of being more “socialist.” 
Incorporating more socialist rules in everyday operations was also an important factor. 
Vested interest, which some cooperatives believed was of capitalist nature, would be 
eliminated from the cooperative operation. Compensations for the land and cash 
investments were certainly categorized as non-socialist and doomed. In most cases, 
land compensation was strictly limited up to 30 percent before agricultural taxes or 
                                                        
62 “Jincheng xian huzhuzu zhong dangqian qingkuang yu cunzai de wenti.” 
63 “Xiang Shengwei de san yuefen zonghe baogao” (March 1953) (Summary report to the province in 
March), JCA, 124.1.1. 
64 Reports on the loss of livestock in cooperatives were numerous, from each main region of China. 
See Neibu cankao.  
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around 10 percent after agricultural taxes. Further, some cooperatives started to 
consider eliminating compensation for land at all.65 
As public assets increased, so did the size of cooperatives. The watchwords “it is 
better to have more than less, to have larger than smaller” and “the more the better, the 
bigger the better” spread widely.66 Blind faith in larger size was widespread. For 
example, in Hongjing village of Licheng county, Changzhi prefecture, in summer 
1952, one agricultural producers’ cooperative consisted of 27 households. After fall 
1952, the village cadres issued orders to increase the members to 40 household. The 
district cadre was not satisfied, and said, in order to compete with the Wang Jinyun 
cooperative in Wuxiang county, all households in Hongjing village (a total 101 
households) should join the cooperative. His advice was honored.67 
The most well known development associated with socialism, was of course the 
practice of “eating from a big pot,” which has been often discussed by scholars.68 In 
this chapter, I will brief introduce some less referred “socialist” features. For example, 
welfare became a bright new feature. Multiple proposals were drafted to create 
fantastic welfare systems. For example, in Linfen county of Changzhi prefecture, 
village heads initiated proposals like “a woman with children would be paid 30 
percent of income even if she does not work,” “women confined to the home would be 
financially supplied by the team,” “kids under 18 years old would be raised by the 
team,” and “seniors over 50 years older would be taken care of by the team.” On the 
one hand, those proposals reflected common peasants’ aspirations for a social welfare 
system; on the other hand, those proposals were simply unrealistic. In the short run, 
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66 Gao Huamin, “Rectifying the Problems of Impetuosity and Rash Advance in the Agricultural 
Mutual Aid and Cooperativization Movement in 1953,” 62. 
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they would only have adverse effects on productivity. Young male laborers did not 
want to work with women, and were resentful of the rule that women were to be paid 
equally.69 
Meanwhile, the need for a good welfare system was practical. Peasants had 
delivered their livestock to mutual aid teams or agricultural producers’ cooperatives, 
and they had shouldered large debts, so they felt they were justified to make as many 
requests as they needed. As one cooperative member Yang Manfu said, “I did what 
you told me to do, I have nothing left; the cooperative should help me in every respect. 
After all, there is nothing you can get out of me.”70 This passage sounds like Mr. Yang 
had read the communist manifesto. Spontaneously, cooperative members turned to the 
cooperatives for help in the face of material shortages and personal problems. In 
theory to meet their requests was one essential purpose of the cooperatives, yet in fact 
the cooperatives were not ready for it. Therefore, the cooperatives turned d to the state 
agencies, mostly banks and credit unions, for aid. For example, in one village of Yi 
county of Changzhi prefecture, after all property had been collectivized, cooperative 
members went to the cooperative head for subsidized food, medicine and 
entertainment such as watching a drama. With no more grain for the winter, the 
cooperative head managed to get a loan of 4 million yuan from the state bank to feed 
its members.71 Few other cooperatives had such good luck and as good a network as 
this cooperative. For example, in Hongdongbei county of Changzhi prefecture, of 
three cooperatives total 122 households, 22 households already were unable to make 
ends meet; 33 households were short of seed, all cattle were very hungry and skinny, 
and they did not know what to do.72 Sadly, no record about their fate has been 
                                                        
69 “Guanyu Shencha nongye shengchan hezuoshe de jinji zhishi” (April 3, 1953) (An urgent directive 
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discovered. 
Side effects and the spread 
As agricultural producers’ cooperatives grew larger, running them became more 
and more difficult. As chapter 2 shows, managing a cooperative of 20 households was 
not easy. A cooperative of 100 households or more was virtually unmanageable. 
Newspapers might have provided many seemingly viable rules, yet peasants’ literacy 
was usually much lower than those writers assumed, and farming included a work load 
that was difficult to quantify. For example, work points were supposed to be a basic 
tool to count peasants’ work and serve as the basis of their labor compensation, but in 
1952, as many cases revealed, cooperatives were not used to it, and quite a few did not 
employ this system at all. Peasants tended to work as little as possible, as chapter 5 
will show. But occasionally, cases were reported that peasants were forced by the 
cooperative heads to work on land for long hours with high intensity.73 In this sense, 
cooperatives were intruding on peasants’ everyday life. One investigation said, “Some 
cooperatives emphasized ‘united action’ which resulted in peasants having no time to 
take care of their personal issues.”74 
Meanwhile, agricultural cooperatives were given more functions. At this stage 
craftsmen and small traders were forced to join cooperatives, which often led them to 
simply shut down their business. For example, in Jincheng county, at the excuse of 
combining agriculture with sideline work, rural cadres arbitrarily levied taxes on 
peasants’ sideline work and pursued profits, which was extortion. In Kaiwan village, Ji 
Hongfu mutual aid team issued regulations to collect 20 percent of members’ sideline 
work. Even women’s earnings by nursing infants was not exempted. Arbitrary taxes 
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were also applied outside mutual aid teams. In Xiyao village, each laborer who was 
working outside the village was required to pay 500 yuan per day for their residence 
outside of the village. In Hedong village, a progressive tax was designed for those 
peasant workers. In Jin village, all of peasants’ income, except agricultural income, 
was subjected to pay 5 percent as the community funds. Discontent among peasants 
was serious.75 
With an unprecedented supply of money, village cadres took this opportunity to 
build up infrastructure, of which they had dreamed: auditoriums, dining halls, 
libraries, and offices. All were established, one after another, at the expense of 
peasants’ cattle and huge debts.76 
The cooperatives, as a channel between the state and individual peasants, also 
facilitated state agencies’ “aid” for peasants, which, more often than not, peasants 
considered as burdens. For example, for a long time the state had tried to persuade 
peasants to employ new farm implements, such as new types of ploughs. Peasants 
showed little interest and simply refused to buy it. But mutual aid teams and 
cooperatives, which were much less cautious in spending money and much more eager 
to please state agents, proved much more willing to buy it. In Licheng county, in 1951, 
only 57 ploughs were sold, but by spring 1953, 581 ploughs were purchased, mainly 
by mutual aid teams and cooperatives. Another example was the subscriptions of 
newspaper. In 1952, in Licheng county, 92,117 copies of newspapers and books were 
sold, but in the first three month of 1953, 74,996 copies were sold, mostly to mutual 
aid teams and cooperatives.77 
Last, but not least, this powerful movement provided rural cadres tremendous 
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chances to abuse mass peasants and take advantage of them. What was accompanying 
all of these excesses was coercion and violence, ranging from threatening words to 
bloody torture. Fully exploring the methods and the degree of the violence is beyond 
the scope of a chapter. Cases of death and suicide occurred, and tears and grief were 
more common. 
 Phenomena listed above also spread into mutual aid teams. As mentioned earlier, 
the practical difference between agricultural producers’ cooperatives and mutual aid 
teams was the amount of property collectivized. Since agricultural producers’ 
cooperatives were characterized as a more advanced form, rural cadres drew a 
conclusion that the more public owned assets in teams, the more the teams were like 
cooperatives, and the more progressive they were. Even cadres at the county level held 
similar notions. Blind faith on a large scale plagued mutual aid teams too. Popular 
slogans, included “small teams should join together to form a large one,” “those with 
less than five households are not counted as mutual aid teams,” and “it is glorious to 
join larger teams” were popular.78 
In Jincheng county of Changzhi prefecture, large scale mutual aid teams were 
formed. On average one mutual aid team consisted of 25 households, the size of the 
first ten experimental producers’ cooperatives. Community funds were blindly 
collected, and public assets were excessively expanded. The first district made it clear 
that the agricultural cooperatives need to collect 20 percent of the output as the 
community funds; mutual aid teams collected 10 percent to 15 percent.79 
Other than the deep impact of the three-anti movement, one more factor that was 
also responsible for cadres’ excessive passion was industrialization. In 1952 the 
industrialization plan was announced and more CCP cadres were needed in industry 
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sectors. Plans for relocating cadres from agricultural sectors to industrial sectors were 
underway. Cadres who had been assigned posts in the countryside aspired to be 
selected and “relocated” to urban areas.80 This chance stimulated rural cadres to 
improve their performance.  
This chapter does not deny that there were cases of peasants voluntarily joining 
cooperatives. They assuredly had their own calculations. However, compared to those 
who joined the first ten experimental cooperatives in Changzhi prefecture, peasants at 
this phase reacted to many more ocercive pressures. Some were convinced that 
“earlier or later, we are bound to follow the road. Doing it earlier is always better than 
later. By doing it earlier we are respected and receive more privileges from the state.” 
As the political atmosphere became intense, peasants of “bad” class background 
directly felt the pressure and were scared. To demonstrate their improvement and 
hopefully avoid being targeted, they invited poor peasants to form cooperatives by 
offering them economic incentives.81 Once the mutual aid and cooperation movement 
became regarded as a political movement, peasants no longer had much zoom to 
maneuver. It is not surprising that economically those cooperatives would fall apart. 
At this stage, the mutual aid and cooperation movement can be considered 
essentially a political movement, no longer economically based. As a matter of fact, 
the pursuit of profit was considered capitalism and was to be “altered.” Many 
adjustments peasants had adopted in 1951 now became immoral, if not illegal yet. 
Hiring laborers, emphasis on sideline production, planting more cash crops, high 
compensation to land, livestock and cash investment were all condemned as elements 
of capitalism. The economic-based formula was formally disregarded. In addition to 
compensation for land, compensation on livestock was another example. Customarily, 
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one herd of cattle was calculated as equal to, if not higher than, one and half full 
laborers because they were much more effective in farming land than men. But under 
the new circumstance, this formula was labeled as exploitation. So the compensation 
for cattle was reduced to the equivalent of half of a laborer, which, in the owners’ 
calculation, was not enough to pay for the fodder. The choices usually were: eat the 
cattle or sell them. But under high pressure from cadres, when peasants dared not to 
withdraw from mutual aid teams, cattle owners considered cattle an increasing burden 
and had to donate cattle to the team or propose that a agricultural producers’ 
cooperative to be formed.82 In the party’s overly optimistic assessments, such actions 
might be interpreted as peasants’ “selflessness” and their eagerness to join 
cooperatives, but we can assume that they would not raise any more cattle. 
This rash tendency was by no means limited in Shanxi Province. By the spring 
1953, in every province, except minority administrative regions, a number of 
agricultural producers cooperatives and mutual aid teams of larger size were 
established. Patterns like the zeal for forming agricultural producers’ cooperatives over 
mutual aid teams, discriminating individual peasants occurred in many regions.83 As 
one party document in 1953 acknowledged in the new liberated regions, it was 
common to use political methods to form mutual aid teams which often infringe the 
interests of middle peasants; in the old liberated regions, it was common to have 
placed too much emphasis on agricultural producers’ cooperatives, collectivized too 
many assets and injected too many “new” socialist features in the cooperatives.84 
Generally speaking, nearly all of the phenomena described here in Shanxi did 
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occur in other regions, probably to a less extent. More important, what happened in 
Shanxi well reflected how local cadres and rural peasants reacted to heavy political 
pressure from above, which eventually was the case all over China when the 
cooperativization movement was formally launched and carried out in 1954-55. In this 
sense, what had happened in Shanxi was a microcosm of what would happen in 1954, 
1955 and 1956, on a national level. Meanwhile, widely regarded as a national model in 
the mutual aid and cooperation movement, many other regions did look to Shanxi for 
inspiration, and some even simply copied the model of Shanxi that was presented in 
media.85 
In China’s accelerating quest towards collectivization, the media certainly played 
an indispensable role. Sadly, I have not yet examined this topic in detail. Nevertheless, 
in my research, I did come across some interesting evidence on this topic. For 
example, in the northeast region, many peasants planned to form agricultural 
producers’ cooperatives, yet few knew how to operate one, simply understanding it as 
“working together and eating together.”86 In the northeast China, the media evidently 
favored agricultural producers’ cooperatives over mutual aid teams. Without exploring 
the basis for building cooperatives (with criteria set by the central party), the 
advantages of agricultural producers’ cooperatives were simply highlighted. Moreover, 
intentionally or otherwise, newspapers created an illusion that agricultural producers’ 
cooperatives might solve many problems faced by mutual aid teams. For example, one 
report on Jin Shilong cooperative presented the following story: Jin Shilong 
cooperative was built upon Jin Shilong mutual aid team. When it was still a mutual aid 
team, it encountered 18 “unsolvable” difficulties in its operations; so it became 
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upgraded to a cooperative. Suddenly, these 18 difficulties no longer bothered the 
cooperative. Following this report, many local cadres raised the slogan “to be rid of 
these 18 difficulties (of running a mutual aid team), build a agricultural producers’ 
cooperative.”87
 
87 Neibu cankao. June 18, 1952. 
Chapter 5 Abandoned rectification and the resumption of cooperativization 
Appreciating the aftermath 
The excesses among the mutual aid and cooperation movement in late 1952, as 
chapter 4 lists, sagged the energy of peasants and severely impaired agricultural 
production. It was reported that in many counties in Shanxi province, for the whole 
winter no one collected the night soil, no one conducted sideline work and no one 
cared about tending crops. For example, in Podi (village) cooperative of Wuxiang 
county, members were not even interested in picking beans. Instead, pigs took care of 
the beans. One elderly peasant was worried. “The agricultural producers’ cooperative 
could afford losing these beans. I cannot afford losing my pigs. I am afraid they will 
die of eating too much.”1 The Changzhi prefecture of course did not worry about th
pigs, but they did worry about the agricultural production plan of 1953. 
ese 
                                                       
 From October 1952 to April 1953, peasants’ desire to farm land reached the 
lowest level since 1950. In two agricultural producers’ cooperatives of Changzhi, 70 
percent of arable land went to waste during the fall of 1952. Peasants refused to plant. 
Indeed not all peasants in Shanxi joined in cooperatives or mutual aid teams, yet 
nearly all of them either had witnessed or heard about what was occurring in 
cooperatives nearby. In their eyes, their neighbors were unjustly deprived of their 
private livestock and farm implements. Their land brought them little or no profit, and 
watchwords like “overthrow the private ownership” were in the air. What was their 
conclusion? Virtually all of them had only one reaction, “Communism is coming!” 
They were next in line. There was no way that they would let the state take away their 
 
1 “Xiang Shengwei de san yuefen zonghe baogao” (March 1953) (Report to the Provincial branch in 
March), JCA, 124.1.1. 
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property. They said frankly, “I am afraid of joining in the cooperatives. I am afraid that 
I won’t be given any grain after the harvest. I am afraid of being starved.” Pessimistic 
about the future, they figured, in their miserable life, they deserved at least some good 
times. So they chopped down fruit trees, slaughtered livestock for meat and took rest 
as much as possible. For example, peasant Feng Zituo in the past rarely ate any meat. 
But in the Chinese New Year of 1953, he slaughtered three pigs and even wanted to 
eat more. In Wuji village of Changzhi prefecture, eight households sold all their 
livestock, some even sold their extra homes. In Tingcheng village of Qin county, 
Changzhi prefecture, there had been at least eight blacksmiths each year from 
1950-52, and dozens of carriages had been sold. Yet in 1953 there was only one 
blacksmith in the village and he was nearly out of business because he did not even 
sell one carriage. Peasants refused to spread fertilizer, saying “Why bother? After the 
fall of 1953 they will all belong to the cooperative.”2 The reality for peasants was that 
they had little hope of maintaining their farming activities at the present level, let 
alone of expanding them.3 
 But the impact of the rash tendency in the mutual aid and cooperation movement 
went far beyond infringing peasants’ incentives in farming land. Other perilous signs 
had come to the surface as well. 
 The cooperativization movement and the following heavy additional levies hit 
peasants severely. Local government was fully aware of this fact. As its reports 
revealed, peasants complained, “For the whole year, I have worked so hard, yet the 
gain is not even enough to feed the state.” They concluded that “there is no future for 
farming. It’s much better to leave the village and find a job in cities.” Land became a 
                                                        
2 “Linfeng zhuanqu huzhu hezuo yundong zhuanti baogao” (May 7, 1953) (Linfeng prefecutre’s 
special report on the mutual aid and cooperation movement), SPA, C29.1.17. 
3 The Soviet farmers met the same question in the late 1920s. Moshe Lewin, Russian Peasants and 
Soviet Power – A Study of Collectivization. 
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burden. No peasant wanted to purchase land. The story of selling land for free was no 
longer a myth. In Licheng county, one mou arable land in 1951 was worth 6-7 dan 
millet. In 1953, no peasant was willing to purchase extra land, regardless of the price. 
In order to get rid of some land, peasant Wang Changsuo sold 6 mou arable land not 
only for free, but also by offering the buyer a bonus. When peasants felt better off 
abandoning land, the government doubtlessly should have been alert and re-examined 
its rural policies. 
Cadres in Changzhi prefecture were also aware that recruiting for the army was 
getting much easier; peasants joined the army with enthusiasm. “In past years, it had 
been difficult to recruit peasants into the army; this year, it is difficult to persuade 
them to go back home (from the recruiting station).”4 This dramatic turn, probably 
partly due to the waning of the Korean War, indeed reflected peasants’ pessimism 
about their future in the countryside. Meanwhile, a large number of youth left villages 
for cities seeking other chances. The primary reason, as Changzhi prefecture analyzed, 
was that they felt “any profession is better than tilling land.” Compared with all other 
careers, farming was hard working, yet the gain was so tenuous. With additional taxes 
and other miscellaneous levies, peasants did not see any profit. Peasants complained 
that they were unable to take up half of their production. Peasants calculated that a 
worker’s salary of half a month would be equal in value to their fall harvest.5 
 Increasingly, peasants’ hostility towards the state became apparent. When hit by 
the freeze that threatened grain, peasants said, “Let it be. We have nothing to eat; so 
the state,” “I only have my flesh now. You (cadres) do whatever you want to me.” 
Although most peasants adopted passive method of resistance, there were groups that 
chose to fight. Even in Changzhi prefecture, an old liberated region where the party 
                                                        
4 “Xiang shengwei de san yuefen zonghe baogao.” 
5 “Xiang shengwei de san yuefen zonghe baogao.” 
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had deep roots, when peasants were pressed too hard, in 1953, they embraced 
millenarianism, and the “Wholehearted worship of ‘Tao’ of heaven and dragon China 
society” [Yixin tiandao longhua hui] revived and organized thousands of people 
conspiring to revolt. The revolt was put down even before it started, but the people’s 
attitude appalled the party leaders. Admitting that chaos among peasants had reached 
an unprecedented degree since 1949, local cadres were conscious of the causes: the 
party was making mistakes in implementing rural polices, and common peasants  
could not make ends meet. It was time to sincerely take account of peasants’ standard 
of living and improve the party’s work in the countryside.6 
Take Changzhi prefecture as an example. At this point, prefecture cadres had to 
acknowledge that the most dangerous trend in Changzhi was the rash tendency in the 
mutual aid and cooperation movement. The excesses triggered peasants’ deep distrust 
of cooperatives. Even those who had volunteered to join the cooperatives now did not 
enroll willingly. Peasants lost a magnificent amount of private property. Changzhi 
prefect started to worry about the production plan of 1953, which by then was clearly 
going to be difficult to fulfill; the spring sowing plan in 1953 was already in trouble. 
Another alarming phenomenon was the resumption of superstitious religions. From 
1949 to 1952 the old superstitions had disappeared, yet in 1953, peasants once again 
started to pray to emperors and gods. Changzhi prefect concluded that infringing on 
middle peasants’ interests had shaken the foundation of new China.7 
 Given the pioneering role of Changzhi prefecture in the mutual aid and 
cooperation movement, its acknowledgment of the gloomy truth in the countryside 
proved that the situation was grave. Excesses by no means were isolated phenomena 
                                                        
6 “Guanxin nongmin shenghuo, gaishan nongcun gongzuo, an’ding nongcun shengchan” (April 23, 
1953) (Take care of  peasants’ living standard; improve works on peasants and stabilize rural 
production), Jianshe, no 215. 
7 “Xiang shengwei de san yuefen zonghe baogao.” 
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in Shanxi province. Quite the contrary, excesses occurred different levels of intensity 
in many regions, as briefly discussed in chapter four. In the northeast region, the 
degree of excesses was severe as well. For instance, in 1952, over 1200 agricultural 
producers’ cooperatives were established in Northeast China. In general, members 
received compensation worthy less than half of their production, and some 
cooperatives went bankrupt.8 
 In the end, between 1952 and 1953 both the north China region and the northeast 
region suffered significant drops in grain production. In Northeast China, planned 
production was 44 billion catties, yet the actual production at best estimation was only 
37 billion catties. Grain production in north China dropped by at least 10 percent. In 
Shanxi, wheat production dropped by 600 million catties.9 
Another gloomy sign was the spring famine in 1953, which was pervasive across 
China. In Shandong province, 4 million people were short of food;10 in the 
central-south China region (including Henan, Hubei, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan and 
Jiangxi), over ten million people were living with insufficient food;11 in the east C
region, 16.57 million people experienced famine;
hina 
                                                       
12 in the northwest region, 1.8 
million peasants were in famine.13 Peasants abandoned their land, fled to cities, sold 
their children, starved, even committed suicide. The mutual aid and cooperation 
movement did not save Shanxi. In some areas of Shanxi, by April 20, six percent of 
the rural population had no food at all and the same amount of people had food 
supplies only for 5 more days.14 For instance, of the 17 villages in Tunliu County of 
 
8  Neibu cankao, Dec 23, 1952. 
9 Dangdai zhongguo liangshi gongzuo shiliao (Historical documents on contemporary China’s grain 
work) (Beijing: internal circulation, 1989), 150-167. 
10 Neibu cankao, March 25, 1953. 
11 Neibu cankao, May 9, 1953. 
12 Neibu cankao, May 9, 1953. 
13 Neibu cankao, April 21, 1953. 
14 Neibu cankao, April 20, 1953i 
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Changzhi prefecture, 672 households could not make ends meet. In Nanxinzhuan 
village and three others, one child was sold, 55 peasants fled, and 17 engaged in 
begging.15 
Multiple factors accounted for this famine. Natural disasters did hit certain areas, 
but they alone could not produce a famine of such a scale. Although there are no 
statistics on this famine, and all local reports first of all attributed it to natural 
disasters, judged by the CCP’s remedy policies in 1953, two factors played key roles. 
One was the “measure land area and determine production levels” movement [Chatian 
dingchan], which was carried out across the nation in 1952. Cadres were sent to the 
villages to re-measure the land owned by each family to determine the amount of tax 
each family should pay to the government. The goal was to maximize the amount of 
grain the government could collect from each peasant family. This movement hit the 
newly liberated regions particularly hard where peasants tended to have hidden a large 
amount of unregistered land. Old liberated regions such as north China and northeast 
China where land reform had been carried out rather radically and peasants had gone 
through a series of political movements, the impact of the “measure land area and 
determine production levels” movement on peasants was relatively moderate. Instead, 
it was the mutual aid and cooperation movement that deeply affected peasants’ ways 
of living. Local reports could blame the natural disasters for the famine, but peasants 
were not fooled: it was the party, not the “heavens” that had issued a variety of 
policies that had adverse effects on them. For example, peasants in Subei were furious 
about “the people’s government being a government that is killing people.” Local 
cadres even sensed the possibilities of a riot.16 
                                                        
15 Neibu cankao, April 20, 1953. 
16 Neibu cankao, Jan 22, 1953. 
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The rectification movement 
It is important to keep in mind the Catch-22 in mobilizing peasants. The spring 
sowing season of 1953 was about to start. Deeply alarmed by peasants’ anger and their 
passive resistance, the government wanted to appease peasants and have them focus 
on agricultural production. The North China Bureau acted first. On January 31, 1953, 
Liu Lantao, the head of the North China Bureau, issued “a reply to all county 
committee secretaries on the question of [how to] lead agricultural production,” 
pointing out that “in terms of guiding the cooperatives, there is a tendency of rash 
advancement as manifested in striving for more and larger cooperatives.” This 
tendency of “blindly going after higher forms, blindly expanding elements of 
socialism, and creating common property both excessively and impatiently must be 
checked and rectified.”17 In response to this order, in early February 1953, Changzhi 
prefecture convened a meeting to criticize the rash tendenc.18 However, it seemed that 
this meeting was not followed by any major action. To reinforce the policy, on March 
2, 1953, the North China Bureau issued a directive on “rectifying the tendency of 
blind and rash advance in the development of agricultural producers’ cooperatives.” 
This directive demanded that “party committees at all levels must pay great attention 
to the serious consequences produced by the mistakes of leftist adventurism” that 
should be immediately stopped and rectified.19 This directive especially criticized 
Changzhi prefecture for the wide-spread impetuosity there. It gave explicit order to 
stop building new cooperatives and to check all established cooperatives.20 
                                                        
17 Gao Huamin, “Rectifying the problems of impetuosity and rash advance in the agricultural mutual 
aid and cooperativization movement in 1953,” 63. 
18 “1953 nian nongye shengchan hezuoshe de jiben zongjie” (January 25, 1954) (A basic summary on 
agricultural producers’ cooperatives in Changzhi), JCA, 124.1.1 
19 Gao Huamin, “Rectifying the problems of impetuosity and rash advance in the agricultural mutual 
aid and cooperativization movement in 1953,” 64. 
20 “Zhengdun nongye shengchan hezuoshe zhong de mangmu maojin qiangxiang” (March 2, 1953) 
(Rectifying the tendency of blind and rash advance in the development of agricultural producers’ 
cooperatives), SPA, C 54. 1005. 34.  
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Ultimately, the Central Committee of the party in Beijing acted. On February 15, 
1953, it issued the directive “Resolution on mutual aid and cooperation in agriculture.” 
On March 16, it issued the “Directive to party committees at all levels on Spring 
sowing and production.” On March 26, People’s Daily published an editorial entitled 
“the key to leading agricultural production.” These three articles, under the Central 
Committee’s order, were collected as a pamphlet with the title “The Guide to Present 
Rural Work” and were published by the People’s Publishing House. This pamphlet 
was to be widely studied and served as the party’s fundamental guideline of the time 
for leading peasants.21 This pamphlet was broadly referred as the “three big 
directives” [sanda wenjian] by cadres. All three directives called to check the 
impetuosity in the mutual aid and cooperation movement, to stop commandism in 
organizing peasants and to encourage peasants to produce more crops. Moreover, 
“three big directives” raised theoretical challenges to the ideas underlying the rapid 
development of the mutual aid and cooperation movement in 1952. 
The directive “Resolution on mutual aid and cooperation in agriculture” 
acknowledged the simple fact that peasants’ inclination towards individual farming 
was unavoidable and should not be ignored or simply curbed. Not denying that the 
ultimate future of the mutual aid and cooperation movement was collectivization, this 
directive maintained that it was currently grounded in private ownership and should be 
moving forwards in zigzags. The party must consolidate its unification with middle 
peasants and also let rich peasants develop. Recognizing the co-existing two 
deviations in this movement, the passively “let peasants take their course” attitude and 
the rash tendency to intervene too much, this directive focused on attacking the latter. 
It emphasized that in dealing with any issue of the mutual aid and cooperation 
movement, two principles must be adhered to: the principle of voluntarism and the 
                                                        
21 Nongye juan, 1953-57, 24. 
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principle of mutual benefit. Coincidently or otherwise, this directive suggested quite a 
few points that applied to the first ten experimental agricultural cooperatives in 
Changzhi prefecture. For example, it stressed that the only standard for judging a good 
mutual aid team or agricultural producers’ cooperative should be the high agricultural 
productivity (higher than individual farmers) and increased income for its members. It 
set the aims of building agricultural producers’ cooperatives as: meeting peasants’ 
needs, the good ground of mutual aid teams, good leadership, peasants’ activism and 
sufficient preparation. It further listed thirteen rules to regulate the cooperatives. 
Sideline work was encouraged and considerable autonomy was called for to be given 
to peasants, such as the right to determine the amount of community funds and income 
distributions. It even allowed cooperatives to hire short-term laborers and technicians. 
In the end, the directive called for respecting individual farmers and treating them 
fairly. In brief, this directive justified peasants’ right to pursue personal interests and 
material profits in mutual aid teams and agricultural producers’ cooperatives. Thus this 
directive intended to depoliticize the nature of the agricultural producers’ cooperative 
and treat it as an economic organization.22 
This directive was not well received by local cadres. One month later, another 
“Directive to party committees at all levels on spring sowing and production” was 
issued that explicitly stated that “the Central Committee required each comrade in the 
prefecture level, in the county level and in the district level, to study the Central 
Committee’s directive on mutual aid and cooperation in agriculture.” This new 
directive was sharper in attacking the rash tendency. In a harsh tone it listed in detail a 
variety of impetuous actions in the mutual aid and cooperation movement most of 
which have been narrated in chapter 4. It censured the use of the methods of land 
                                                        
22  “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu nongye shengchan huzhu hezuo de jueyi” ((the Central 
Committee’s) Resolution on Mutual Aid and Cooperation in Agriculture), Nongye juan, 1953-57, 
125-135. 
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reform in the mutual aid and cooperation movement, demanded that all comrades 
accept peasants’ correct critiques and rectify all leftist mistakes. It warned comrades 
that “in forming mutual aid teams and cooperatives, don’t forget to start from 
peasants’ actual political consciousness and their own personal experiences, and to 
start from peasants’ practical needs and the existing production mode of small 
producers.” It stated that it was incorrect and impossible to abolish the freedom of 
hiring laborers, the freedom of money lending, the freedom of trading, and the 
freedom of enriching the peasant economy in the countryside, as so called “the four 
freedoms”. All in all, the directive made it crystal clear that overwhelmingly, the 
central issue in the countryside was the spring sowing; anything that would 
compromise it should be modified, delayed or cancelled.23                                    
People’s Daily’s editorial once again emphasized the dominant role of individual 
farming and reiterated that increasing production was what common people were 
mainly concerned with and was what the party should focus on. This editorial 
specifically elaborated on the issue of incorporating the small peasant economy into 
the centralized planned economy. It reminded the party cadres of the fact that since the 
small peasant economy was extremely scattered and private, it unavoidably generated 
some spontaneous trends and blindness in agricultural production, and even had some 
adverse effects on the state economy. Therefore, to incorporate the small peasant 
economy into a planned economy was a long-term task that could not be achieved in a 
short period. The main method to guide peasant was through reasonable commodity 
prices, supplemented with viable economic and political policies. The editorial 
denounced the action of forcing peasants to do things according to the party’s plans.24 
                                                        
23 “Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang weiyuanhui guanyu chungeng shengchan gei geji dangwei de 
zhishi” ((the Central Committee’s” Directive to party committees at all levels on Spring sowing and 
production), Nongye juan, 1953-57, 24-29. 
24 “Lingdao nongcun shengchan de guanjian suozai” (The key to leading agricultural production), 
People’s Daily, March 26, 1953. 
 174
In essence, this editorial asked the party members to tolerate petty peasants’ backward 
thought and deeds, a point strikingly resembling Bukharin’s conviction that “peasant 
should be accepted first of all for what he is, then guided along the path of self-interest 
towards better and more evolved social and economic structure.”25 
In crucial respects the “three big directives” refuted Gao Gang’s ideas and 
demanded that party members should respect peasants as small producers. They 
slowed down the transition to collectivization. In addition, they made it clear that the 
agricultural producers’ cooperative was merely adopted on a trial basis in new 
liberated regions and the number should be strictly limited. Mutual aid teams were the 
main form to be propagated.26 In theory, “three big directives” called for respecting 
small peasant economy, even at some expense of the central-planned economy; in 
practice, they denounced the rapid development of agricultural producers’ 
cooperatives. 
 The North China Bureau immediately followed the new guidelines. On March 20, 
1953, it issued the “North China Bureau’s directive on reinforcing the party’s guidance 
on agricultural producers’ cooperatives (draft)” which explicitly called for “strictly 
controlling the number of cooperatives, immediately stopping building new 
agricultural producers’ cooperatives and organizing cadres to inspect the established 
ones.” It ordered local cadres to use the five standards set by the “Resolution on 
mutual aid and cooperation in agriculture” to examine each cooperative, one after 
another. The cooperatives that could not meet all the standards must be stopped and 
converted into mutual aid teams. The directive stated in the end, the party branch in 
                                                        
25 Moshe Lewin, Russian Peasants and Soviet Power – A Study of Collectivization, 335. 
26 “Zhonggong zhongyang tongyi zhongnan ju guanyu jiuzheng shiban nongye shengchan hezuoshe 
zhong jizao qingxiang de baogao” (March 14, 1953) (The Central committee’s support of the South 
China Bureau’s report to rectify the rash tendency in the building experimental agricultural producers’ 
cooperatives), Nongye juan, 1953-57, 143-144. 
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each level was expected to report its progress to the North China Bureau frequently.27 
To ensure this policy was honored by certain local cadres, on April 6, Liu Lantao 
wrote to county heads in Changzhi prefecture requesting each of them to write a report 
to him directly.28 
Without a leader as firm as Lai Ruoyu, Shanxi provincial leaders this time better 
complied with the orders of the North China Bureau, yet remained optimistic. On 
March 1, vice secretary of Shanxi party branch Tao Lujia prohibited building new 
collective farms in Shanxi and reminded his colleagues to respect the conservativeness 
and diversity of small peasants.29 On March 26, he still planned to build 2500 new 
agricultural producers’ cooperatives in Shanxi in 1953, but he started to call for 
prudence.30 Abruptly, however, in April such an optimistic attitude vanished. On April 
3, 1953, Shanxi party branch drafted “the urgent directive on inspecting agricultural 
producers’ cooperatives” and distributed it to counties. This directive demanded that 
the party heads of all levels closely follow the North China Bureau’s directives and 
personally inspect agricultural producers’ cooperatives. The language of this directive 
was unusually aggressive. It urged the cadres who were wavering and had not acted 
quickly and firmly in disbanding unqualified cooperatives to act immediately. “If now 
converting (those unqualified cooperatives to mutual aid teams), it is easier to wipe the 
arse; if not, in the future it will be very difficult to wipe the big arse.” Reluctance to 
act might eventually lead to the collapse of mutual aid and cooperation movement, the 
directive warned.31 The harsh tone revealed the reluctance, if not the resistance, from 
                                                        
27 “Huabei ju guanyu jiaqiang dang dui nongye shengchan hezuoshe de lingdao de zhishi” (March 20, 
1953) (North China Bureau’s directive on reinforcing the party’s guidance on agricultural producers’ 
cooperatives), SPA, C54, 1005, 34. 
28 Reports from different county heads to Liu Lantao are found in Jinchen city archive. JCA, 146.1.1. 
29 Tao Lujia, “Tao Lujia zai di, zhuan lianxi huiyi shang de jielun” (Tao Lujia’s conclusion at the 
conference of prefectures), Huibian juan, 330-331. 
30 Tao Lujia, “Tao Lujia zai di, zhuan lianxi huiyi shang de jielun,” 331. 
31 “Guanyu zhengdun nongye shengchan hezuoshe de jinji zhishi” (April 3, 1953) (the urgent directive 
on inspecting agricultural producers’ cooperatives), SPA, C54. 1005. 34. 
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cadres of lower ranks in implementing the rectification directives. 
In late March 1953, Changzhi prefecture convened a meeting of county heads to 
discuss the rectification and raised the guideline of “stop building new, inspect and 
rectify (the old), consolidate and improve.” After the meeting, it dispatched 125 
district cadres to villages to conduct inspections. In early April, each county convened 
cadre meetings of three levels (county, district and village) to study “three big 
directives.”32 The rectification was carried out with great haste. According to a report 
of Changzhi prefecture, in twenty days the prefecture had completed a comprehensive 
inspection of 1349 cooperatives of the area and found 338 unqualified cooperatives. 
Oversized cooperatives were divided into smaller ones, and peasants were allowed to 
withdraw. In dealing with collectivized livestock and tools, the principle of “not to 
infringe a peasant’s personal interest while at the same time to facilitate the 
management of cooperatives” was well honored, yet the report did not elaborate on 
how such a subtle principle was to be applied. The report concluded that most peasants 
chose to stay in cooperatives and mutual aid teams happily and voluntarily; that 
peasants’ incentives to work were restored; that cadres, after studying “three big 
directives,” had substantially improved their political consciousness and working 
methods. In the end, this report warned that when fighting against the leftist mistakes, 
it was equally important to prevent the “rightist” mistake of not organizing peasants.33 
On May 4, 1953, Tao Lujia critically reviewed the history of the mutual aid and 
cooperation movement in Shanxi province. He admitted that cadres had overestimated 
the increase of agricultural production in Shanxi, that the progressiveness and 
achievements of the first ten experimental agricultural producers’ cooperatives in 
                                                        
32 “Guanyu xianweihui hou jinyibu jiuzheng huzhu hezuo yundong zhong mangmu maojin qingxiang 
de zonghe baogao” (April 15, 1953) ( On further rectify the rash tendency in the mutual aid and 
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33 “Guanyu xianweihui hou jinyibu jiuzheng huzhu hezuo yundong zhong mangmu maojin qingxiang 
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Changzhi prefecture were exaggerated, and that peasants’ aspiration for collective 
working was overestimated. Furthermore, Tao Lujia admitted, from the very 
beginning, cadres refused to take into account the opposing opinions: the rash 
tendency was rooted in many rural cadres’ mentality since 1951. Regardless of the 
diverse condition in different regions, a unified code was applied to all peasants. As a 
result, from the fall 1952, peasants had been deeply disturbed and considered giving 
up on farming. They no longer saved the grain but consumed lavishly. The price of 
land plunged. Situations were especially bad in areas where agricultural producers’ 
cooperatives were established. Given all those facts, Tao Lujia asked rural cadres to 
focus on agricultural production and downplay the importance of mutual aid teams 
and cooperatives. He warned not to launch some hollow education on socialism, as 
occurred in 1952. Tao Lujia instructed cadres to intensively study the “three big 
directives,” to work on increasing agricultural productivity; and to restore public 
assets.34 
Tao Lujia’s critical remarks cast a pall over Shanxi’s quest towards 
collectivization of the past three years. It seems Shanxi cadres were about to give up 
their pioneering role.  
The new three-anti movement and falsified reports 
The first half of 1953 indeed was a time for the CCP to reflect on its mistakes in 
rural policies. In November, 1952, Shandong Provincial prosecutor filed a report 
exposing excesses and misdeeds of local cadres. According to the report, commandism 
was fairly common among rural cadres. More often than not, it was their only working 
method. Rural cadres had developed a variety of measures to impose their wills upon 
                                                        
34 Tao Lujia, “Zai 190 ci sheng changwei shang de fayan” (speech on the no 190 meeting of the 
Provincial standing committee), Huibian juan, 333-336. 
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peasants, ranging from political threatening, long-lasting meetings with no break for 
food and rest, to the use of police and militia. Beating, arresting, detaining, holding 
private court, extorting confessions were all common. Cases that local cadres shot 
peasants just for making one negative comment were reported. In addition, village 
cadres raped women. Often, it was the whole group of village cadres were involved - 
sometimes raping women to death.35 Appalled by Shandong’s report, the Central 
Committee of the party decided to have other regions to run a check. In the following 
months, more and more reports reached the Central Committee, demonstrating kinds 
of excesses which were by no means sporadic. Beijing was infuriated. In early 1953, a 
new “three-anti” movement, targeting commandism, bureaucratism, and the violation 
of laws, was launched in the countryside. During this new three-anti campaign, more 
excesses in the mutual aid and cooperation movement were reported to the center. The 
new three-anti movement in effect acted as a brake on anti-capitalism campaign in the 
countryside and provided a chance for the Central Committee to check and stem the 
rash tendency in the mutual aid and cooperation movement. 
When spring famine occurred in 1953, the drop in agricultural production was 
undeniable. So the high productivity those model mutual aid teams and cooperatives 
had claimed were put into question. Actually, as early as December 1952, Shanxi 
provincial leaders noticed some falsified accounts and issued a decree criticizing such 
misreporting. This decree instructed that any model laborer or cadre who had 
intentionally falsified accounts or intentionally covered up those falsified reports 
would be severely censured, even punished. Meanwhile, no matter what their true unit 
yields were, they should no longer be rewarded as model laborers. This decree 
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questioned the custom of only praising, never censuring, model laborers, and it 
instructed to watch those model laborers closely and critically.36 
As the rectification against the rash tendency proceeded, a large number of 
falsified reports were discovered, one after another. The situation was especially bad in 
Wuxiang County. In April, thirteen agricultural producers’ cooperatives in Wuxiang 
including the well known Wang Jinyun cooperative were discovered to have falsified 
accounts.37 By June 1953, 135 units, (include agricultural producers’ cooperatives, 
mutual aid teams and individual farmers) out of 408 units that had been awarded 
special status in 1952, were exposed to have fabricated data. As peasants commented, 
“just useless, you are cheating yourself.” Nearly all famous model laborers were 
involved. As a matter of fact, falsifying reports had become a trend spreading all over 
the region. All local residents knew it, as they said, “From villages to the central 
government, one level is cheating another.” It is important to note that cadres at 
district and county levels were likely involved in the cheating; in many cases, they 
were the backstage bosses.38 
 Take Li Shunda cooperative as an example. The official report showed that the 
unit yield of Li Shunda cooperative in 1952 was 442 catties per mou, yet the real yield 
was at best 372 catties per mou. In the fall 1952, an investigation team composed of 
cadres of Shanxi province, Changzhi prefecture and several neighboring counties was 
dispatched to Li Shunda cooperative to check the production. By then the crop had not 
been fully harvested, so the investigation team estimated an average unit yield of 442 
catties per mou. To make Li Shunda eligible for the national competition of 
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38 Neibu cankao, May 14, 1953. 
 180
high-yielding model laborers, the county cadre Chen Jie used this estimated unit yield 
as the real yield and submitted it to Shanxi province. Li Shunda ultimately won the 
prize. However, the real yield was only at most 372 catties per mou. Chen Jie decided 
to conceal this fact, saying “if correcting the number, Shunda’s reputation over the 
nation would be tarnished.” In the first round of “checking falsified accounts” in April 
1953 that was conducted by cadres of the same county, Chen Jie managed to have Li 
Shunda cooperative spared. In May, when the Agricultural Ministry in Beijing sent its 
own agents to investigate, Chen Jie worked with the cooperative treasurer and other 
county cadres to modify the old accounts and finally got the cooperative through the 
inspection. Only in June, when Changzhi prefecture sent cadres to settle the issue of 
compensating collectivized livestock and to make a new annual production plan of 
even higher yield, did Chen Jie and Li Shunda confess their misdeeds.39 In this case, 
the cheating was covered up for several rounds of inspections. Even then, only some 
material interests of cooperative members were revealed. I believe, the exposed cases 
were merely a drop in the ocean of unexposed ones. 
Well aware of the degree of the data fabrication, Changzhi prefect prohibited 
counties from punishing these cheaters without the prefecture’s further notice. 
Changzhi prefecture emphasized that only those who intentionally cheated the party 
and had very bad reputations, and that were opposed by masses of people were to 
forfeit the title of model laborer and return their prizes; in most cases, a public apology 
was the only punishment. In effect, most model laborers maintained their title and 
their prizes. The principle was, as Changzhi prefecture set forth, “to protect and 
nurture model laborers, unite with them, educate them, and correct them.”40 Contrary 
to the decree of Shanxi province, in practice, the action of falsifying accounts was 
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rarely punished. 
From this episode we can learn, as contemporary peasant activists learned, that 
first prefects usually were unwilling to punish model laborers and were reluctant to 
criticize local cadres, unless extremely severe violations were exposed. Second, 
without high pressure from above, prefecture cadres seldom focused on “bad things” 
in their regions. Those cadres, township or even higher levels, who were sent to model 
villages often encouraged peasants to exaggerate their yields. It is unlikely that such 
cadres could actually inspect peasants. Third, the local governments, concerned with 
rural stability, were willing to aid those who suffered from “progressing too fast” if 
they had at their disposal the resources. Agricultural lending was a good example. The 
more peasants owed to the bank, the more rate deductions they were offered.  
At this time, peasants were not required to pay extra taxes for higher production. 
However, later model laborers, together with millions of Chinese peasants, paid a 
heavy price for their exaggerations. The high unit yield they falsely reported left the 
party with an illusion of substantially increased rural productivity and an assumption 
that a large amount of surplus grain existed, hoarded among peasants. More tragically, 
fabricating high unit yield coincided with the “measure land area and determine 
production levels” movement. Consequently, the party raised its expectations and 
increased its extraction plans to claim its share of the “increased” production. 
In the middle of 1953, from the Central Committee to villages, “three big 
directives” were studied and implemented. While not overtly questioning the theory of 
the mutual aid and cooperation movement, they placed substantial constraints on the 
movement and justified peasants’ mentality as small producers. Gao Gang’s 
anti-capitalism manifesto had been devalued, peasants’ nature as small producers was 
once again honored, the three-anti movement was replaced by the new three-anti 
movement which aimed at protecting peasants. The political atmosphere appeared to 
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be completely altered. At this time, Gao Gang was appointed the chair of Central 
Planning Committee and was relocated from the northeast region to Beijing, Lai 
Ruoyu was transferred out of Shanxi province. Shanxi provincial leaders were less 
enthusiastic in supporting the mutual aid and cooperation movement: at least they no 
longer dared to challenge the central directives. Agricultural production once again 
became the foremost concern of the CCP’s rural policy; more and more inconvenient 
truths about the agricultural producers’ cooperatives had been discovered. In summer 
1953, the mutual aid and cooperation movement was virtually stopped. It seemed that 
socialism for Chinese peasants was once again postponed. Peasants seemed to be 
granted a break. Were they? 
The limits of the rectification 
“Three big directives” appeared clear and well balanced: to disband those poorly 
operated cooperatives, modify those shabbily run, and consolidate those well based. 
The voluntary principle was to be honored; peasants were allowed to withdraw at any 
time along with their assets. Yet, considering that so many properties had been pooled 
together, so much zeal or anger had been invested, and often so large amount of debts 
were hanging there, any move would arouse strong personal emotions and personal 
interests. Rectification was not an easy task. 
 In practice, the more balanced the policies were, the more difficult to implement 
them. To comprehend “three big directives” was not easy for most local cadres. To 
measure what local cadres had learned from “three big directives”, several prefectures 
in Shanxi province tested them. The scores were surprisingly low. For example, of 193 
cadres in Wutai county, only 19 passed the test; 177 of them did not know the 
differences among mutual aid teams, agricultural producers’ cooperatives and 
collective farms. Some cadres had never even heard of “three big directives.” Of 40 
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cadres in Yucheng prefecture, only two had read the “directive to party committees at 
all levels on spring sowing and production.” To explain those local cadres’ poor 
performances in tests, in addition to the “objective” reasons such as low literacy and 
the lack of time, the lack of subjective motivation needed to be included as well.41 
A report drafted by “the spring-sowing inspection team” sent by Shanxi province 
to Changzhi prefecture well demonstrated the confusions and angers the rectification 
had engendered in the countryside. In contrast to the Changzhi’s own report, the report 
from the inspection team revealed rural cadres’ resistance to the rectification. Heads of 
multiple counties had not studied the “three big directives,” and most cadres of the 
district level could not understand them. For those who had studied the documents, a 
common reaction was “then what we should do in the future to lead peasants?” Those 
cadres who had little knowledge of farming did not want to raise the issue of 
agricultural productivity. Confusion prevailed among rural cadres. Fearing that they 
would be labeled rightists who “let peasants take their course,” quite a few of cadres 
dared not to rectify the leftist mistakes. In practice, deviations were common. For 
example, in Pingshun and Gaoping county, cooperative heads returned the 
collectivized livestock to the former owners, a point “three big directives” had 
stressed. However, they retained other public assets, controlled their members’ trading 
activity and vehemently attacked the small peasant economy. In Qin county, 
Yangcheng county and Jincheng county, county heads were still wavering on whether 
to push for the rectification. Many hesitated or carried out policies slowly and 
reluctantly. There were cadres who resisted the policies and personally modified them 
in order to delay or deny cooperative members’ requests to withdraw. As happened in 
Wuxiang county, county heads created various methods to threaten the households 
who had asked for withdrawal. Rural cadres tended to claim that their cooperatives 
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were well founded and had no problems. Reasons were multiple. Some did not want to 
lose their title of model laborers and their reputations; some simply did not want to 
“lose face.” Some complained to their superiors, “You shit, we wipe. Only your words 
matter. I could not take back what I have said. You can go ahead to make the 
correction.”42 
In halt-completed cooperatives, situations were complex and difficult. In many 
cases, collectivized livestock had already died or were sold, farming implements had 
worn out, fertilizers had been mixed together and land had been sown collectively. 
More often than not, many agricultural producers’ cooperatives were in deep debt. In 
these cades, what share of the debt should peasants shoulder?43 However, such kinds 
of messes were covered up. For example, the operation Hedong cooperative of 
Jincheng county was stopped, but conditions were very bad, yet the village head in his 
report to the district said “we did fine.”44 
Resistance to the rectification movement was by no means only limited in 
Changzhi prefecture. For example, in Hebei province, quite a few cadres were angry 
about rectification. In their view, they had made enormous efforts to persuade or force 
peasants to form a agricultural producers’cooperative. Now, with some orders from 
above, all their efforts were to vanish. They asked, “Is it illegal to form a cooperative? 
If it is legal, we are going to hold on; if it is illegal, take me to court;” “if you say so, it 
is a cooperative; if you don’t say so, it is a mutual aid team. It is what it is like now 
and I am not going to change it;” or “if converting (cooperatives) to mutual aid teams 
now, I won’t form any cooperative for the rest of my whole life. And I will not allow 
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my sons to form one either.” It was not rare that cadres felt ashamed, even betrayed.45 
“Three big directives” were fairly well balanced documents. On the one hand, 
they called for toleration, even respect for the small peasant economy and criticized 
the leftist mistakes; on the other hand, for undisclosed reasons, they recommended to 
converting most of agricultural producers’ cooperatives to mutual aid teams and to 
preserve mutual aid teams as the major form of organizing peasants. Given rural 
cadres’ commonly poor understanding of the policies, they could rarely maintain such 
a balance. In the end, they sent peasants some simplified messages, such as, “you can 
voluntarily join mutual aid teams, or farm individually as your wish,” “cooperatives 
are not as good as mutual aid teams, mutual aid teams are not as good as individual 
farmers.” Some rural cadres who had been earlier labeled “laggard” now laughed at 
those once “activist” cadres. A common understanding was that the wind was going to 
change and the state would no longer endorse mutual aid teams. Reports also showed 
that there were cadres who responded promptly and simply regarded the rectification 
as to “stop and return the property to individuals.” For example, in the Xiwan 
agricultural producers’ cooperative, one militia head forced the unit to disband without 
consulting with its members, so the cooperative members were not delighted by this 
arbitrary decision.46 In practice, if a cooperative was considered unqualified, it was 
more likely to be disbanded rather than to be converted to a mutual aid team. Labor 
hiring, money borrowing and lending, and private trading resumed, as the ban was 
lifted by “three big directives.”47 
In brief, correcting the impetuosity was much more than acknowledgement of 
errors and making of apologies. Some local cadres were concerned that there were too 
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many problems to be solved at one time so it was better not to touch them 
immediately. Some of the worries from the below were realistic and were well 
grounded, such as the worry that if livestock were returned to their owners, they might 
be immediately sold or slaughtered, with an adverse effect on agricultural production. 
However, those worries fell on deaf ears.48  
The resistance to the rectification was not just from some peasants and cadres at 
the bottom. At the central level, there was discontent as well. For example, Deng 
Zihui, minister of newly-established Rural Work Department in Beijing, viewed 
situations differently. On April 18, 1953, at the second national rural work conference, 
he claimed that agricultural producers’ cooperatives should be the main form in the old 
liberated regions and that cadres of new liberated region should make greater efforts to 
help mutual aid teams and prepare them to become agricultural producers’ 
cooperatives after the fall. Deng Zihui criticized the rash tendency, however, he also 
valued the trend of move peasants towards socialism and thought it should go further. 
To him, the key issue of the first or second five year plan was to build agricultural 
producers’ cooperatives.49 Five days later, he described the “two roads” of rural 
developments and confirmed that the only correct road was to get peasants organized 
and moving towards socialism. Deng Zihui suggested building slightly lower a 
number of new agricultural producers’ cooperatives in 1954. Nevertheless, he also 
highly praised the virtue of good cooperatives and warned against to simply 
disbanding those poorly-operated cooperatives. He explicitly pointed out that the 
notion of “ensuring the private ownership” was wrong; the notion of unqualified 
encouragement for the “four freedom” was inappropriate.50 
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Given Deng Zihui’s post, his view should be read as a sign of the split among the 
central leadership. Deng Zihui was to become the leading official in charge of the 
cooperativization movement. In 1955 he bravely confronted Mao Zedong’s plan to 
push peasants into the high-stage producers cooperative (quasi- collective farm) and 
risked his political career to protect peasants. He was purged. Since then, he has been 
respected by contemporary CCP members and highly revered by historians. Because 
so, a possibility that at the early stage Deng Zihui might have been a strong supporter 
of Mao is ignored. But a simple fact is that in January 1953 Mao personally asked 
Deng Zihui to take up the appointment of minister of the Rural work Department. If 
Deng Zihui had not supported Mao in the beginning, why had Mao Zedong chosed 
him? Deng’s talks in April 1953 confirm this argument. It is fair to say that in 1953 
Deng Zihui was Mao’s confidant in rural issues and he likely than not knew Mao 
Zedong’s plans better than most other central leaders. Therefore, the divergence 
between his talks and “three big directives” indeed reflected a split among the CCP 
leadership, with Mao Zedong and Deng Zihui on one side, and leaders like Liu Shaoqi 
and Bo Yibo on the other side. 
The thought of Mao Zedong in 1953 
    Between 1952 and 1953, Mao Zedong devoted himself to promoting “the general 
line for socialist transition” (hereafter as the general line) for China. How and why at 
this moment Mao Zedong engaged in devising the general line has been a subject of 
much research and is not a topic for this dissertation.51 What we need to note is that as 
Mao was more and more obsessed with his visions of China’s socialist future, his 
                                                                                                                                                                
(April 23, 1953) (Deng Zihui’s summary report on the first national conference on rural work), 34-50. 
51 The most recent book is Mao and the Economic Stalinization of China, written by Li Hua-yu. She 
probably over estimates Mao Zedong’s willingness of duplicating the Soviet model, but she describes 
the whole issue in a full range. So far, this is the most through monograph on this topic. 
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optimism for China’s socialist future grew accordingly. Some other factors also help 
him to foster such kind of optimism. In October 1952, during the nineteenth party 
congress of the CPSU, Malenkov reported that the Soviet Union had solved its grain 
problems through collectivization. His remarks received long applause from the 
audience. Mao must have heard the story because in October 1953 he used 
Malenkov’s story to encourage the members of the Central Committee to adopt similar 
policies.52 In 1952, as more and more stories of pure success from the mutual aid and 
cooperation movement were reported, Mao Zedong was impressed by the virtues of 
getting peasants organized. So in February, 1953, Mao made changes to the Draft that 
was originally written in December 1951. In place of setting mechanization as the 
precondition for collectivization, Mao modified the text of the Draft so that 
collectivization could begin “with the complete consent of the peasants and suitable 
economic conditions.” As Li Hua-yu analyzes, by using a vague term as “suitable 
economic conditions,” Mao freed himself to begin collectivization whenever he 
wished, even before the mechanization was obtained.53 In the Soviet Union in the 
1920s, there was a deification of the machine.54 For Mao, since China did not have 
machines, he and his followers created, consciously or otherwise, the deification of 
“getting peasants organized.” 
    In February 1953, when more and more negative reports on the mutual aid and 
cooperation movement and rural situations reached the center, Mao launched his first 
formal inspection trip after 1949 to southern China to observe for himself the 
conditions of the country. The primary purpose of this trip was to collect first-hand 
information. To obtain more information, riding on his own special train from place to 
place, Mao met with party leaders at all levels as well as common people. He learned, 
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or precisely speaking it was arranged for him to learn, about both positive and 
negative things about mutual aid teams and agricultural producer cooperatives. He was 
told by local cadres that the idea of organizing mutual-aid teams had become rooted in 
the minds of the people.55 He was also told that experiments of agricultural producers’ 
cooperatives in Xingtai prefecture were successful. Mao Zedong was very delighted to 
hear about them and commented, “Mutual aid cooperation is better than farming on 
one’s own.” “It is possible to achieve collectivization without mechanization, and 
therefore China does not have to follow the Soviet way of doing things.”56 
The first document of “three big directives” was issued by the Central Committee 
of the CCP on February 15, the exact day Mao Zedong was about to leave for Wuhan. 
The other two documents were issued when Mao Zedong returned to Beijing. These 
documents were not in keeping with Mao’s optimism he had just fostered during the 
trip. More important, what he had observed with his own eyes contradicted these 
documents. As Li Hua-yu points out, in early 1953 there were no directives written by 
Mao on combating the rash tendency of the mutual aid and cooperation movement.57 
However, in March, Mao made some concessions by acknowledging the existence of 
the small peasant economy and emphasizing the fact that mutual aid teams and 
cooperatives were still founded on the ground of private ownership, so they should not 
be equal with the collective farm.58 To what degree Mao Zedong was sincere when he 
made those concessions was unknown. But, soon Mao would forget about them and 
further attack the cadres who had placed too much emphasis on the small peasant 
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economy. 
Starting in April, 1953, the Central Committee instructed the party to study Short 
Course. Two days later, this directive appeared in People’s Daily, sending a clear 
signal to the nation that Stalinism and Stalin’s path to socialism were to be adopted.59 
Ideas of Stalin and Lenin were widely cited. However, as Chinese scholars have 
pointed out, what was reflected in Chinese media was in essence Soviet war 
communism that had been inherited and developed by Stalin, not Lenin’s NEP. The 
party’s, more precisely Mao Zedong’s, understanding of Lenin’s transition theory was 
as such: in the transition period, capitalism, commodity production and communism 
existed concurrently. The small peasant economy was rooted deeply in capitalism, 
upon which capitalism would survive and revive. So the fundamental feature of this 
transition period was the cruel struggle between dying capitalism and growing 
communism. In this sense, the goal of the transition period was to eliminate 
capitalism, to eliminate classes, and to create a socialist society. Briefly, in Mao’s 
understanding, the tasks of the transition period were: to eliminate capitalism, to 
modify the small peasant economy and to form a state-owned socialist economy.60 
Ideas manifested in Short Course dominated his thought. Lenin’s famous excerpt 
“small production is still very, very widespread in the world and small production 
engenders capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously 
and on a mass scale” was to be reiterated, extensively and intensively. 
By June 1953, Mao had fully in his mind completed his vision of China’s 
transition to socialism, drawing mainly from the key features of the Stalinist road to 
socialism, as presented in Short Course: industrialization, collectivization in the 
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countryside and an all-out war on the capitalist economy.61 In summer 1953 Mao 
started to push for this agenda, first concentrating his attack on the notion of 
preserving the capitalist economy. 
On June 15, 1953, at a politburo meeting, Mao criticized three kinds of “rightist” 
expressions, namely, “the consolidation of a New Democratic Order,” “walking 
toward socialism from New Democracy,’ and “protecting private property” in the 
countryside. Mao then attacked the small peasant economy and those who proposed to 
respect it. In essence, Mao refuted the very basic notion of “three big directives.”62 
However, in the summer, Mao focused his attention mainly on state-capitalist 
relations, not on state-peasant relations, a topic he would later pick up in October. 
From June to August, 1953, the national conference on Financial and Economic 
Work was convened in Beijing. Mao proclaimed that the main purpose of the 
conference was to discuss the general line and to redirect the thinking of the party 
leaders from building a New Democratic Economy to making an immediate transition 
to socialism. In addition to citing Lenin and Stalin, Mao enlisted Gao Gang to help 
him attack the leaders who disagreed with him, mainly Liu Shaoqi and Bo Yibo, who 
had a history of conflict with Gao Gang. It seemed that although the majority of the 
party leaders were not wholeheartedly convinced by the general line, after two months 
of persuasion and coercion, they acquiesced. In fall 1953, Mao won acceptance of the 
general line from important party leaders.63 
Then Mao moved forwards to “consult” with leading non-communist national 
figures and business leaders about his general line. In a meeting of Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference (hereafter as CPPCC) in September 1953, Mao 
released his general plan to CPPCC members. Liang Shuming, a well-known 
                                                        
61 Li Hua-yu, Mao and the Economic Stalinization of China, 134. 
62 Li Hua-yu, Mao and the Economic Stalinization of China, 132-139. 
63 Li Hua-yu, Mao and the Economic Stalinization of China. 
 192
Confucian scholar who had conducted extensive social experimentation in rural China 
prior to 1949, stood up and questioned Mao’s general line and the first five year plan. 
Liang made two sharp critiques of the party’s rural policies: he believed that peasants 
were living in hell while the workers were living in heaven, and he said the party had 
forgotten the peasants.64 Based on peasants’ complaints, as described earlier, Liang 
Shuming’s remarks were accurate. Humiliated, Mao immediately launched a brutal 
counterattack. Mao’s angry action was partly because he hoped to suppress dissent by 
creating an intolerant atmosphere,65 partly because of the fact that Liang dared to 
confront him publicly, and probably also because deeply in Mao’s heart, he knew 
Liang was correct. Ironically, when Liang blamed Mao and the party for having 
forgotten the peasants, Mao was blaming peasants for having forgotten the party too.66 
Sadly, Liang’s eloquent defense of peasants only triggered Mao to act quickly and 
boldly. Two years earlier, in fall 1951, Mao Zedong accommodated Zhao Shuli’s 
objections to the Draft; however, in September 1953, convinced by what he had been 
shown and had incorporated into his own vision, Mao Zedong was no longer open to 
the ideas of “the discontented.” 
Soviet comrades further convinced Mao. On September 7, 1953, Khrushchev 
drafted a report on the measures to improve Soviet agriculture. In approving the 
report, the CPSU recognized both the positive and negative features of collectivization 
and decided to maintain the system and further improve it. Mao must have felt 
encouraged by Soviet decision to maintain the collective system that Stalin set up 
decades earlier.67 
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In October the third National Mutual Aid and Cooperation Conference was 
convened. To orient this conference, Mao held a conversation with Chen Boda and 
Liao Luyan, vice ministers of Rural Work Department. With full faith in the high 
productivity of agricultural producers’ cooperatives, Mao said, “the room for 
individual farmers to increase productivity is very limited. (We) must rely on mutual 
aid teams and cooperatives.” In the face of a grain procurement crisis, Mao attributed 
the shortage of grain supply to the contradiction of private ownership and production 
forces and insisted that “the private ownership must be converted to collective 
ownership in the transition to socialism.” Agricultural producers’ cooperatives must be 
built, the more, the better.68 Mao’s evaluation of the rectification of spring 1953 was 
rather low. To him, it certainly had hampered the progress of mutual aid and 
cooperation movement. Mao condemned Rural Work Department for not talking about 
socialism and for overvaluing the small peasant economy. Pressed by the urgent need 
to increase agricultural productivity, Mao was obsessed with the virtues of large-scale 
cultivation. The two main excesses that the rectification movement had targeted were: 
building too many agricultural producers’ cooperatives and blindly stressing that larger 
is better. Mao neglected both. Between mutual aid teams and agricultural producers’ 
cooperatives, Mao apparently favored the latter. He said, “The general rule is from 
mutual aid teams to cooperatives, but directly jumping to building a cooperative 
should be allowed.” “Developing agricultural producers’ cooperatives is not only 
necessary, but also possible, the potentiality is prodigious.” If conditions permitted, he 
even suggested building collective farms. Mao also valued the virtue of larger size and 
believed that building larger cooperatives were indeed practicing socialism. He 
encouraged that whenever possible larger size cooperatives should be built. In his 
mind, multiple problems in the countryside would be remedied automatically in large 
                                                        
68 Gao Huamin, “Guanyu hezuohua yundong bufa jiakuai yuanyin de lishi kaocha.” 
 194
cooperatives. “Mutual aid teams cannot prohibit peasants from selling their land. Only 
cooperatives, large-size cooperative can do it.” Mao estimated that a large 
cooperatives of hundreds of households could help take care of impoverished families, 
so “all problems will be solved.”69 
Liao Luyan faithfully conveyed Mao’s orientation to the attendees. Aware of 
Mao’s intention, attendees unanimously agreed that the rectification in the spring was 
of some value, but it had been too prudent. After the rectification, to “let peasants take 
their course” was viewed as a main deviation that should be now curbed. The political 
atmosphere was once again altered. Bo Yibo, for example, changed his positions. 
Reviewing the history of agricultural producers’ cooperatives in north China, Bo Yibo 
concluded that except for a very few cooperatives, agricultural producers’ cooperatives 
had produced more than individual farmers and mutual aid teams. The excesses had 
been exaggerated in the rectification movement causing good cooperatives to suffer 
unnecessarily. Of all cooperatives under rectification, only 20 percent truly needed to 
be “corrected,” the remaining 80 percent were good. Bo said, “There was some rash 
tendency in accumulating the public assets in cooperatives. But now situations have 
changed.” “The overall tendency now is to collectivize livestock and farming 
implements, which will bring about more and more accumulation.” Bo commented 
that on the issue of developing agricultural producers’ cooperatives, cadres he had 
contacted were not brave enough. They should be braver. To substantially encourage 
building new cooperatives, Bo promised to grant each agricultural producers’ 
cooperative that consisted of over 30 households state loans ranging from 10 million 
yuan to 15 million yuan. This loan was to be repaid in eight years, a much longer 
duration than for other loans. All in all, “the investment is necessary,” “10 to 15 
million yuan for each cooperative of 30 households is appropriate.” Then Bo 
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advocated doubling the number of agricultural producers’ cooperatives in north China 
in 1954.70 What a contrast to the tone and actions of the North China Bureau only 
months earlier! After the conference, a goal of building 32,500 agricultural producers’ 
cooperatives by fall 1954 was set. 
As mentioned earlier, most central officials accepted Mao’s grand vision 
reluctantly. It seemed that they lacked the enthusiasm to carry it out. What Mao 
Zedong needed was a platform to formally announce his plan and have the plan 
implemented with the full range of resources and administrative actions. The grain 
procurement crisis provided him a timely opportunity to unfold his plan. 
The nationalization of the grain market 
In the fall of 1953, a severe grain procurement crisis occurred. Marketable grain 
plunged. In every region of China, state-owned grain stores sold much more grain than 
they purchased. For example, in Henan, in October the traditional grain procurement 
season, the state sold nine times more grain than purchased. By then, the state’s total 
grain reserve had dropped by one third due to the spring grain crisis. Worst of all, 
much less grain was sold by peasants. Publicly, the state blamed private traders for 
speculation. Internally, the state blamed peasants for hoarding their grain and 
consuming too much. The solution was to press peasants to sell “surplus” grain. To 
remedy the situation, the policy of nationalization of grain market [tonggou tongxiao] 
was put on the table. 
Three popular explanations have been given to explain the decision to nationalize 
the grain market. One explanation is that this policy was originally a temporary 
solution to the grain procurement crisis, but it was later kept for decades. The second 
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explanation is that it was part of Mao Zedong’s general line. The third explanation is 
that it was created as part of the agricultural cooperativization movement. Recently 
published documents shed light on a fourth explanation: it had been long planned by 
the Financial and Economic Committee, but had been opposed by certain regional 
leaders. The grain procurement crisis provided the Financial and Economic Committee 
a golden chance to put this plan into practice. 
Before 1949 China had been importing grain for years. After 1949, the grain 
import was cut off and the new state even planned to export some grains. So from the 
very beginning of the founding of the PRC, extracting grain from peasants was a 
challenge, despite of the CCP’s long history of mobilizing peasants. This problem was 
directly shouldered by the Financial and Economic Committee which took charge of 
the state’s financial budget. As early as 1951, Chen Yun, the head of the Financial and 
Economic Committee, raised the proposal of implementing forced purchase of surplus 
grain (Zhenggou). The Soviet Union’s forced requisitioning of grain had a cruel 
reputation and this terminology had long been avoided by the CCP. However, in short 
term, it was one of the most efficient methods for states to extract grain, a fact the CCP 
was acutely aware of. Chen Yun could also draw on China’s experience on the 
Japanese’s grain extraction system in Manchuria during the anti-Japanese war 
(1937-45) and the Nationalist government’s rationing system in Chongqing in 
wartime. Chen Yun’s proposal vividly reminded his comrades of the three notorious 
models listed above – the Soviet, Japanese and Chinese Nationalist models - so Chen 
Yun had to differentiate his from them and give his plan a different name. In early 
1952, Chen Yun and his fellows in the Financial and Economic Committee submitted a 
proposal to the Central Committee  stating that the grain supply would be deficient 
for a long period to come. The urban population and the state reserve would have 
increasing need, so it recommended to employ the method of forced purchase of 
 197
surplus grain.71 This proposal was opposed by certain regional leaders and was not 
adopted.72 In September 1952, at the national grain conference, the possibility of 
forced purchase of surplus grain was again discussed. In October, the report on “the 
first national grain conference” suggested trying it. This suggestion was not taken 
because it was too late to start in 1952. In the spring grain crisis of 1953, the policy of 
forced purchase of surplus grain was brought up again. Fearing the possible chaos it 
might bring to peasants, the Central Committee did not approve it.73 But in certain 
regions, for example in Sichuan, it was introduced on a trial basis later in 1953.74 
Overall, the Financial and Economic Committee was the main advocator for the policy 
of nationalization of grain market. As Chen Yun said, if the free market continued, the 
central government had to beg for grain every day, so every day was painful. He 
considered nationalization of the grain market a long-term solution.75 The severe gr
procurement crisis provided Chen Yun the best time to promote this plan. Howev
Chen Yun never mentioned anything related to the cooperativization plan or the 
general line prior to October 1953. 
ain 
er, 
                                                       
Comparing Chen Yun’s plan with “three big directives” which stressed the need to 
incorporate the small peasant economy into the central-planned economy with great 
prudence, the contrast is striking. More often than not, cadres, even in the central 
level, only cared about their own sectors with much less concern given to others, and 
least of all to the people’s everyday living. 
In early October, the emergency meeting on grain crisis was convened in Beijing 
to discuss the operation of a nationalized grain market. For the first week, the whole 
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discussion had nothing to do with the general line or the cooperativization plan. Aware 
that the party would take away all the peasants’ surplus grain from the current year 
plus their savings of the past,76 the CCP leaders foresaw that peasants would resist the 
policy. There would be bloodshed. It was very clear to them that this was a political 
movement. However, to the party’s dismay, the objections first came from within the 
party. On the provincial level, there were already complaints even before the final 
decision was made. Li Xiannian, the head of South China Bureau, briefly mentioned 
that Guangdong and Guangxi province both resisted the policy, Henan province was 
wavering, and Jiangxi vaguely opposed. Only Hunan and Hubei provincial leaders 
supported the policy.77 But even in Hubei, when the provincial CCP congress was 
convened to discuss this policy, most representatives resisted it. A common reaction 
was “this is indeed the CCP’s attack on peasants.” Many were unwilling to carry out 
this policy. At county and district level, discontentment was stronger and deeper. 
This was a serious issue. Those old cadres opposing the new policy were regarded 
the backbone of the party. Li Jingquan, who took charge of the trial of the policy of 
nationalization of grain market in Sichuan and who was known for his loyalty to Mao 
Zedong, suggested combining the nationalization of the grain market with the 
propaganda for the general line, to persuade those old cadres. Shifting attention to the 
bright future, it would be easier for cadres to overcome the present difficulties, Li 
Jinquan reasoned. Mao agreed and suggested that in propaganda, the nationalization of 
grain market must be combined with the general line. By clarifying the general line, it 
was possible that the whole party would embrace this policy and implement it. In 
propaganda, peasants should be told about socialism, about industrialization, and the 
Soviet future. Chen Yun, after discussing with Mao, confirmed that the nationalization 
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of the grain market should be one part of the general line.78 So in November, the 
propaganda for nationalization of the grain market was placed in the context of 
studying the general line. Now, to express the discontent with the nationalization of 
grain market had a much higher stake: “Are you questioning Chairman’s line?” 
Starting from November, 1953, studying the general line was intensively enforced 
at each level. In the countryside, two major points of this campaign were, first, to urge 
peasants to sell more grain to the state, and second, to draw the line between 
capitalism and socialism leaving cooperativization as the only correct path to follow. 
Peasants’ spontaneous tendencies were to be curbed and further eliminated. To 
reinforce this movement, the CCP frequently educated rural branches. Under pressure 
from Mao’s words and intensified political atmosphere expressed in the general line, 
the effort of rectification movement in spring 1953 evaporated. The nationalization of 
the grain market paved way for cooperativization. Fearing of being stripped of all 
grain, in 1954 middle peasants poured into agricultural producers’ cooperatives. In 
years to come, what had happened in Shanxi in the late 1952 and early 1953 would be 
repeated in other regions, which is another story beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
 
 
78 Dangdai zhongguo liangshi gongzuo shiliao. 
Conclusion 
The key question for this dissertation, as noted in the introduction is: why did the 
CCP ultimately choose Stalin’s model, which had taken Soviet peasants into decades 
of hunger and suffering? The beginning points of the state-peasant relations in the 
Bolshevik Russia and the People’s Republic of China seem different. In the eyes of 
Soviet Bolsheviks, the peasantry as a class became extinct. Lynne Viola has 
considered the state-peasant relations from the Russian Revolution of 1917 a 
continuing battle between two cultures.1 She probably overestimates the conflicts 
from her own angle of cultural studies, but it was for certain that the state-peasant 
relations in the Soviet Union were not smooth. In the 1920s, the Soviet party could not 
penetrate the countryside; it was the mir, not the selsovet (the rural Soviet), that 
controlled the villages. Peasants’ apathy, if not antipathy, towards the state and the 
party, has been well acknowledged, both by scholars in retrospect and the 
contemporary party leaders at the time. 
The Chinese Communist Party, by contrast, has been widely considered a party 
that formed close relations with peasants. CCP leaders, in 1949, were quite confident 
about Chinese peasants, who in Mao Zedong’s view, had better political consciousness 
than proletarians in the US.2 Keeping in mind the Soviet collectivization as the 
ultimate goal for China’s countryside in the future, Chinese leaders were keenly aware 
of tremendous disturbances the soviet collectivization had caused in the Soviet Union, 
and they made it clear that China would not launch a similar movement for years to 
come, as chapter 1 shows. As a matter of fact, at all times Chinese were cautious not to 
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use the word “collectivization”. However, in spite of Chinese leaders’ wariness, China 
soon ended up with collectivization, although in China, the official name was 
cooperativization. This movement started in 1953, was completed in 1956, reached its 
apex in 1958 in the so called commune movement, and was followed by a huge 
famine, as in the Soviet Union. So in the 1950s, state-peasant relations in China very 
quickly came to resemble state-peasant relations as they had been in the Soviet Union 
in the 1920s. If Chinese leaders had wanted to avoid this outcome, how could it have 
happened? 
Like the Soviet Union in the middle 1920s, the CCP defined the early 1950s as a 
stage of “economic rehabilitation.” Russia in the 1910s and China in the 1950s each 
emerged from a civil war, and both then briefly adopted moderate agricultural policies. 
In Russia, it was New Economic Policy (NEP), in China, it was the New Democratic 
policy, a strategy similar in nature to Lenin’s NEP. Both strategies were intent on 
fostering a mixed economy and a market socialism. Both acknowledged the dominant 
role of individual farming. Both promised to protect rich peasants. In terms of the 
state’s control of the rural sector, Lenin recommended cooperatives as a solution, 
which was further elaborated by Bukharin in the middle 1920s, to serve as the state’s 
channel to control the individual peasant economy. In China, Liu Shaoqi and Zhang 
Wentian proposed building cooperatives, a form rooted in Bukharin’s idea of SMC, to 
connect the state with peasants. Following these suggestions, numerous commercial 
cooperatives were built in both countries. And, in both countries, they failed to serve 
as a channel between the state and individual peasants. They functioned as regular 
retail shops, at best serving the interests of the better-off peasants. Moreover, 
mismanagement and corruption were quite common. 
After years of moderate policies in both countries, quite a few new phenomena 
occurred that were not necessarily to the party’s liking. In both countries, compared 
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with wartime, peasants slightly improved their living standard. The majority of 
peasants desired to be left alone, to prosper as farmers and to dispose of their produce 
as they saw fit.3 But the rural productivity remained low, many peasants lived at 
subsistence levels, rarely improving their life. New technology was not utilized by 
peasants. In both countries, peasants’ earnings from off-farm work and crafts were 
sharply reduced.4 Peasants’ main complaint against the state, in both countries, was to 
do with taxation, which roughly 14-20 per cent of peasants’ income.5 The next 
common cause of dissatisfaction was the contrast between peasants’ hard life and the 
better and easier life of urban workers. Peasant gradually began to adopt capitalist 
practices and become stratified.  
One significant new phenomenon, in both countries, was the drop in the amount 
of marketable grain supply. As Moshe Lewin points out, in the Soviet Union the 
amount peasants marketed fell from 26 percent in prewar to 13.3 percent in1928.6 The 
same happened in China. From archives I found in Shanxi province the amount of 
marketable grain dropped by nearly 50 percent in 1950. As the state sector was 
steadily developing in the direction of centralization and planning, it was coming into 
conflict with household decision-making in the peasant economy.7 Under the shadow 
of war - the Korean War for China and the war scare in 1927 for the Soviet Union - 
industrialization became imperative, and heavy industry took the priority. The states 
put a five-year plan on their agendas in the Soviet Union in the middle 1920s and in 
China in 1952. It was getting clearer that in the long run, agriculture could not bear the 
cost of the accumulation for industrialization. In short, Russian and Chinese leaders 
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began to feel that the existing structures must be changed. 
Then the severe grain procurement crises triggered changes. In the Soviet Union, 
the grain crisis of 1927-28 directly caused leaders to adopt new measures of grain 
procurement. In 1929, a contract system was introduced that obligated all villages to 
deliver specified quotas of grain to the state. Together with the need to build the 
capital reserves for the first five year plan, in 1929, the decision of collectivization 
was announced. In China, the grain crisis of 1953 directly led to nationalization of the 
grain market in October 1953. Before it, Mao Zedong’s general line was announced, 
and right after it, Mao proposed a new plan of launching a national cooperativization 
movement. After the new plans were announced, reality outpaced planning, 
collectivization or cooperativization, and soon went far beyond the initial central plans. 
The goals were achieved much faster than Stalin and Mao had originally anticipated, 
of course with more intense use of force than planned too.8 
The parallels are striking. All in all, the most prominent resemblance is that, 
ironically, in both cases, two new regimes did not plan for the collectivization at its 
beginning, yet both ended up with the same. The path appeared similar, and the 
outcome was almost the same, however, the processes were not so identical. For 
example, in the case of China, unlike the Soviet Union, the accumulation for 
industrialization was not the primary motivation for starting cooperativization. 
Another significant difference is that in China, unlike the Soviet Union, 
cooperativization was not purely imposed from the center, it was initiated by cadres at 
intermediate levels and had support from groups at lower levels, as chapters 2-5 have 
shown. 
In the Soviet Union, accumulation for industrialization was the main concern of 
the state in the middle 1920s, when left wing, right wing, and neutral groups all were 
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thinking about this issue and brought forth different solutions, yet all agreed that 
accumulation had to come from agricultural production. The left began to hope that 
collectivization might prove practicable in terms of primitive accumulation. In the late 
1920s, statistics convinced Stalin that collective farms were able to provide much 
higher rates of market crops than individual farms.9 In the face of the grain 
procurement crisis of 1928, Stalin personally imposed the policy of collectivization 
from above. The fundamental reasoning underlying his insistence on collectivization 
was his faith that collective farms and state farms were able to turn in much higher 
portion of agricultural products to the state than individual farmers. In other words, he 
launched collectivization to achieve primitive accumulation. 
By contrast, in China, accumulation for industrialization was not a major cause for 
the cooperativization at all. In 1949, agriculture was the focus of the state’s economic 
plan, next was light industry, and last was heavy industry in the order of priorities. The 
Korean War altered the whole blueprint. In 1952 Mao Zedong insisted that priority 
should be given to heavy industry, and industrialization was put on the national agenda. 
However, when it came to primitive accumulation, peasants were not the primary 
source. For example, Gao Gang proposed that the accumulation should mainly come 
from industry itself, by increasing productivity and saving more; next it should come 
from city taxes. Only the third source was agricultural taxes. My reading is that Gao 
Gang aimed to squeeze urban capitalists for primitive accumulation. He explicitly 
warned not to increase agricultural taxes and tried to lower the “scissor price” to 
protect peasants. In his opinion, peasants should not be asked to make sacrifices for 
the sake of industrialization. If one class was to be sacrificed, it was national 
capitalists.10 As a leading politician who supported radical transitions to socialism and 
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one of the earliest leaders pushing for the cooperativization movement, Gao Gang did 
not regard cooperativization as an effective way of achieving primitive accumulation.  
Similarly, in regions where agricultural producers’ cooperatives were established, 
no one cited the value of marketable crops as a rationale for founding them. For 
example, in Shanxi, no investigation was conducted to demonstrate the high rate of 
marketable crops, and no statistics were presented. Quite the contrary, peasants were 
promised lower agricultural taxes if they joined agricultural producers’ cooperatives. 
In the Soviet Union and in China, the grain procurement crisis functioned as the 
catalyst. But in China, the grain procurement crisis did not lead directly to 
cooperativization, rather it created a circumstance favoring radical solutions that 
ultimately led to cooperativization. In the Soviet Union, collectivization was imposed 
from above purely for the sake of extracting grain, yet in China, as this dissertation has 
demonstrated, it had strong support from cadres at intermediate levels and even lower 
ranks. 
At the top, the role played by Mao Zedong is worth some discussion. Certainly, 
his undisguised interest in mutual aid teams and his deep faith in Soviet 
collectivization provided Gao Gang and Lai Ruoyu with whatever political incentives 
they needed to advocate their radical policies. But Mao himself was rather passive in 
the early stage of the mutual aid and cooperation movement. There is no evidence at 
present that Mao himself hinted to Gao Gang or Lai Ruoyu that they should push 
mutual aid teams, and he did not clarify his own position until he was presented with 
what appeared to be well-documented reports showing the effectiveness and 
popularity of cooperatives. Mao Zedong was convinced that cooperatives had two 
virtues: high unit yields and the claim that a good cooperative could solve all the 
problems in the countryside. It is fair to say that it was the Shanxi leaders’ actions 
from relatively low levels in the administrative hierarchy who provided Mao with the 
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inspiration, evidence, confidence, and even theories that convinced the Chairman to 
support a nationwide coop movement– not Mao taking the initiative from the top 
down. 
It is still not fully clear what drove Lai Ruoyu to so persistently advocate the 
building of agricultural cooperatives and to so boldly challenge Liu Shaoqi, the second 
most powerful figure in the CCP. Currently his former colleagues, including Tao Lujia 
and Wang Qian, all highlight Lai’s deep faith in Soviet-style collectivization. Another 
explanation is that Lai was keenly aware of Mao’s long-term preference for mutual aid 
teams and his lack of enthusiasm for New Democracy policies, so Lai chose to 
challenge Liu Shaoqi to win Mao’s favor. This view has its merits. In retrospect Lai 
Ruoyu seems to have taken a well calculated risk. Ultimately his proposal was fully 
endorsed by Mao and applied to the whole country.  
From the perspective of cooperativization’s relationship with industrialization, 
this case is of particular significance considering its location and the issue it dealt with. 
Shanxi had been within the center areas for the CCP when it was based at Yan’an in 
the revolutionary era before 1949. But as the CCP conquered the whole nation, the 
political center moved eastward from Yan’an to Beijing, and Shanxi was losing its 
charm. How did the provincial leaders deal with such a change? The case described 
here is about peasant issues, which had been a key component of the politics. But in 
1949, the CCP predominantly turned to urban issues, paying much less attention to the 
rural. For a prefecture like Changzhi, mainly a rural area, with no modern industry, no 
big cities, how could officials there attract attention from above and get promoted? In 
Shanxi’s case, did Changzhi cadres launch agricultural cooperativization to counteract 
the potential effects of industrialization? This question has not been answered directly. 
Nevertheless, there are hints that these questions were in contemporaries’ minds and 
might even be the dominant factors in making decisions, yet they have escaped notice 
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in scholarship. Now with more access to local archives and some internal-circulation 
reports, a chance arises to explore Chinese history from individual perspectives and 
group interests. 
The 1951 episode had a direct impact on the political careers of Shanxi leaders. 
Ironically, Lai Ruoyu himself did not benefit much politically from this victory. In 
1952 he was appointed secretary of the National Labor Union, a position that carried 
with little power or influence. Lai Ruoyu was purged in 1958 and died the same year. 
Cheng Zihua, who had opposed Lai Ruoyu on the issue of mutual aid teams, was 
transferred out of Shanxi province to an inconsequential post. This change was 
intentionally executed to facilitate the launching of the coop movement in Shanxi.11 
Other Shanxi cadres who were supportive of Lai Ruoyu were rewarded. Wang Qian, 
for example, had provided Lai Ruoyu with theoretical support and statistical backup at 
several critical moments and had been especially good at theorizing Shanxi’s plans in 
terms of Mao’s most authoritative writings. Wang Qian became well known and 
continued to build his reputation as a specialist on coops. He was soon promoted to the 
office of chief of the Policy Research Center of the North China Bureau and 
subsequently appointed vice minister of Rural Work Department of the North China 
Bureau. Between 1954 and 1956 he assumed the post of vice secretary of the central 
Rural Work Department. In 1956 he was appointed vice secretary of the CCP Shanxi 
provincial branch. Given the fact that both Lai Ruoyu and Wang Qian had deliberately 
twisted the facts in their favor, it is safe to conclude that political ambitions for 
moving up to higher positions must have played a role in their decision to promote 
cooperativization. 
This dissertation also shows how reports were modified and twisted to meet the 
specific purposes of certain groups. Rural reality was complex and varied, but the 
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images presented to higher-level CCP leaders were one-dimensional and simplified. It 
was not rare that local cadres misled provincial cadres, provincial officials misled 
regional and central leaders. The central leaders, who were misled, ultimately made 
rash decisions. It is rather astonishing to consider how a policy that would transform 
millions of people’s lives was grounded on intentionally fabricated reports. Moreover, 
when the central leaders tried to rectify the situation, the efforts were often 
circumvented by local cadres, as chapter 5 demonstrates. Breakdowns in 
communication at all levels were also a factor causing China to follow the Soviet 
Union down the same unfortunate path to collectivization. 
This does not mean we should demonize all CCP cadres. The practical difficulties 
they encountered created day in and day out pressures. Constrained by ideological 
strictures and their limited experiences, they turned to the Soviet model as an easy way 
out, a way that would not entail any ideological risks.  
While this dissertation underscores the CCP’s subjective role in interpreting and 
applying Soviet models, we must keep in mind that the Soviet influences reached 
beyond the policy and strategy level. Certain Soviet norms were deeply ingrained in 
the CCP’s conceptions of China’s socialist future. One crucial question this 
dissertation should have addressed is the question “what is socialism.” This 
dissertation frequently refers to the party’s debates and resolution on how to make the 
transition to socialism, yet it does not explain what socialism is. Indeed seeking the 
answer for this question had been the central quest of the CCP leadership since 1949. 
And up to the 1990s, the CCP continued to puzzle over the nature of a socialist society 
and tried to reinterpret this term. Not knowing the ultimate answer, Mao Zedong and 
his fellows had a vague, even instinctive, perception that “socialism is the antidote to 
capitalism.” This perception in crucial respects resembled that the Soviet Union. As 
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Kotkin puts it, “one achieved socialism by eradicating capitalism.”12 It bespoke a 
certain commitment to social justice: no one should be left starving, people should 
receive education, every sick person should receive medical treatment, every one 
should be provided a job. The most distinguishing characteristic of socialism was the 
elimination of private property and exploitation.13 When the CCP could not achieve 
social welfare, the least it could do was to eliminate capitalism and abolish the private 
ownership of the means of production. The failures of achieving a welfare society 
generated the guilt which drove the CCP constantly to attack capitalism whenever the 
social-economic conditions were not at the edge of collapse.  
Is it possible at all to measure the Soviet impact on China precisely? On the one 
hand, it is hardly to exaggerate the deep Soviet influence over China with respect to 
norms and perceptions, such as what is socialism,14 such as the faith that the means of 
production with the development of “the productive forces” would automatically yield 
a communist future as the solution for all problems.15 Moreover, both states adopted 
Leninist systems of government under communist parties, and both operated through 
multi-layered bureaucratic hierarchies. The similarity between state-peasant relations 
in the Soviet Union and China can be explained by analyzing decision making at all 
levels of these bureaucratic hierarchies. On the other hand, when it comes to specific 
policies and actions, the Soviet input should be treated with extreme caution, given 
contemporary Chinese, especially Mao Zedong’s sensibility about sovereignty, 
China’s fluctuating relationships with the Soviet Union, the complex Chinese domestic 
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politics and then ultimately the dichotomy between the CCP’s prescription and actual 
implementation. One more factor that further contributes to the complexity of Soviet 
impact on China is that at times there was more than one Soviet model available; even 
a single model appeared in more than one version; even one version was given 
different interpretations. Which model to choose and how to apply it was always an 
issue settled within China. 
MAP 
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Source: Jonathan Spence, The Search for Modern China 2nd (New York: W.W. Norton  
Company, 1999), 498 
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APPENDIX   
From mutual aid teams, to cooperatives, to collective farms 
 
Chinese peasants had a tradition of informal mutual aid. There were different 
types of mutual aid, most of which were temporary and seasonal. The fundamental 
principle was reciprocity. The foundation was usually friendship or kinship. The scale 
was small, usually involving a few families, and the operation was completely 
voluntary and functioned within the framework of the private economy. This tradition 
did not involve collective ownership or collective labor, just neighbors and relatives 
helping each other from time to time. 
To overcome labor and livestock shortages, to reorganize peasants to meet the 
needs of war, and to better monitor and control agricultural production, in the early 
1940s the CCP promoted mutual aid teams among peasants. They were totally based 
on private ownership, and agricultural output belonged entirely to the owner. But the 
party placed considerable emphasis on the advantages of group work and showed 
concern for helping the needy. The scale was small, usually consisting of five or more 
families. In 1943, learning from Soviet collectivization theory, Mao asserted that 
mutual aid teams were the sprouts of socialism and embodied the progressive nature of 
socialism. Mao’s assertion was widely circulated among party members, yet the 
positive effects of mutual aid teams in improving production had hardly been tested in 
reality.  
Agricultural producers’ cooperatives were considered as the next step on the 
road to socialism. Initially, entry and exit were voluntary. Cooperatives combined a 
socialist component and a capitalist component. Individual farmers still owned the 
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land and livestock, but the land and livestock were pooled in the cooperative as an 
investment. Members of the cooperative worked on the land collectively. Profits were 
distributed proportionally, partly according to individual labor input and partly 
according to individual land investment. Remuneration according to labor was 
considered the socialist component, thus the higher the percentage of profits 
distributed according to labor the more socialist and “progressive” the cooperative. 
The scale was moderate, usually consisting of a dozen or so families. Meanwhile, to 
ensure a proper “socialist” direction, setting aside communal funds and investing in 
communally owned goods and equipment was required of most cooperatives. This 
practice initiated a transition in the direction of full collective ownership.  
The last stage was the Soviet-style collective farm, although in China it was 
called a higher level agricultural producers’ cooperative. In this form, land and 
livestock were owned collectively by the cooperative. The scale was quite large, 
usually consisting of an entire natural village of hundreds of households. Peasants 
were required to work collectively and farm strictly according to the rules of the 
collective. Remuneration was entirely according to labor input. Entry was required. 
Exit with one’s former land and animals were not allowed. 
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